Why Not Start Younger? Implications of the Timing and Duration of Schooling for Fertility, Human Capital, Productivity, and Public Pensions by Skirbekk, V.
Why Not Start Younger? 
Implications of the Timing and 
Duration of Schooling for 
Fertility, Human Capital, 
Productivity, and Public 
Pensions
Skirbekk, V.
 
IIASA Research Report
November 2005
Skirbekk, V. (2005) Why Not Start Younger? Implications of the Timing and Duration of Schooling for Fertility, 
Human Capital, Productivity, and Public Pensions. IIASA Research Report. Copyright © November 2005 by the 
author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/7599/ All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or 
part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or 
distributed for profit or commercial advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first 
page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by 
contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
Why Not Start Younger?
Implications of the Timing and Duration of
Schooling for Fertility, Human Capital,
Productivity, and Public Pensions
Vegard Skirbekk
RR-05-002
November 2005
I I A S A
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
is an interdisciplinary, nongovernmental research institution founded in 1972 by leading
scientific organizations in 12 countries. Situated near Vienna, in the center of Europe,
IIASA has been producing valuable scientific research on economic, technological, and
environmental issues for over three decades.
IIASA was one of the first international institutes to systematically study global issues of
environment, technology, and development. IIASA’s Governing Council states that the In-
stitute’s goal is: to conduct international and interdisciplinary scientific studies to provide
timely and relevant information and options, addressing critical issues of global environ-
mental, economic, and social change, for the benefit of the public, the scientific community,
and national and international institutions. Research is organized around three central
themes:
– Energy and Technology
– Environment and Natural Resources
– Population and Society
The Institute now has National Member Organizations in the following countries:
Austria
The Austrian Academy of Sciences
China
National Natural Science
Foundation of China
Czech Republic
The Academy of Sciences of the
Czech Republic
Egypt
Academy of Scientific Research and
Technology (ASRT)
Estonia
Estonian Association for
Systems Analysis
Finland
The Finnish Committee for IIASA
Germany
The Association for the Advancement
of IIASA
Hungary
The Hungarian Committee for Applied
Systems Analysis
Japan
The Japan Committee for IIASA
Netherlands
The Netherlands Organization for
Scientific Research (NWO)
Norway
The Research Council of Norway
Poland
The Polish Academy of Sciences
Russian Federation
The Russian Academy of Sciences
Sweden
The Swedish Research Council for
Environment, Agricultural Sciences
and Spatial Planning (FORMAS)
Ukraine
The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences
United States of America
The National Academy of
Sciences
Why Not Start Younger?
Implications of the Timing and Duration of
Schooling for Fertility, Human Capital,
Productivity, and Public Pensions
Vegard Skirbekk
RR-05-002
November 2005
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Laxenburg, Austria
International Standard Book Number 3-7045-0145-X
Research Reports, which record research conducted at IIASA, are independently reviewed before
publication. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of IIASA, its
National Member Organizations, or other organizations supporting the work.
Copyright c  2005
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by
any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright holder.
Cover design by Anka James.
Printed by Remaprint, Vienna.
Contents
Foreword v
Abstract vi
Acknowledgments vii
About the Author ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Strengthening Public Pension Systems through Education Reform 1
1.2 Timing of Events over the Life Cycle: Identifying Causality . . . 4
1.3 Outline of Chapters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 The Effect of the Duration and Timing of Education on Human Capital 12
2.1 The Norwegian School System: Schooling Duration and Age at Entry 13
2.2 Effects of Schooling on Human Capital and Productivity Levels . 19
2.3 Age at School Entry and Wage Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4 Duration of Schooling and Student Performance at the End of
Secondary School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3 Completing Education and the Timing of Births and Marriage: Findings
from a Birth-Month Experiment in Sweden 63
3.1 Graduation Age and the Age at Parenthood . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.2 Empirical Estimates of the Impact of the School-Leaving Age on
Fertility Patterns: The Case of Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4 Age and Individual Productivity 86
4.1 Age and Productivity: A Review of the Literature . . . . . . . . . 86
4.2 Age and Individual Productivity Potential: New Evidence Based
on Ability Levels and Industry-Wide Task Demand . . . . . . . . 99
iii
iv Contents
5 Projections of the Effects of Education Reforms on Norwegian Public
Pensions 112
5.1 MOSART . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.2 Projection Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6 Conclusions 132
Appendix 134
The Dynamic Microsimulation Model, MOSART, and the Norwegian
Public Pension System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
References 165
Foreword
by Professor Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan, Director of the Mannheim Research Institute for
the Economics of Aging, University of Mannheim, Germany
This publication makes a very helpful contribution to three debates: population
aging, pension reform, and education reform. Its novelty is the way it establishes
linkages among the three. The author’s agenda is to show that, if the economic
burden of population aging is to be alleviated, then education reform should be
another important reform step in addition to pension reform.
The author makes three arguments: education can proceed faster without harm-
ing human capital formation; education reform may have important side-effects on
fertility; and—the most controversial of the three—a later retirement age has less
impact than often claimed because—the author argues—of the relatively low pro-
ductivity of the later years of life. Finally, the author puts these arguments together
in a simulation model that quantifies and compares the various mechanisms.
The real meat of the argument lies in two well-written case studies of the
Swedish and the Swiss education systems, which link the duration of education
to several achievement dimensions, such as income, test scores, and marriage. The
author finds no evidence for any sizable negative effect on such achievements, ei-
ther from an earlier school-leaving age (the Swedish case) or from a shorter school-
ing length (the Swiss case). He correctly concludes that a shortened education does
not harm human capital formation. He does, however, find a striking pattern in the
dominant role of the “social age” of the school cohort in influencing the timing of
births and marriages for a long time after the cohort leaves school. The use of the
Norwegian MOSART simulation model to pull all the elements together provides
a natural and satisfying culmination to the arguments.
The publication is well written, making the author’s approach and his line of
thinking easy to follow and convincing. The empirical analysis is professional, and
the chosen experiments and econometric analyses are admirably crafted. I take
great pleasure in congratulating the author on his achievement.
v
Abstract
The relatively long periods of time required to complete the different educational
levels in countries such as Norway lead to relative lateness in the school-leaving
age and in the timing of subsequent events. A late entry to the labor market in-
volves not only social costs, such as adverse effects on public pensions, but also
individual costs in the form of a shortened working life, fewer years to achieve fer-
tility intentions, and a later timing of childbearing that may negatively affect the
health of mother and child.
The individual and social costs associated with a late school-leaving age raise
the question as to whether similar educational standards could be achieved by shift-
ing the timing of education to a younger age. We consider the impact of a reform
that lowers the age of school graduation by two years by compressing the duration
of primary and secondary schooling from 13 to12 years and also by decreasing the
age of school entry from 6 to 5 years.
By lowering the school-leaving age, the reform would also lower the age of
entry to the labor market. However, according to our estimates of the effects on
student performance of marginal variations in the timing and duration of school-
ing, the human capital effects are likely to be either nonexistent or very small. To
analyze the effects of the reform, we ran projections of the Norwegian public pen-
sion system with a large-scale microbased dynamic model. We find that the reform
could have an alleviating effect on the sustainability of the public pension system
by reducing the aging-induced growth in the contribution rate by one-tenth in the
period from 2000–2100 and by one-fifth if fertility were to increase as a result of
the reform.
Policies that aim to lower the school-leaving age while maintaining educational
quality could play a role in expanding and rejuvenating the labor force and may rep-
resent an important contribution to the sustainability of the public pension system
in aging economies such as that of Norway.
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1
Introduction
1.1 Strengthening Public Pension Systems through
Education Reform
Rapidly growing dependency ratios in the coming years will challenge the sustain-
ability of public pension systems in most industrialized countries.1 This is a partic-
ular problem for European countries with relatively generous pension systems and
the prospect of a large increase in the size of their elderly populations (Gruber and
Wise, 2001; United Nations, 2005). Unless pension benefits decrease, the growing
number of people receiving a pension will mean that more contributions will need
to be paid into the pension system. Other than raising tax levels, one relevant policy
option would be to increase the proportion of contributors.
Extending the length of the working life by raising the retirement age has been
suggested as one way of achieving this (OECD, 2002; Avramov and Maskova,
2003). As well as looking at the impact that this might have, we study another
approach that, like later retirement, could increase the number of years spent in the
labor market: whether shifting the timing of education to apply to a younger age
range and compressing the amount of time spent at school would lower the age of
entry into the labor market and ease the pensions burden.2
Although life expectancy has increased in recent decades, in European
economies the working life has tended to become shorter, with the retirement age
becoming lower and the age of entry into the labor market higher. As illustrated
by the case of Austria (Figure 1.1), the strongest effect of reducing the length of
the productive life span may have been a later entry into the labor market. More-
over, estimates by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
1Public pension systems based on the pay-as-you-go principle, where pensions are financed by
current workers’ contributions, are highly sensitive to changes in the age composition of the popu-
lation. On the other hand, some estimates suggest that the effects on economic growth of a change
in age composition is expected to be relatively moderate, as European annual growth per capita is
projected to decline from 1.7% today to 1.1% by 2050, which would mean a doubling in per capita
GDP (Turner et al., 1998).
2This assumes that a lower school-leaving age would lead over time to younger labor-market
entry. (This is discussed in Section 2.1.)
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Source: Statistics Austria (2003).
(OECD) suggest that in the 1950–1995 period in Norway, the average age of tran-
sition3 to retirement for males dropped from 68 to 64 years and for females from
69 to 62 years (Blo¨ndahl and Scarpetta, 1998). Conversely, the median age for
entering full-time work reached 25 years in Norway by 1996 (OECD, 1999).
Using the case of Norway, we estimate the impact on the public pension sys-
tem of an education reform under which the school-leaving age is lowered by two
years: one year through a lowering of the school-entry age and one year through
a compression in the length of schooling. Although such a reform might lengthen
the productive life span and increase lifetime output, it might also decrease human
capital and productivity levels, which would reduce its beneficial effects. Accord-
ingly, we study the school systems of Sweden and Switzerland, where data avail-
ability and institutional settings allow us to analyze the impact on human capital
formation of modifications in the timing and length of schooling.
We present a study based on birth-month-induced variation in the age at en-
tering and leaving school in Sweden and find that going to school at a marginally
younger age does not substantially affect human capital or productivity levels as
measured by wage levels. We also analyze the impact of a variation in the duration
of schooling based on Swiss regional differences in secondary school duration and
find that, at least for Switzerland, going to school for 12 years instead of 13 years
has no effect on student performance.
An education reform that lowers the school-leaving age could also lower the
timing of childbearing (Corijn, 1996; Skirbekk et al., 2004a; Skirbekk et al.,
2004b), and it may raise cohort fertility (Kohler et al., 2002). Even if it is only
3Retirement is defined as complete withdrawal from work, as recorded in labor-force surveys.
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Figure 1.2. Outline of investigation into the effects of the school reform.
the timing of fertility that is shifted, leaving cohort fertility unaffected, a transition
to a younger childbearing age could increase period fertility and thus rejuvenate
the population’s age structure (Lutz and Skirbekk, 2005). A younger age struc-
ture could further decrease the ratio of pensioners to workers and thus increase the
sustainability of public welfare systems.
A further issue relevant to the age at entering and leaving the labor force is
that individuals may be more productive relatively early in their working careers
(Lazear, 1988; Hægeland and Klette, 1999; Cre´pon et al. 2002). Structural changes
in the labor market caused by high rates of technological change increase the de-
mand for individuals who are able to adjust quickly and absorb new knowledge,
and these changes could favor younger people who tend to learn faster and be more
flexible than older individuals (Avolio and Waldman, 1986; Autor et al., 2003;
Skirbekk 2004). Rejuvenating the labor force by lowering the age at labor-market
entry could allow individuals to participate in the labor force during more of their
most productive years.
In Figure 1.2 we outline the issues that are the main focus of this publication:
the effects of a change in the timing and duration of schooling on fertility, human
capital, and the shape of the age–productivity profile. These findings are used to
calibrate the impact of the reform in a microbased simulation model, MOSART.
Other suggestions for sustaining public pension schemes, such as increased
immigration, are unlikely to provide substantial gains to the public pension system
in European welfare states.4 Nor are fertility policies likely to be very effective in
4Immigration could produce fiscal gains if the immigrants are highly skilled, but current immigra-
tion flows to Western countries tend to be relatively low-skilled (Lee and Miller, 1997; Storesletten,
2000; Bo¨rsch-Supan, 2002). Recent studies conclude that immigration cannot be a solution for ag-
ing societies in Europe and that it may even increase fiscal expenditure through weak labor-market
attachment and high rates of welfare participation (Storesletten, 2003; Ekhaugen, 2005). This could
exacerbate the problem of increasing public expenditure, particularly in countries with strong wel-
fare systems (ECON, 1996; Ekberg and Andersson; 1995). There is also some evidence that sup-
port for public redistribution programs decreases as a society becomes more diverse (Luttmer, 2001;
Smeeding, 2004). Finally, increasing immigration may be difficult to implement politically, as public
4countering population aging. Policies intended to increase fertility, to date at least,
have had only a modest effect on childbearing outcomes.5
1.2 Timing of Events over the Life Cycle: Identifying
Causality
A central challenge for the current study, which considers the impact of an edu-
cation reform, is to estimate the causal effects of a downward shift in the age at
school graduation on the timing of childbearing and on human capital formation.
Studies on the timing of events in adulthood suggest that individuals tend to se-
quence events according to fixed schemes. Billari et al. (2000, p.37) emphasize
that leaving school typically affects the timing of family formation: “Having left
full time education—or at least having left the parental home—seems to be a nec-
essary condition for entering a steady cohabiting partnership. Furthermore, being
in a steady cohabiting partnership seems to be an almost necessary condition for
becoming a parent.”6
Despite the emphasis on the role of education in the postponement of subse-
quent events, very few studies have succeeded in establishing any causal effects of
the “age at school graduation” on fertility patterns and human capital levels. Such
analyses are particularly hampered by the fact that unobserved characteristics asso-
ciated with higher graduation ages are difficult to adjust for. Comparing individu-
als across educational attainment invokes selection problems, as people with more
education also differ in terms of their preferences, abilities, and other variables rel-
evant to the timing and outcome of fertility. Standard analyses of the relationship
opinion favors a decrease (Bauer et al., 2000; Statistics Norway, 2003), even though attitudes toward
highly skilled immigration are generally more positive (Simon and Lynch, 1999).
5OECD (2003b) reviews 42 studies on the effects of fertility policies (family cash benefits, tax
policies, maternity leave, and family-friendly working regulations) and concludes that “most studies
seem to suggest a weak positive relation between reproductive behavior and a variety of policies.”
The studies discussed in the report suggest that, in several cases, fertility policies had no significant
effect, while in the cases where they did work, the effects were modest and fertility seldom increased
by more than 10%–12%. A Rand report surveying fertility policies came up with similar findings
and argued: “It is also worth stressing that the impact that governments have is limited, inasmuch as
it is likely to slow down the fall in fertility rates, as opposed to halting the fall or bringing it back to
replacement level” [cited in Grant et al. (2004, p.132)].
For the EU15 countries, even substantial fertility increases would have only a slight effect on
population aging because of increasing life expectancy. Even in the case of a hypothetical permanent
increase in fertility to 2.2 children for the EU15 countries [an increase of about 50%, given that the
total fertility rate (TFR) was 1.5 in 2000], the old-age dependency ratio in this region would still more
than double in the period 2000–2050 (Lutz and Scherbov, 2003).
6A discussion of the relationship between the school-leaving age and other events in early adult-
hood, such as entering the labor market, is given in Section 2.1.
5between education and fertility that compare individuals with different educational
attainment are likely to be distorted for that very reason.7
Several econometric approaches have been used to overcome the endogeneity
problems associated with analyses of education and fertility behavior (Retherford
and Sewell, 1989; Neiss et al., 2002) or of education and human capital forma-
tion (Raaum and Aabo, 2000; Plug and Vijerberg, 2003). Often, these studies rely
on strong assumptions to identify any “causal influences” of education on fertility
and human capital. To overcome this problem, analyses need to rely on instrumen-
tal variable techniques, fixed-effect models, or “natural experiments” (Rosenzweig
and Wolpin, 2000).
We apply the latter approach—natural experiments—to identify the impact of
a variation in the school graduation age on the timing of fertility. As outlined in
Figure 1.3, the effect of variation in the school graduation age in Sweden is not
correlated with any other influences on fertility and education because the enroll-
ment of children in Swedish schools depends on their date of birth—children born
during the two consecutive months of December and January belong to two differ-
ent school cohorts and therefore graduate in two different calendar years. Hence,
the age of graduation from compulsory schooling of children born in December
and children born in January differs by almost one year, despite the fact that the
children were born more or less one month apart.
On the assumption that parents cannot time the births of their children to the
exact month, this characteristic of the Swedish school system results in exogenous
variation 1) in the age of entry to and completion of compulsory education and
2) in the age of graduation from higher education of those who continue to study
after compulsory schooling.8 This institutional mechanism allows us to identify
the causal effect of the completion of schooling on important demographic behav-
iors during the transition to adulthood, net of unobserved characteristics affecting
schooling decisions and net of variations in human capital that are otherwise asso-
ciated with differences in the age at school graduation.
7This bias can be specified in the simple regression model for the relationship of, for example,
fertility, denoted y
i
, to years of education, denoted x
i
. The regression then specifies that y
i
 

 
 

x
i
 u
i
 e
i
, where 

is the coefficient of interest and u
i
and e
i
represent unobserved
characteristics. Endogeneity problems due, for instance, to unobserved characteristics arise if x
i
is
determined as x
i
  
 


z
i


u
i
v
i
, where z
i
represents observed determinants of education,
such as parental characteristics, and v
i
represents unobserved influences. Even if e
i
is independent
of v
i
, the presence of u
i
in the x
i
equation implies that the education variable x
i
is correlated with
the unobserved term in the regression equation for y
i
. In this case OLS does not provide unbiased or
consistent estimates for the coefficient 

. Instead, the regression yields plim 

  



varu
i

varx
i

,
which differs from the true value 

whenever varu
i
   and 

 .
8Graduating at younger or older ages is difficult because of the rigidity of the school system. The
Swedish school system is explained in Section 2.3.
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Figure 1.3. Institutional variation in the timing and duration of education: Sweden
and Switzerland.
We use the same research approach in our studies on the effects of differences
in the school-leaving age on human capital levels, and we consider variation in
the variables of interest and in the duration and timing of schooling caused by
institutional settings. In the Swedish case, the birth month determines the age at
which a child enters and leaves school, and this allows us to analyze the impact of
the variation in the timing of schooling on wage levels and other outcome variables
related to human capital levels, net of other influences.
Furthermore, we consider the impact of a variation in the duration of school-
ing in the Swiss case, where the length of schooling is institutionally determined.
In Switzerland the duration of (academic-track) secondary school depends on the
canton and varies between 12, 12.5, and 13 years (as Figure 1.4 illustrates). To
investigate whether a marginal variation in the duration of schooling affects hu-
man capital levels, we consider the impact of the length of schooling on student
performance, measured as test-score performance at the end of secondary school.
Our suggested education reform—compressing the length and shifting the tim-
ing of education to apply to a younger age group—will lower the school graduation
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Figure 1.4. Effect of younger graduation age on the timing of subsequent events.
age and could cause a parallel shift in the timing of subsequent events (including
childbearing and age at joining the labor force). This stylized situation is shown in
Figure 1.4, where a younger graduation age shifts the timing of leaving school and
events subsequent to it, while the spacing between these events does not change.
1.3 Outline of Chapters
Following an introduction, Chapter 2 discusses the effects of variation in the timing
and duration of schooling on human capital formation. We show that, by interna-
tional standards, there is scope for a shift in the timing and duration of primary and
secondary schooling in Norway (where there is currently a school-entry age of 6
years and a school duration of 13 years, which leads to a relatively high school-
leaving age). Under an education reform of the type suggested above, the Norwe-
gian school system would adopt a length and timing framework that is found, for
example, in the Scottish school system, which allows entry at 5 years and has a
length of 12 years. We also discuss the importance of schooling relative to other
factors in the human capital production function and show that a marginal variation
in the length and timing of schooling is unlikely to play an important role in the
formation of human capital. The intermediate schooling years matter relatively lit-
tle for student performance because of signaling effects: attaining a degree signals
that an individual has higher abilities that, regardless of schooling, would improve
his/her performance in the labor market.
We consider the effects on human capital formation of the variations in the
timing of schooling in Sweden (as affected by school entrance laws), and we find
that starting school up to a year earlier increases subsequent income levels by 1%.
8This could, however, be caused by the relative class-age effect, whereby those who
enter school at a later age ultimately earn more (being among the oldest in the class
and therefore more self-confident may have the effect of increasing pay levels).
We also discuss the impact of the length of schooling on educational outcomes,
using regional variations in the length of primary and secondary schooling in the
Swiss education system. In Switzerland the number of years spent in school varies
according to canton from 12 to 13 years, but this variation has not been found to
have an effect on student performance.
Chapter 3 aims to identify the effects on fertility of a shift in the school-leaving
age by analyzing the childbearing patterns of more than 850,000 Swedish women.
In Sweden the strict laws on school entry mean that the age of leaving compulsory
schooling is dependent on the month of birth. This allows us to study the causal
effect of the graduation age on childbearing patterns. The differences in school-
leaving ages provided by Swedish school enrollment laws are found to have strong
effects on the timing of fertility. The birth-month-induced variation in the age at
graduation from compulsory schooling is reflected in the age at conception of the
first child (there is an average interval of 8–10 years between these events), with
about 45% of the difference in the graduation age being reflected in the age at
becoming a parent. The effects of the graduation age on the timing of the birth of
the second child and of marriage are found to be of a similar order of magnitude.
Chapter 4 estimates the shape of the age–productivity profile by extensively
reviewing the literature and constructing new estimates for the profile. Earlier
studies tended to predict that productivity decreases or at least flattens off from
mid–working life, while wages continue to rise. We estimate the relationship be-
tween age and performance using time-varying causal data (based on age-specific
supply of abilities and industry-wide demand for abilities) and find that workers are
most productive from age 35–44 or below, depending on the rate of technological
change. Rejuvenating the labor force by lowering the age of labor-market entry
could thus allow more individuals to enter the labor force in their most productive
years. It also suggests that seniority-based earnings that increase over the life cycle
may reduce opportunities in the labor market for older workers.
In Chapter 5 we apply a microbased simulation model, MOSART, to project
the effects of a school reform (under which the school-leaving age is lowered by
two years) on various variables related to the future of the public pension system in
Norway. The findings from Chapters 2 and 3 are used to investigate the effects of
the school reform on wages and its impacts on fertility patterns. Based on results
from Chapter 4, we also estimate the impact of a decrease in productivity when the
retirement age is raised. Some of the key findings from the projections follow.
In Figure 1.5 we show the effect of a school reform on the old-age dependency
ratio (i.e., the number of people aged 65 years and over relative to the number
of people aged 15–64). According to these projections, the old-age dependency
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Figure 1.5. Old age dependency ratio (those aged 65 : those aged 15–64) in Nor-
way, 2000–2100.
Notes: S1 = reference scenario; S2 = school-leaving age decreasing by 2 years; S3
= school-leaving age decreasing by 2 years and fertility levels increasing.
Source: Own calculations.
ratio increases throughout the period, but if the school reform is introduced and
childbearing takes place at a younger age, the rise in the old-age dependency ratio
becomes lower (S2) relative to the case without a reform (S1). If earlier childbear-
ing is accompanied by a higher fertility level, this further reduces the increase in
the old-age dependency ratio (S3).
The development in the number of workers is shown in Figure 1.6. We observe
that implementing the school reform (S2) substantially increases the size of the
labor force relative to the case where no reform is implemented (S1). The school
reform (S2) is also projected to increase the size of the labor force to a greater extent
than a postponement of the retirement age (S5). If the school reform increases
fertility levels, this further adds to the size of the labor force (S3).
As shown in Figure 1.7, the development of the contribution rate (the share of
wages used to finance public pensions) is projected to increase to 38% by 2100 in
the benchmark case (S1). When the school reform is introduced, the contribution
rate reaches a level of 36.9% (S2) in 2100. If the fertility level increases as a result
of the school reform, then the contribution rate will increase to 35.4% (S3) by the
end of the simulation period.
The effect of a later retirement on the contribution rate could be marginally
stronger than that of a school reform, as it decreases the number of those receiv-
ing pensions while at the same time increasing the number of contributors. The
contribution rate rises to a level of 34.8% in 2100 in the case of a two-year-later
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retirement (S5). However, in the case where older workers’ productivity and wages
decline because of accelerating technological change, a two-year-later retirement
leads to a contribution rate of 36.2% in 2100 (S7).
In Chapter 6 we summarize 1) the findings from the different parts of the study,
2) the effect of the education reform on human capital formation and fertility, and 3)
the estimate of the age–productivity profile. We conclude that an education reform
that lowers the graduation age by shifting the timing and duration of schooling
could represent a substantial contribution to the sustainability of the public pension
system in Norway.
2
The Effect of the Duration and Timing of
Education on Human Capital
In this chapter we consider whether lowering the age of school entry and shortening
the duration of schooling would affect the transition from school to work. If school
reform were to lead to a lower accumulation of human capital, this could decrease
wages, which in turn would lower wage-indexed pension benefits. Thus, we also
discuss the impact that a school reform of this type might have on human capital
levels.
There are no relevant variations in the timing and duration of education in Nor-
way that we can study to estimate their effects on human capital and productivity.
To our knowledge, the ideal case study, where variations in the school-entry age
and school duration can be observed simultaneously, does not exist. As we need to
identify settings that will allow us to make this analysis, we focus on two different
countries that are characterized by 1) a relevant variation in the variable of interest
that is not explained by unobserved factors and 2) data availability. We investi-
gate the effects of the timing of schooling on human capital in Sweden, a country
where birth-month-induced variations in the timing of education can be observed
and where a large-scale detailed data set is available. We also analyze variations
in the length of education in Switzerland, where schooling length differs according
to canton and where data exist on the effects of these variations on human capi-
tal. By combining the findings from Sweden and Switzerland, we can estimate the
joint impact on human capital formation of shifting the timing of schooling and
compressing its duration.
We divide Chapter 2 into four sections. In Section 1 we describe the current
school system in Norway and discuss the potential for changing the secondary
school graduation age and the effects that this would be expected to have on the
age at labor-market entry. In Section 2 we investigate the importance of schooling
relative to other determinants of human capital. Section 3 analyzes the effects on
wages of a younger school-entry age using Swedish data. Section 4 estimates the
impact on student performance of shortening the length of time required to graduate
from secondary school, based on evidence from Switzerland.
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2.1 The Norwegian School System: Schooling Duration
and Age at Entry
The school reform under consideration here would shift the Norwegian school-
entry age (currently 6 years) to 5 years and compress the duration of primary and
secondary school (currently 13 years) to 12 years. By international standards, there
seems to be scope for such a change.
The school-entry age ranges from 4 to 8 years in different countries of the
world (UNESCO, 2004). When Norwegian children first enroll in school, their
English and Welsh counterparts of the same age are already in their second year,
while children of the same age in Luxembourg and Northern Ireland are in their
third year and children in Denmark have not yet started school. The most common
duration of primary and secondary school is 12 years, while some school systems
have an even shorter duration (Mullis et al., 1998; UNESCO, 1999 and 2004). The
schooling duration in Norway, where it takes 13 years to complete primary and
secondary school, is relatively long compared to other countries.
2.1.1 Organization of education
To study school systems and school reforms, a standardization of education accord-
ing to school levels can be useful. The different school levels can be categorized
according to the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED)
(UNESCO, 2003), which divides education into seven main categories, ranging
from 0 to 6, that represent schooling from preprimary to advanced research training
levels. See Box 2.1.
2.1.2 The timing and duration of schooling
The way a school system is organized in terms of formal school-entry age and the
length of time required to achieve an academic qualification is often traditional to a
country or stems from historical factors. Differing ideas on when a child is ready for
school, changes in parental roles, and new ways of organizing work and family life
have all influenced the school-entry age and the length of primary, secondary, and
tertiary education in Norway (Høiga˚rd and Ruge, 1947; Levin, 1995; Jørgensen,
1997). However, the Norwegian school system was not designed with the current
levels of educational attainment in mind, where a high proportion of each birth
cohort pursue tertiary education and remain in the school system until at least their
mid-twenties.
Universal schooling was introduced in Norway about 250 years ago. From
1889 onwards there were seven years of compulsory education, which was raised
to nine years in 1969. The most recent extension of compulsory schooling took
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Box 2.1. Different school levels according to the International Standard
Classification of Education, 1997.
ISCED Level 0: Preprimary education. Institution-based and designed for children
who are at least 3 years old.
ISCED Level 1: Primary education. Has systematic introductory studies in core sub-
jects, such as mathematics, reading, and writing. School participation at this level is
mandatory in all countries and generally lasts 5–6 years. Entry age varies between 4
years and 8 years.
ISCED Level 2: Lower-secondary education. Tends to have somewhat more subject-
oriented education, the teachers are more specialized, and the number of instruction hours
is higher than in primary education. In some countries, such as Germany, academic- and
vocational-track students are separated at this stage, and in other countries, including
Norway, not. Lower-secondary education is typically the last part of compulsory educa-
tion.
ISCED Level 3: Upper-secondary education. Generally begins at the end of com-
pulsory schooling and includes the Norwegian school Videregende Skole. In the upper-
secondary school, subject teaching is generally more advanced than at earlier stages, and
a separation of academic- and vocational-track students has usually taken place. Students
have considerable freedom to choose specialized subjects. The stage lasts from 1–5 years,
depending on country and school system.
ISCED Level 4: Postsecondary nontertiary education. Programs sometimes require a
secondary school qualification. They typically have more subject depth, are more special-
ized than secondary education, and are often of too short a duration to fit into the ISCED
5 category.
ISCED Level 5: Tertiary education. Programs are more advanced than education of-
fered at ISCED levels 3 or 4 and have a minimum duration of 2 years. They may require
completion of a research project or a thesis and are meant to direct the participants to
professions with high skill requirements or to research programs.
ISCED Level 6: Advanced tertiary degree. Requires the submission of a thesis or
dissertation. Students who complete this stage of education should have proved their
ability to carry out original and advanced research work.
place in 1997, lengthening mandatory education to 10 years by lowering the school-
entry age from 7 to 6 years. The students now finish compulsory lower-secondary
school the year they turn 16, though most continue with further education. Students
who complete upper-secondary school after an additional three years in the school
system graduate the year they turn 19.
The age of school entry has been lowered in some countries and regions over
the last decades. In the United States only seven states required enrollment in
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school below the age of 7 years in 1965; 25 states required this in 1992 (U.S. De-
partment of Health, 1965; Education Commission of the States, 1994). In Germany
an industry-sponsored research project proposed lowering the school-entry age to
4 years, two years below the current school-entry age of 6 years (Lenzen, 2003). In
Sweden the rules regarding school-entry age were liberalized in the 1990s. Parental
choice as to when children should start school has now become more important, and
this has had the effect of lowering the age of school entry.
There have recently been several political attempts to reduce the number of
years required to attain a specific educational qualification. Education reforms that
decrease the duration of schooling are either in the planning process or already in
place at national and federal/state level in many European countries. In Germany,
Norway, and Switzerland, a reduction in the length of schooling is being consid-
ered. In 2001 the German state of Saarland shortened the duration of primary and
secondary school (Gymnasium) from 13 to 12 years, and other states are in the
process of implementing similar reforms.
The relatively long duration of schooling in Norway has led public committees
to suggest compressing the Norwegian school system to allow a younger leaving
age (NOU, 1991:28; NOU, 2000:21). At the tertiary level the Bologna Declaration
(1999), which aims to harmonize the length of tertiary education in Europe, was
recently implemented in Norway. As a result, the most common Norwegian uni-
versity degree, the four-year cand.mag degree was replaced by a three-year bach-
elor’s degree (NOU, 2000:14). A similar reform aimed at shortening the duration
of schooling has not, as yet, been implemented at the primary and secondary level;
while it is not known whether such a reform will take place in the future, this is
currently under debate (Utdannings- og Forskningsdepartementet, 2003), and the
financial costs for shifting the timing and duration of schooling may be relatively
low. On the other hand, certain interest groups may attempt to influence the timing
of school entry and the duration of schooling. This includes teachers and education-
sector unions who may oppose a reform that would decrease the demand for their
services and reduce their bargaining power. Teaching unions, which supported the
extension of primary and secondary school education from 12 to 13 years through a
lowering of the school-entry age, opposed the suggestion by the Norwegian minis-
ter of education of shortening the length of school back to 12 years (NOU, 2002:10;
Lektorbladet, 2003; NOU, 2003:16). Moreover, other interest groups may attempt
to influence the timing and duration of schooling (e.g., the privately run Steiner
schools that advocate school entry at 7 years (Steinerskolen, 2003).
2.1.3 School-leaving age and the timing of events in adulthood
Variation in the school-leaving age can affect the timing of demographic and labor
market events. Studies on the timing of events in adulthood tend to show that
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individuals sequence events in adulthood according to rigid schemes and that a
change in the timing of one life event affects subsequent events. Leaving school
tends to precede parenthood and entry to the labor market, and increases in the
graduation age have been associated with increases in the age of labor-market entry,
age of childbearing, and the timing of other events in adulthood (Hogan, 1978;
Rindfuss et al., 1980; Marini, 1984; Blossfeld and De Rose, 1992; Gustafsson,
2001).
International comparisons suggest that the length of the period from finishing
education to entering the labor force is not affected by the age at which a per-
son leaves school (OECD, 2003c; UNESCO, 2004). Figure 2.1 shows that coun-
tries’ school-leaving ages are not associated with years spent not employed.1 In
Figure 2.2 we observe that the age at leaving compulsory education [which tends
to include ISCED levels 1 (primary school) and 2 (lower-secondary education)]
is also unrelated to the time spent not employed. School systems with younger
school-leaving ages do not have a longer transition from school to work than school
systems with a higher school-leaving age.2 This suggests that a variation in the
school-leaving age (whether after completion of the highest educational qualifica-
tion or simply compulsory schooling) does not affect the speed of transition to the
labor market; it also suggests that a shift in the school-leaving age would lead to a
similar shift in the age of entry to the labor market.
The speed of the transition from school to the labor market is, however, likely
to be influenced by a number of other institutional factors. We discuss these to
investigate which settings, in addition to a change in the school-leaving age, may
possibly affect the length of the transition to adulthood. One example of a policy
that can affect the spacing between events in adulthood is parental entitlement to
welfare payments. In Norway a parent’s entitlement to and the level of welfare
support depend on parental income during six of the previous 10 months (Odelst-
ingsinnstilling, 2001; Trygdeetaten, 2003). This policy may increase the length of
time between leaving school and entering parenthood, as it provides an important
incentive to work before having children so as to obtain a higher level of benefit
during maternity leave.
Norms regarding whether marriage and leaving the parental home should ac-
company labor-market entry, as well as the role of the family in providing financial
1All countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) with
relevant data (school-leaving age, length of compulsory schooling, years of unemployment) available
are included in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2.
2For the age group under consideration (15–29) in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, a younger school-
leaving age implies that there may be more post-schooling years when one is not working. Thus,
for a given employment rate, a younger school-leaving age would imply a longer period of not being
employed. The lack of an association between the school-leaving age and the period spent out of the
labor force for those aged 15–29 could thus imply a somewhat shorter transition from school to work
in countries with a younger school-leaving age, if such a relationship exists.
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Figure 2.1. Graduation age and years spent not employed, ages 15–29.
Source: OECD (2003c); UNESCO (2004).
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support, also affect the spacing of events in adulthood (Planas, 1999; Bentolila and
Ichino, 2000). Other influences on the school-to-work transition include choosing
to take a year off to travel, whether young men are required to enroll in military or
community service, the effectiveness of education systems in easing the transition
from school to work, and the degree of labor market flexibility (OECD, 1999, 2000,
and 2003a).
The introduction of a reform to lower the graduation age could lead to a tem-
porary increase in the number of new labor market entrants, as several cohorts
would graduate at the same time. The increased number of new labor market en-
trants could lead to temporary increases in youth unemployment, as some studies of
the cohort size of new labor market entrants suggest (Easterlin, 1978; Martin and
Ogawa, 1988). Easterlin (1978) compares the time trends in American employ-
ment rates with variations in cohort sizes from the 1940s to the 1970s and argues
that there is an inverse relationship between them. Martin and Ogawa (1988) con-
sider the Japanese case and find that the wage ratios of 20–29 to 40–49 year olds in
Japan are reduced by 1% when the share of the former increases by 10%.
More recently, Shimer (2001) considered detailed evidence from geographic
entities in the United States which suggest that cohort size is positively related to
employment rates. He finds that larger youth cohorts in a region are associated with
higher labor force participation rates and decreased unemployment levels. Shimer
(2001) argues that firms tend to relocate to where the labor supply is expected to
increase (given that an increase in the number of labor market entrants can indeed
be foreseen). The school reform that we investigate in Chapter 5 will be known
about several years in advance, so that firms and labor market regulators will have
time to prepare for and adjust to it.
The relationship between cohort size and unemployment is also likely to be in-
fluenced by labor market flexibility. Cohort size may increase unemployment when
wage-setting systems are rigid (Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela, 2002). When
real wage flexibility is high, as some evidence suggests is the case for Norway
(Layard et al., 1991, p.407), labor markets adjust to larger labor market inflows in
a shorter time span. Because of differences in the educational attainment of those
affected by the reform, the increase in labor market supply is likely to be spread
over a number of years, softening the shock to the labor market.
Based on what the intercountry evidence provided here suggests, a marginally
younger school-leaving age may lead to a parallel shift in the age of entry to the
labor market, at least over time as labor markets adapt to changes in the supply of
labor. In simulations where a lower school-leaving age is considered (Chapter 5),
the time horizon extends to the year 2100. Any possible short-term adjustment
problems in the labor market are unlikely to determine unemployment rates over
this long time period.
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2.2 Effects of Schooling on Human Capital and
Productivity Levels
To predict whether a change in the timing and duration of schooling will affect ed-
ucational outcomes, we need to understand the role of education in relation to other
environmental and biological determinants of human capital. We therefore look at
whether educational attainment serves to identify workers with different productiv-
ity potential and the extent to which schooling contributes to an individual’s stock
of human capital.
If the variation in human capital levels is largely determined by factors that have
nothing to do with schooling, as suggested by the signaling theory, there will be few
or no effects on human capital of changes to the duration and timing of schooling.
However, if, in accordance with Mincer’s (1974) human capital production theory,
marginal variation in schooling does matter, then small changes in the length and
timing of schooling could affect skill levels. We consider both theoretical and em-
pirical studies on the determinants of skill differentials to see which theory fits best
with the findings from the literature.
The Measurement of Human Capital
We are interested in estimating the effect of the duration and timing of schooling on
human capital. Educational level is sometimes used as a proxy for human capital,
but this measure can be misleading as 1) it conceals great heterogeneity between
individuals with the same formal education qualifications and 2) it is an input factor
in the human capital production function rather than a measure of output. A more
valid measurement is found in measures of the quality of human capital, such as
results from ability tests,3 which are more closely associated with income differen-
tials both at the macro and micro level.
At the aggregate level, Barro (1999) provides evidence that favors the use of
measures of education quality (test scores) rather than education quantity (years
of schooling), on the basis that measures of education quality are more closely
correlated to economic growth than are the number of years spent at school. This
argument is supported by Hanushek and Kimko (2000), who find that countries
3Tests of individual performance can be categorized according to whether they are aptitude tests,
which measure the ability to learn, or achievement tests, which measure the amount of acquired
knowledge. However, such a categorization can be misleading as: 1) both aptitude tests and achieve-
ment tests are able to predict individual productivity levels more accurately than educational attain-
ment (Murnane et al., 1995; Schmidt and Hunter, 1998); 2) results from different tests tend to be
strongly positively correlated (Wechsler, 1997; Kunzel et al., 2004); and 3) a test used as an achieve-
ment test in one setting can be an aptitude test in another, for example, a mathematics test can predict
both the current proficiency in the subject and the ability to learn more (Atkinson et al., 1993).
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with one standard deviation higher mathematics and science test scores have over
1% higher economic growth.
At the individual level, test-score performance has been shown to be closely
related to adult income levels in a number of studies (e.g., Boissiere et al., 1985;
Currie and Thomas, 1999; Tyler et al., 2000). Ability tests tend to predict individ-
ual productivity better than other observable individual characteristics, including
formal educational attainment (Schmidt and Hunter, 2004).4
Several longitudinal studies find that the correlation between test scores and
wages has increased over time. Juhn et al. (1993) find empirical support for the
increasing payoff to ability levels within narrowly defined school and occupational
groups, and Murnane et al. (1995) show that the relationship between performance
in mathematics at the end of high school and adult wages becomes stronger over
time. Furthermore, cognitive skills have become increasingly in demand in the
labor market as a whole for the last 40 years, at least in the United States, while
physical abilities, such as manual dexterity, have decreased in importance (Autor
et al., 2003; Spitz, 2004). To sum up, the evidence gives weight to the argument
that an output measure of human capital, such as test scores, should be used in
the human capital production function rather than input factors, such as school
attainment.
Assuming that the level of human capital is described by the variable T
it
(for
individual i at time t), the human capital production function can be stated as
T
it
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(2.1)
In Equation 2.1, 
 
is a vector of parameters that measures the impact of
individual-level environmental influences (such as parental support), 

represents
parameters for biological influences (such as innate ability), 

measures aggregate
influences (such as educational expenditure in the region), and 

estimates the im-
pact of the institutional settings we focus on (including the duration and timing of
schooling). The respective variable vectors are X
it
, Y
it
, Z
it
, and D
it
, while 
it
is
the error term.
2.2.1 Schooling and human capital levels: Screening and skill gains
Will school-entry age and school duration influence human capital and income?
According to Mincer (1974), marginal increases in the length of schooling lead to
4Schmidt and Hunter (1998) investigate how different individual characteristics such as education,
work experience, and general mental ability relate to productivity. They find that mental ability tests
predict a person’s work performance better than any other characteristic observable before a person
enters the job. A range of other studies support the notion that differences in mental ability strongly
affect productivity and wage levels, including Barrett and Depinet (1991); Bishop (1991); Dolton and
Vignoles (2000); Grogger and Eide (1993); and Murnane et al. (2000).
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higher productivity. Additional schooling improves individuals’ skills, and this is
reflected in the higher earnings of those who are better educated.
Equation 2.2 presents Mincer’s (1974) schooling function in a simple form, in
which only schooling matters for human capital production.
y
it
    
 

it
 



it
 u
it
(2.2)
Here y
it
is the wage level of an individual i at time t, while a is a constant,

it
is the number of years of schooling, and u
it
is the residual term. Wages are
determined by the impact of schooling on human capital, and the effect of education
length on wages is captured by the 
 
coefficient, while the 

coefficient measures
whether the returns to schooling are diminishing, constant, or increasing.
In a comprehensive international survey on education and income,
Psacharopoulos (1994) finds that returns to schooling are highest for the primary
school years, while education at the secondary and tertiary levels have a consider-
ably smaller effect on increasing wages. The lower wage gains for more advanced
education could be explained by diminishing human capital gains to schooling.
However, changes in the relative supply of and demand for highly skilled labor can
provide another explanation for the decreasing wage returns to higher education,
namely, that a strong increase in the supply of skilled workers can, at least for some
periods of time, decrease their wages irrespective of human capital gains (Katz and
Murphy, 1992; Teulings and Van Rens, 2002). Hansen et al. (2004) study the effect
of education on cognitive abilities, which can represent a way of disentangling the
effect of schooling on human capital from other influences. They find that gains in
ability resulting from education are diminishing, that the marginal gains to cogni-
tive abilities are lower for higher levels of education, and that the AFQT (Armed
Forces Qualification Test) scores rise by only one-half by the time the students
reach college relative to the early high school years.
The finding that schooling at lower levels does more to increase human capital
levels may imply that one of the key functions of more advanced schooling is to
identify the quality of the worker. This supports the screening or signaling theories
of education which emphasize that preschooling heterogeneity in abilities deter-
mines educational attainment and adult wages. Different versions of these theories
(Arrow, 1973; Spence, 1973; Stiglitz, 1975; Weiss, 1995) share certain common
assumptions: 1) educational attainment is a signal of individual job proficiency; 2)
these signals are easily observed by employers; 3) highly productive individuals
acquire more education, as their cost of participating in education is lower; and 4)
there are no externalities to human capital—productivity is fully person-specific.
In the strict sense of the screening theory, schooling is not productivity-
augmenting, as shown in Equation 2.3, where z
it
represents the individual’s innate
ability. The ability level is revealed through schooling, and there are no direct gains
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to human capital from schooling. The coefficient 
 
measures the wage gains from
a higher ability level, while 

determines whether the wage gains from higher abil-
ity are diminishing, constant, or increasing. The variable y
it
is the wage level of
individual i at time t, u
it
is the residual term, while  is a constant.
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(2.3)
A synopsis of Mincer’s (1974) human capital production function and the
screening model is made when both the schooling selection and human-capital-
increasing effects are taken into account as, for example, in Mincer (1980). Al-
though the literature suggests that longer schooling is associated with higher in-
come [see, for example, Harmon et al. (2001)], this is partly because those with
higher innate abilities are more likely to attend higher education. This situation
is captured by Equation 2.4 (the interpretation of the variables is the same as in
Equation 2.2 and Equation 2.3).
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(2.4)
In the case where 
 
 , 

  and 
 
 , 

 , both schooling and
ability positively influence the wage level, but there are diminishing wage returns
for additional years of schooling and higher abilities.
2.2.2 Cognitive ability levels: Biological influences
In much the same way as there are genetic influences on personality (Lochlin, 1992)
or psychopathology (Nigg and Goldsmith, 1994), cognitive abilities are also af-
fected by hereditary factors (McGue and Bouchard, 1998). However, the relative
effect of biological and environmental influences on cognitive abilities is difficult to
estimate. To disentangle the effects of biological and environmental influences, one
needs to disaggregate the phenotype (observed outcome) into genotype and envi-
ronmental elements. One way of accomplishing this is to study monozygotic twins
or siblings, as monozygotic twins share 100% of their genes, while dizygotic twins
and siblings share about 50%. When human capital measurements are increasingly
correlated, the higher the genetic similarity between two individuals, the higher the
degree of heritability for mental abilities that is identified.
If IQ were determined entirely by family and socioeconomic influences, then
adoptive siblings reared together should have an IQ correlation that is close to 1
and siblings reared apart should have a correlation closer to 0. Teasdale and Owen
(1984) study Danish males (who completed a pre–military service IQ test) and find
correlations of 0.47 for siblings reared apart, 0.52 for siblings reared together, 0.22
for half-siblings reared together, and 0.02 for adoptive siblings reared together.
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Studies based on monozygotic twins reared apart also tend to find a strong
hereditary influence on IQ levels, with correlations in the range of 0.64 to 0.78
(Bouchard et al., 1990; Pedersen et al., 1992). The genetic influences on ability
levels have been found to increase with age and to become stronger from early
childhood to adolescence (Lochlin et al., 1997). In a study comparing monozygotic
and dizygotic twins, the correlation was found to be around 0.68 for both groups
when the twins were 3–6 months old; but at the age of 15 it increased to 0.86 for the
monozygotic twins and decreased to 0.54 for the dizygotic twins (Wilson, 1983).
This age-induced increase in measured heritability may seem counterintuitive
since, as the individuals grow older, they are exposed to more social influences,
which should strengthen the impact of environmental influences. However, the in-
creasing association between genetic similarity and ability levels can be explained
by the fact that the freedom to choose one’s environment also increases with age
and that individuals are likely to select activities according to their own hereditary
predisposition (Plomin and Petrill, 1997; Gottfredson, 1998).
2.2.3 Cognitive ability levels: Environmental determinants
Individual ability levels are influenced by a variety of environmental inputs, such
as parental stimulation, nutrition, education, family type, existence and timing of
parental disruption, as well as education costs and norms of school attainment.
Prenatal, Infancy, School, and Parental Influences
Environmental factors may influence cognitive ability levels even before birth, as
fetal exposure to nutrients and hormones (environmental womb effects) are impor-
tant influences on cognitive development. Twins share their womb environment for
the months before birth; consequently, observed similarities may come from envi-
ronmental womb effects rather than genetic similarities [see Devlin et al. (1997)
for an overview of the topic].5 Streissguth et al. (1989) provide further evidence on
the importance of prenatal factors, showing that drinking or smoking on the part of
the mother during pregnancy may adversely affect the child’s health and cognitive
abilities.
Infant nutrition and, in particular, whether a child is breastfed is another impor-
tant environmental influence on infant intelligence. Certain ingredients in the breast
milk, as well as the breastfeeding experience itself, may cause IQ differences. In
5Environmental womb effects should, however, also be present for dizygotic twins. Hence, differ-
ences between dizygotic and monozygotic twins are likely to reveal the effect of genetic differences
net of environmental womb effects. An example of such a study on cognitive abilities is McGue et
al. (1993) who find that adult monozygotic twins have a correlation of 0.83, while dizygotic twins
have a correlation of 0.39, which suggests that genetic factors are considerably more important than
environmental womb effects.
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a test of the intellectual capacity of 300 prematurely born individuals, Lucas et al.
(1992) argue that the type of nutrients given during the first weeks of life affect IQ
scores by up to 10 points at the age of 8. In a meta-analysis of such studies, Ander-
son et al. (1999) find that breastfeeding increases the child’s IQ by three points on
average. Birch et al. (2000) argue that breastfeeding improves cognitive abilities
through the effects of the fatty acids DHA and ARA. Other components of human
milk may also affect intelligence levels (Uauy et al., 1999).
The family situation seems to be of importance for human capital achievements,
and growing up in a single-parent household has been found to lower an individ-
ual’s school performance and adult productivity (Fronstin et al., 2001; Ver Ploeg,
2002). Ermisch and Francesconi (2001) find that parental divorce is particularly
unfavorable if the child is aged 0–5 when the disruption takes place. International
data from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) study on
students’ knowledge suggests that coming from a single-parent household signifi-
cantly decreases human capital formation in a number of countries, although other
social background factors, including low income level, often reinforce the relation-
ship (OECD, 2001).
Schooling has been shown to positively affect IQ levels in several studies. A
meta-analysis by Winship and Korenman (1997) concludes that an extra year of ed-
ucation raises IQ levels by around 2.7 points. However, studies that try to estimate
the impact of schooling on IQ levels could be biased, as individuals with higher
preschool abilities tend to achieve more education, and reliable and valid control
variables for nonschooling factors tend to be missing or of low quality.
Ceci (1991) reviews studies that try to overcome the selection issue by ana-
lyzing the effect of potentially exogenous variation in schooling on individuals’
cognitive development. Examples of cases he studies are the impact of a late
school onset, the effect of early school termination, and historical interruptions
of the school career (for example, due to war and a temporary lack of access to
schooling). Nonetheless, some of the cases he investigates are likely to be influ-
enced by other confounding factors (e.g., there could be independent effects on
human capital formation in children who experience a war); other cases may over-
come the selection problems that the more traditional approaches are subject to.
Ceci (1991) finds that one missed year of education reduces IQ levels by from 0.25
to 6 IQ points.
2.2.4 Test score increases over time
Cognitive test performance has been shown to increase over a relatively long pe-
riod of time, spanning the period from the beginning of the twentieth century to
the present time (Tuddenham 1948; Flynn, 1987; Dickens and Flynn, 2001). By
studying military test-score performances, Tuddenham (1948) finds that there were
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gains in measured IQ levels between World War I and World War II, while Flynn
(1987) shows that this development continued in the post–World War II period. The
size of the increase is, however, uncertain.6 That there have been increases in IQ
levels over time suggests a strong environmental influence on human capital levels,
as the changes are estimated over a too short a time span to involve changes in the
population’s genetic makeup.
A likely cause of the improvements in military test-score performance could
be the increase in educational attainment levels over the same period (military
test scores measure the ability levels for a large proportion of the male popula-
tion and may be affected by schooling). Another influence may be that such tests
have become more common in candidate selection processes (Jenkins, 2001). This
suggests that individuals from more recent cohorts are more motivated and better
prepared to take such tests, as the test outcomes can be important for their career
potential.
In contrast to IQ tests used for a broad cross-section of the population, the
educational composition of which differs over time, the Scholastic Aptitude Test
(SAT)7 considers individuals with the same education (high-school diploma level)
who should be motivated to take the test, as the results will affect their education
outcomes. The SAT scores in verbal aptitude decreased from 1967–2000, however,
while mathematical abilities in 2000 were similar to the 1967 level (College Board,
2002). The increasing share of the population taking this test (Fallows, 1980) may
imply that the test participants are less selected and also explain why SAT scores
have been stable or decreasing over time in contrast with military test scores.
The Impact of Schooling on Earnings
Surveys show that the estimated gain in income for an extra year of schooling in
industrialized countries tends to lie in the range of 4% to 14% (e.g., Harmon et
al., 2001). For European countries the wage increases resulting from education
are lower than in the United States, and for the Scandinavian countries they are
particularly low, which is likely to reflect the more compressed wage distribution
in these countries.
Simple, linear, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the relationship be-
tween educational attainment and income can be criticized on several accounts.
First, though presented as marginal income gains for each extra year of education,
6Flynn (1987) finds that there has been a large rise in the average IQ level for several countries,
with the largest increase in Holland, where test scores increased by 1.3 standard deviations between
1952 and 1982. However, Rodgers (1999) argues that these findings are likely to be upwardly biased
because of methodological errors and that the true increase in IQ scores is likely to be considerably
lower.
7The Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) is a test used to assess individuals’ abilities before college
entrance in the United States.
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these estimates typically stem from the highest schooling level of completed educa-
tion (i.e., high school diploma, bachelor’s degree, or master’s degree). This means
that the term “yearly returns” is an approximation that does not take into account
that certain years in school can be more skill-enhancing than others. Second, and
more important, educational achievement is positively correlated with a number
of individual characteristics that are difficult to observe and that, independently of
education, could increase income.
Several authors find evidence of a diploma effect, where the wage returns for
completing a school year in which a qualification is attained are higher than the
wage returns from other school years. School admission and graduation are char-
acteristics that employers use as an indication of a worker’s productivity potential,
while how many intermediate years there are is of no interest. The diploma ef-
fect supports the signaling theory: the attainment of a qualification matters, but the
number of years of schooling matters less.
Empirical findings from Hungerford and Solon (1987) identify the first and the
final year in school as having the strongest impact on future earnings. Other studies
also support the existence of a diploma effect (Jaeger and Page, 1996; Frazis, 2002),
as well as its validity for different education levels (Park, 1999) and across gender
and race (Chatterji et al., 2003).
OECD (1998) and Psacharopoulos and Layard (1974) find that the gradient of
the age–earnings slope becomes steeper with the length of education, which can be
taken as evidence in favor of the screening model of education. Abler individuals
are screened into higher education. This leads to an increased steepness in the
age–earnings profiles, as the higher productivity of these abler individuals comes
to light gradually, the longer they work in the labor market. Adjusting for innate
abilities, for example, by studying identical twins, tends to significantly lower the
impact of schooling on wages (Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1998; Raaum and Aabo,
2000; Plug and Vijerberg, 2003). Moreover, twin studies would probably suggest
an even weaker earnings effect if signaling effects could be adjusted for.
When employers determine how much to pay individuals with a given level of
education, they include information from the average work performance of other
individuals with the same formal qualifications. Signaling effects can therefore
also play a role in the case of monozygotic twins, where innate abilities are equal.
Attaining a higher level of education would signal a higher ability in the labor
market, as the average person holding a more advanced school qualification has
higher innate abilities. This implies that studies examining the effects of education
on wages using twins data to overcome endogeneity problems may be upwardly
biased.
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2.2.5 Conclusion
To sum up, both environmental and genetic factors have strong impacts on cog-
nitive ability levels. Analyses of large-scale data sets on twins, which permit a
distinction to be made between environmental and genetic contributions, provide
evidence of a strong hereditary influence. However, environmental issues, ranging
from infant nutrition to parental behavior and schooling, are also found to sub-
stantially affect cognitive performance. Many psychologists argue that hereditary
factors are stronger than environmental ones, at least in determining some aspects
of cognitive abilities. An article written by a committee of leading researchers from
the American Psychological Association concludes that the share of heritability in
intelligence is close to 75% (Neisser et al., 1996).
The strong impact of genetic influences on mental abilities is evidence in favor
of a weak screening model of education. Consequently, although increasing edu-
cational attainment significantly raises ability and productivity levels, much of the
variation found between schooling and human capital may be rooted in a person’s
genetic predisposition and in environmental factors that are unrelated to schooling.
Schooling is only one of many determinants of human capital, with a range of
other environmental and biological influences also having substantial effects. The
effects of signaling and selection account for a large proportion of wage differences
resulting from school attainment. Studies that control for factors that are associ-
ated with, but not caused by, schooling find that the effects of schooling are much
weaker than bivariate regressions between skills or income and schooling length
suggest. Consequently, the evidence suggests that education, although having an
important effect in terms of improving skills, is only one of many influences. It is
therefore possible that a marginal variation in the duration and timing of schooling
would be unrelated to the level of human capital output.
2.3 Age at School Entry and Wage Levels
The teaching of overly complex material to students at an age when they are devel-
opmentally unprepared for it may not only make them feel helpless and frustrated
at what they perceive as their own shortcomings but also put them off studying,
with long-term effects on their educational attainment and subsequent performance
in the labor market. On the other hand, as the ability to learn declines with age,
starting school too late can mean that some of a child’s best learning years are lost.
These two seemingly contradictory views on the costs and gains of variation in the
school-entry age are, however, not mutually exclusive, as entry both too early and
too late can be harmful for the student. In this section, we investigate whether a
variation in the age of school entry of up to one year has any long-term impacts
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by studying the effect of such a variation on individuals’ performance in the labor
market.
2.3.1 Review of the literature
In several studies, student performance levels, usually measured by test perfor-
mance or teachers’ evaluations, are found to be slightly lower for those who enter
school at a younger age (Teltsch and Breznitz, 1988; Alberts et al., 1997). How-
ever, achievement differences related to age tend to be small in relation to other
influences on human capital formation (Davis et al., 1980; Jones and Mandeville,
1990). For instance, Jones and Mandeville (1990), in a study of reading skills,
find socioeconomic and ethnic factors to be 13 times more important than a pupil’s
school-entry age. Moreover, some studies argue that the initial differences caused
by an early school-entry age tend to diminish or disappear in later grades (Langer
et al., 1984; Shepard and Smith, 1986), although other studies suggest that the
youngest in the class perform the least well throughout their school career (Uphoff
and Gilmore, 1985; Sharp, 1995).
The majority of studies analyzing the effect of the school-entry age entry upon
achievement investigate within-class age variation (comparing the achievement of
younger and older students within a school class). Using this approach it is difficult
to establish why there are differences in student performance, as different theories
could account for the same results. Better performance by the older students in the
class could be due to the timing of education, as the greater school readiness and
maturity of the older children improves their performance. However, within-class
differences in performance could also be caused by the relative class-age effect,
whereby those who enter school at a later age earn more and perform better, as
they are the oldest in their social reference group (the school class), an effect that
is independent of the school-entry age (Thompson et al, 1991; Alton and Massey,
1998; Plug 2001). Moreover, Gredler (1984) shows that postponing the age of
school entry does not seem to improve student performance, which demonstrates
that is not age per se that is the main cause of within-class performance differences.
2.3.2 Birth month and school enrollment as a natural experiment
Previous investigations into the effects on earnings of the school entry age have
several shortcomings that our study may overcome:
  Sample size is generally relatively small, and the test participants may come
from only one school, which increases the risk of the sample being nonrandom
and unrepresentative;
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  The output measures used in some studies are subjective, such as the teacher’s
opinion of the students; and
  Earlier studies typically concentrate on students’ performance and their adult
income, while other relevant outcome variables, such as marriage and divorce
patterns, are not considered.
In the current study we look at the Swedish school system, where the birth
month of an individual determines the age at which he/she enters school. In Sweden
rigid rules govern the school-entry age and duration of schooling for the cohorts we
consider. As the month of birth determines the timing of school attendance, those
born right after the school entry cut-off date are older when they enter and leave
school.
Several studies have documented the effects of the birth month on phenomena
such as the risk of suffering from schizophrenia, the sex ratio at birth, and life ex-
pectancy (Nonaka et al., 1987; Sham et al., 1992; Doblhammer and Vaupel, 2001).
The use of the birth month in econometric studies of causal influences in behavioral
relations, however, is relatively new. Angrist and Krueger (1991) pioneered this
approach in their investigation of the relationship between earnings, educational
attainment, and school regulations in the United States, where school regulations
stipulate a minimum age at graduation that differs over time and across American
states. The study shows that men born in the first quarter of the year earn slightly
less than those born in the other three quarters. The authors attribute this finding
to compulsory schooling laws that allow students to leave school after reaching the
age of 16, even if they have not completed the school year. As a consequence, chil-
dren born in the first quarter of a calendar year will have received less schooling if
they drop out of school when they turn 16 as compared with children born later in
a calendar year.
The study by Angrist and Krueger (1991) stimulated several follow-up inves-
tigations that have been critical of its conclusions. Bound and Jaeger (1996), for
instance, provide evidence from cohorts predating the compulsory schooling laws
that the link between season of birth and educational/labor market success can be
at least partially explained by factors other than schooling laws.
The Swedish school enrollment rules, which differ from those of the United
States, make Sweden a more suitable subject than the United States for using birth-
month-induced variation in the timing of education and age of graduation as a nat-
ural experiment. A normal Swedish school year starts at the end of August and
lasts until the beginning of the following June and consists of about 40 weeks, with
children being taught every week from Monday to Friday. Compulsory schooling
starts for almost all children the year they turn 7, lasts for 9 years, and finishes in
the June of the calendar year in which the pupils turn 16 (or n   if they started
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at the age of n).8 Graduation from compulsory schooling therefore occurs when
children are between 15.5 and 16.5 years old. Graduation at younger ages is im-
possible (except for a few cases of early enrollment), and graduation at older ages
is rare, as very few students repeat classes and/or enter school at a later age.
The school entry cut-off-date mechanism means that those born in January enter
school 11 months later than those born in the previous December. Upon completing
compulsory schooling after the ninth grade, pupils can choose whether they would
like to go on to a vocational or academic program in the upper-secondary school,
which normally lasts three years. After graduating from upper-secondary school,
roughly one-third of female students continue with tertiary education, while the
remaining two-thirds pursue other activities, such as entering the labor market or
starting a family.
The most important aspect of this system of enrollment and the compulsory
completion of ninth-grade education is that the variation in the month of birth
causes a systematic variation both in the timing of schooling and in the school
cohort to which an individual belongs. This effect is most pronounced between
children born in December and the subsequent January: these children belong to
different school cohorts, and at each grade, and in particular at completion of com-
pulsory education after the ninth grade, children born in January will still be only
around one month younger than children born in the preceding December. This
differential timing of schooling (and age at graduation) thus provides an important
“natural experiment” through which to identify the effect of educational enrollment
on demographic behaviors, as the childhood and early adulthood of those born dur-
ing December and the following January take place during virtually the same time
period. Any influences of that period on education or fertility, such as variation in
the returns to education, economic upturns or downswings, or changes in family
policy, affect these individuals identically.
At graduation from compulsory education, women born in December and Jan-
uary differ in the timing of their education but not in the level of their human capital:
in both cases, the women have completed ninth grade education and face decisions
about further options within the education system or entering vocational training.
8Almost all children start school when they turn 7, though some individuals bring forward or
postpone school entry, for example, starting school at the age of 6 or delaying until the year they turn
8. The proportion of all female pupils entering school at the age of 6 constituted 1.6%–2% of all
6-year-old females in 1960, 1963, 1966, and 1969, the years for which data are available (Statistisk
Tidsskrift, 1962; Statistiska Meddelanden, 1964, 1968, and 1970). The percentage starting to go to
school at the age of 8 is not explicitly given. However, as the share of the 8-year-olds in school is only
up to 2.4 percentage points higher than that of 7-year-olds, we may deduce that very few postponed
school entry. The birth month of the individuals who brought forward or postponed school entry is
not known. The change in Swedish school-entry rules, mentioned in Section 2.1, increased parental
choice as to when their children entered school. This first occurred in the 1990s and is not relevant
for the cohorts we study.
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As many women extend their schooling beyond the ninth grade and there is little
or no possibility of “catching up” within the school system, the difference in the
timing of schooling also extends to upper-secondary school, twelfth grade, and po-
tentially also to the timing of tertiary education among women who decide to con-
tinue in education. For women who pursue higher education, therefore, the month
of birth is likely to have an effect on the age at graduation substantially beyond the
ninth grade.9
2.3.3 Data
Our data set is based on the Swedish registration system and provides comprehen-
sive information on fertility and other life-course events as well as socioeconomic
background variables for almost all Swedish women born from 1946 to 1962. Our
data cover 891,066 individuals born in Sweden from 1946 to 1962. We do not
consider immigrants and we also omit one woman who is reported to have had her
first child in 1897, despite having been born in 1960, which leaves the sample with
863,304 women. The data set includes longitudinal observations of demographic
events (childbirth, marriage, divorce, death, emigration, and immigration) and in-
come.10 The income data are given in 1980 values. All demographic events are
registered on a monthly basis up to 31 December 1999.
We have information on income in the period 1980–1998, which means that
we can observe the cohorts’ earnings through a 19-year-long window. The 1946
cohort’s income can be observed for ages 34–52 years, the 1947 cohort for ages
33–51 years, and so forth. The 1962 cohort’s income is observed for ages 18–36
years. When investigating the effect on income, we concentrate on the calendar
years in which the respondents are aged 34–36, which are the only ages at which
we can observe these variables for all women born from 1946 to 1962.11
9The design of the Swedish school system also avoids some of the weaknesses of the approach of
Angrist and Krueger (1991). In their study, educational effects are based on the ability of the oldest
children in the class to drop out of school. As the majority of students, regardless of the quarter of
the year in which they were born, do not drop out of school at the youngest possible age, these laws
are relevant only for a small proportion of the students. Our focus is on school legislation that affects
the age at graduation for the whole population (Sweden), rather than compulsory school attendance
laws that regulate the minimum age of graduation for the minority that drops out of school (United
States).
10The income variable is the sum of taxable income (before tax), sick-leave benefits, and parental-
leave benefits. However, as adjusting for fertility in the income regression, Table 2.4, does not alter
the sign or the significance level of the birth-month effect on income, parental-leave benefits are
unlikely to mediate the relationship between birth month and income. Given that sick-leave benefits
are not substantially affected by the birth month, particularly between those born in December and
those born in January, the association between birth month and the income variable is driven by
variation in work income.
11Only annual income is observed. This means that the 34–36 age group in fact refers to individuals
from a slightly wider age range. The largest deviations are found between those born in January, who
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We present descriptive statistics for women aged 34–36 in Table 2.1, where in-
come is given in 100 SEK (Swedish kronor). Those born earlier in the year earn
about 1% more than those born later in the year. Swedish women born in the
January–June period have an income of 47,936–48,268 SEK, while those born in
the July–December period have an income of 47,607–47,878 SEK. Wage differ-
ences due to educational differences are, however, much greater than birth-month
differences, with those who have three or more years of tertiary education earn-
ing on average 72% more than those with just a basic education (the income being
64,510 SEK for the former group compared to 37,470 SEK for the latter group).
We choose to focus on those aged 34–36 years for another reason; we are in-
terested in the long-term effects of the age of school entry, and such effects may
materialize only after several years in the labor market. For example, mathematics
test scores from the eighth grade were found to be increasingly better predictors of
earnings as the working life progressed (Murnane et al., 1995). Thus, any effect
of the age at school entry on the student’s ability levels may be more accurately
measured after a longer period in the workforce, when wages are more closely
correlated with differences in job performance.
2.3.4 Hypothesis
The hypothesis we investigate is whether the age at school entry affects productivity
in adult life. The Swedish school situation allows us to study the effect on adult
productivity of up to one year’s difference in the age at school entry, as the school
entry cut-off date means that, at school entry, those born in January are 11 months
older relative to those born in the following December.
We investigate the effect of the age at school entry on several outcomes that re-
late to “positive” events in adult life. These variables include marriage, educational
attainment, and income. We also investigate the effect of the age of school entry on
divorce, which can be characterized as a “negative” risk.
The hypothesis we would like to check is whether a higher age at school en-
try increases the risk of experiencing “positive” outcomes and lowers the risk of
experiencing “negative” outcomes. That is, we would like to investigate whether
are observed from ages 34–36.92, and those born in December, who are observed from ages 33.08–
36. However, as the age at leaving each stage of education is independent of the birth month, this
does not pose a problem for our approach. Within every cohort, the number of years spent in the
labor market is equal for individuals with different educational levels. Thus, the age differences we
observe between those born in January and those born in December should not affect the number of
years spent in the labor market. Consequently, the age differences in observed income between those
born early and those born late in the year are not likely to affected by differences in the length of the
working life.
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Table 2.1. Average income by birth months and education. Swedish women born
1946–1962, aged 34–36 (100 SEK, 1980 value).
Average income Standard deviation
All women 479.86 263.2
Birth month
January 481.32 262.30
February 483.42 263.77
March 482.68 261.74
April 482.55 265.72
May 482.96 273.59
June 479.36 258.29
July 477.55 258.00
August 476.97 266.81
September 478.78 267.31
October 477.34 260.35
November 477.62 259.63
December 476.07 258.24
Education
Primary school 374.70 240.24
Secondary school, up to 2 years 443.20 218.25
(mostly vocational study tracks)
Secondary school, 3 years or more 487.73 263.76
(academically oriented study tracks)
Tertiary education, up to 2 years 531.79 238.47
Tertiary education, 3 years and above 645.10 326.89
Source: Statistics Sweden; own calculations.
those born in the first calendar months of a year have a higher risk of getting mar-
ried, attaining higher education, and earning more, and are less likely to become
divorced.
2.3.5 Findings
We analyze Swedish women born from 1946 to 1962 with respect to the effect
of the school-entry age on variables that relate to outcome variables in adult life,
namely income, education, marriage, and divorce.
The average income for different birth cohorts at age 34–36 is presented in
Figure 2.3, which shows that for the cohorts of the mid- and late-1950s, the income
of the older cohorts was, without exception, higher. These cohorts were aged 34–
36 years in the early 1990s at a time when the Swedish economy was plunged into
a state of crisis, with a rapid increase in unemployment and massive public-sector
reforms. Figure 2.4 shows the development of the unemployment rate over time
and illustrates the magnitude of the economic crisis in Sweden in the 1990s.
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Figure 2.3. Average yearly income at ages 34–36. Swedish women born 1946–
1962.
Source: Statistics Sweden, own calculations.
Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.5 give the average annual income according to birth
month. These results reveal patterns in support of the hypothesis that the age at
school entry is a significant factor. Those who entered school at an older age have
higher earnings in 15 of the 17 cohorts born from 1946 to 1962. On average, those
born in January have a 1% higher income than those born in December.
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Figure 2.4. Swedish unemployment rates 1964–1997, men and women aged
16–64.
Source: Statistics Sweden; own calculations.
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Figure 2.5. Pretax work income, ages 34–36. Swedish women born 1946–1962.
Source: Statistics Sweden; own calculations.
We also find that those born in spring have a slightly higher income than those
born in January. This is in line with the fact that women from higher social classes,
who may be more likely to experience positive outcomes and less likely to experi-
ence negative ones, tend to give birth in spring (Smithers and Cooper, 1984; Bobak
and Gjonca, 2001). The reason why women from higher social classes give birth
in spring may be that they have a higher conception risk in the summer holidays
when sexual activity is higher and stress levels lower. As women who are out of
the workforce and women in part-time employment are likely to be less influenced
by holidays, their seasonality patterns may be weaker. However, the effect of the
spring peak does not jeopardize the hypothesis of income decreasing according to
age at school entry. Moreover, the differences in income between December and
January—only one month apart—cannot be explained by differences in the social
class of the parents.
The finding that those born earlier in the year earn more is confirmed by results
from the regression analysis, shown in Table 2.2.12 The logarithm of the income for
those born from August to December is significantly lower than for those born in
January (first column). However, when education is adjusted for (second column),
the birth-month differences are no longer significant. As shown in Figure 2.6, those
12The R-squared levels in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 in the regression results for income and educa-
tion are very low (ranging from 0.001 to 0.059), as we do not take into account the most important
determinants of schooling variables, such as innate ability and socioeconomic background character-
istics, but use a very restrictive set of variables, mainly relating to birth date. This does not represent a
substantial problem for our analysis, as we are interested only in the effect of the timing of education,
as observed by the birth date (which is unlikely to be affected by the omitted variables).
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Figure 2.6. School attainment. Swedish women born 1946–1962.
Source: Statistics Sweden, own calculations.
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Figure 2.7. Birth month and income by education.
Source: Statistics Sweden, own calculations.
born in the earlier months of the year tend to have higher educational attainment.
Figure 2.7 provides further evidence that the income differences are primarily ex-
plicable by educational attainment: the birth month is found to have little or no
effect on income when educational levels are adjusted for.
The effects of the birth month on education levels are presented in more de-
tail in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4. Table 2.3 shows the relationship between the birth
month and length of schooling among those born in different birth months. Start-
ing school at a younger age is associated with lower educational attainment, the
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Table 2.2. Income variables, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (1980 val-
ues). Dependent variable: Log of yearly income (average annual income for 34–36
age group, 100 SEK). Those who died or emigrated before they turned 37 and those
without known education are excluded.
Coeff. Std. dev. Coeff. Std. dev.
Constant 5.818 0.005 *** 5.570 0.005 ***
Birth month
January Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
February 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.005
March 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.005
April 0.003 0.005 –0.001 0.005
May 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.005
June –0.001 0.005 0.001 0.005
July –0.007 0.005 –0.003 0.005
August –0.011 0.005 ** –0.004 0.005
September –0.008 0.005 * –0.004 0.005
October –0.010 0.005 ** –0.005 0.005
November –0.012 0.005 ** –0.007 0.005
December –0.010 0.005 ** –0.004 0.005
Birth year
1946 Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
1947 0.018 0.005 *** 0.008 0.005
1948 0.028 0.005 *** 0.013 0.005 **
1949 0.032 0.005 *** 0.011 0.005 **
1950 0.073 0.006 *** 0.046 0.005 ***
1951 0.135 0.006 *** 0.108 0.005 ***
1952 0.201 0.006 *** 0.173 0.005 ***
1953 0.254 0.006 *** 0.227 0.005 ***
1954 0.300 0.006 *** 0.275 0.006 ***
1955 0.321 0.006 *** 0.293 0.005 ***
1956 0.311 0.006 ** 0.284 0.005 ***
1957 0.259 0.006 0.231 0.005 ***
1958 0.229 0.006 0.202 0.006 ***
1959 0.200 0.006 0.173 0.006 ***
1960 0.199 0.006 ** 0.171 0.006 ***
1961 0.209 0.006 0.179 0.006 ***
1962 0.230 0.006 *** 0.203 0.006 ***
Education
Primary school Ref. cat.
Secondary school, up to 2 years 0.197 0.003 ***
Secondary school, 3 years or more 0.266 0.004 ***
Tertiary education, up to 2 years 0.408 0.003 ***
Tertiary education, above 3 years 0.601 0.003 ***
R-squared 0.015 0.059
N 816,583 802,489
***=Significant at p  0.01 level. **=Significant at p  0.5 level. *=Significant at p  0.1 level.
Coefficient; Standard deviation; Reference category.
Source: Statistics Sweden; own calculations.
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Figure 2.8. Marriage risk until age 37, Swedish women born 1946–1962.
Source: Statistics Sweden, own calculations.
youngest in the class having one-twelfth of a year less schooling than the oldest in
the class. Table 2.4 shows the risk of attaining specific levels of education: those
born early in the year are less likely to have primary or lower-secondary school-
ing as their highest educational attainment and more likely to have achieved more
advanced education. Again, those born in spring are the most “successful” in terms
of educational attainment, while the largest gap is between January and December,
indicating the strength of the impact of the school entry cut-off-date mechanism.
In Table 2.5 regression results from the women’s marriage and divorce proba-
bilities are shown. Those born later in the year are significantly less likely to marry,
but they have a higher likelihood of divorcing; and the effect of birth date on divorce
is slightly weaker at age 45 than at age 37, which suggests that it weakens slightly
over the adult life course. Controlling for education in these regressions does not
affect the significance levels or the sign of the explanatory variables. From Fig-
ure 2.8 we see that the likelihood that individuals will marry increases with age at
school entry, while Figure 2.9 shows that an older age at school entry decreases the
risk of divorce.
2.3.6 Concluding remarks
To what extent does an individual’s age position in school relate to whether she
is successful or not later in life? We consider all Swedish women born in the pe-
riod 1946–1962 and study outcome variables related to educational attainment and
performance in the labor market, as well as marriage and divorce risks. Entering
school at up to a year older leads to slightly higher educational attainment and more
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Table 2.3. Years of education, OLS regression.
Coeff.  Std. dev.
Constant 12.893 0.015 ***
Birth month
January Ref. cat.
February 0.030 0.014 **
March 0.032 0.014 **
April 0.049 0.014 ***
May 0.031 0.014 **
June –0.033 0.014 **
July –0.057 0.014 ***
August –0.102 0.014 ***
September –0.072 0.014 ***
October –0.073 0.014 ***
November –0.080 0.015 ***
December –0.084 0.014 ***
Birth year
1946 Ref. cat.
1947 0.048 0.016 ***
1948 0.017 0.016
1949 0.071 0.017 ***
1950 0.073 0.017 ***
1951 0.053 0.017 ***
1952 0.020 0.017
1953 –0.060 0.017 ***
1954 –0.116 0.017 ***
1955 –0.082 0.017 ***
1956 –0.132 0.017 ***
1957 –0.128 0.017 ***
1958 –0.133 0.017 ***
1959 –0.136 0.017 ***
1960 –0.134 0.017 ***
1961 –0.094 0.017 ***
1962 –0.127 0.017 ***
R-Squared (adj.) 0.001
N 807 927
***=Significant at p  0.01 level. **=Significant at p  0.5 level. *=Significant at p  0.1 level.
Coefficient; Standard deviation; Reference category.
Source: Statistics Sweden; own calculations.
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Table 2.4. Risk of educational attainment. Logistic regression results (odds ratio).
Secondary Secondary Tertiary Tertiary
Primary school, up to education, at education, up education, at
school 2 years least 3 years to 2 years least 3 years
Birth month
January (Ref. ) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
February 0.992 0.980 0.976 1.012 1.043 ***
March 0.980 0.989 0.981 1.005 1.039 ***
April 0.967 0.989 0.981 1.006 1.058 ***
May 0.981 0.997 0.977 0.998 1.042 ***
June 1.014 1.017 0.981 0.987 0.981
July 1.024 * 1.037 *** 0.956 ** 0.976 * 0.955 ***
August 1.049 *** 1.059 *** 0.947 *** 0.944 *** 0.933 ***
September 1.021 1.043 *** 0.963 ** 0.973 ** 0.944 ***
October 1.020 1.064 *** 0.956 ** 0.960 *** 0.943 ***
November 1.020 1.064 *** 0.965 * 0.949 *** 0.944 ***
December 1.028 ** 1.062 *** 0.962 ** 0.945 *** 0.948 ***
Birth year
1946 (Ref.) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1947 0.897 *** 0.992 1.131 *** 1.077 *** 1.063 ***
1948 0.846 *** 1.034 *** 1.198 *** 1.154 *** 1.093 ***
1949 0.773 *** 1.002 1.244 *** 1.274 *** 1.146 ***
1950 0.692 *** 1.016 1.324 *** 1.365 *** 1.140 ***
1951 0.646 *** 1.035 *** 1.395 *** 1.454 *** 1.084 ***
1952 0.608 *** 1.046 *** 1.418 *** 1.567 *** 1.045 ***
1953 0.613 *** 1.084 *** 1.297 *** 1.595 *** 1.013
1954 0.668 *** 1.009 1.351 *** 1.638 *** 0.992
1955 0.569 *** 1.117 *** 1.251 *** 1.697 *** 0.980
1956 0.561 *** 1.174 *** 1.250 *** 1.670 *** 0.944 ***
1957 0.539 *** 1.205 *** 1.241 *** 1.690 *** 0.934 ***
1958 0.541 *** 1.207 *** 1.287 *** 1.638 *** 0.945 ***
1959 0.495 *** 1.277 *** 1.399 *** 1.578 *** 0.916 ***
1960 0.462 *** 1.342 *** 1.434 *** 1.590 *** 0.884 ***
1961 0.419 *** 1.377 *** 1.530 *** 1.568 *** 0.900 ***
1962 0.423 *** 1.362 *** 1.718 *** 1.572 *** 0.837 ***
***=Significant at p  0.01 level. **=Significant at p  0.5 level. *=Significant at p  0.1 level.
Reference.
Source: Statistics Sweden; own calculations.
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Table 2.5. Risk of marriage and divorce. Logistic regression results (odds ratio).
Marriage (all women) Divorce (married women)
Until age 37 to age 45 to age 37 to age 45
Birth month
January (Ref. ) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
February 1.015 1.017 0.983 0.989
March 1.005 1.016 0.994 1.000
April 1.009 1.032 * 0.984 0.988
May 0.999 1.026 0.985 1.002
June 1.005 1.000 1.010 1.012
July 0.982 0.972 1.029 * 1.013
August 0.977 ** 0.989 1.052 *** 1.015
September 0.959 *** 0.957 ** 1.053 *** 1.020
October 0.956 *** 0.966 * 1.042 * 1.017
November 0.949 *** 0.949 *** 1.041 *** 1.035 **
December 0.929 *** 0.922 *** 1.075 *** 1.066 ***
Birth year
1946 (Ref.) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1947 0.904 *** 0.934 1.015 1.010
1948 0.847 *** 0.905 1.023 0.999
1949 0.739 *** 0.808 0.958 *** 0.941 ***
1950 0.654 *** 0.725 0.966 ** 0.955 ***
1951 0.592 *** 0.671 0.944 *** 0.939 ***
1952 0.551 *** 0.619 0.894 *** 0.915 ***
1953 0.650 *** 0.587 0.858 *** 0.954 ***
1954 0.590 *** 0.536 0.845 *** 0.944 ***
1955 0.544 *** 0.852 ***
1956 0.507 *** 0.867 **
1957 0.473 *** 0.876
1958 0.427 *** 0.867
1959 0.398 *** 0.907
1960 0.368 *** 0.910
1961 0.342 *** 0.958
1962 0.312 *** 1.021
***=Significant at p  0.01 level. **=Significant at p  0.5 level. *=Significant at p  0.1 level.
Reference.
Source: Statistics Sweden; own calculations.
42
R
is
k
0.210
0.205
0.200
0.195
0.190
0.185
0.180
Birth month
Ja
n
Fe
b
M
ar
A
pr
M
ay
Ju
n
Ju
l
A
ug
Se
pt
O
ct
N
ov
D
ec
Figure 2.9. Divorce risk to age 37 (married women), Swedish women born 1946–
1962.
Source: Statistics Sweden; own calculations.
income. We also find that those who were oldest when they entered school, while
somewhat more likely to marry, are less likely to divorce.
The income gain from entering school up to a year older is explained by the
fact that those who entered school at an older age received rather more education.
The effects are relatively moderate; those who are 11 months older when they enter
school have an education that is one-twelfth of a school year longer and earn about
1% more.
Our study is the first to identify the effects of school-entry age on the likeli-
hood of getting married or divorced. We also identify that income and educational
attainment depend on a pupil’s age in class. The availability of a large data set
(more than 100 times the size of the largest samples applied to date) and more
objective outcome variables (administrative registers rather than individuals’ sub-
jective statements) could suggest that our approach is more valid and reliable than
earlier studies.
Our finding that the oldest in class earn 1% more does not, however, necessar-
ily support the theory that a later school-entry age improves school performance.
The finding that older students perform better can just as well be explained by the
relative class-age effect as by the absolute age of school entry. Those who are of a
higher age in the classroom may be more likely to take a leading role and may feel
that they should be in charge. Their relative age position may translate into greater
self-confidence and better school performance.
Would a one-year-earlier start to education affect human capital formation?
The evidence presented here suggests that if a child enters school one year later,
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her adult income will be about 1% greater. However, the higher income of those
who enter school earlier could be due to the relative class-age effect. If the effects
that we have observed, namely, income gains on the part of those who were among
the older students in their class, are due to the students’ relative age position, then
a change in the school-leaving age is unlikely to have any net effects on individual
productivity.
2.4 Duration of Schooling and Student Performance at the
End of Secondary School13
A number of studies that investigate the effects of educational attainment on wages
tend to identify a significant positive effect [reviews of the literature are found
in Card (1999) and Harmon et al. (2001)]. However, as these studies base their
analyses on the earnings outcomes of individuals with different educational quali-
fications, the estimates could be biased. Attaining higher education involves going
through a strong selection process where screening and signaling mechanisms can
increase wages independently of human capital gains. Studies of education level
and earnings are therefore likely to be biased, as estimates of innate abilities are
usually omitted or poorly measured; they are therefore of little relevance to our
research question regarding the effect of variation in the length of schooling.
Shortening the duration of primary and secondary schooling by one year will
not affect the screening mechanism, but it could influence the formation of human
capital. A more relevant research approach, therefore, is to analyze the variation in
the number of years required for a given qualification, which allows one to focus
on the effects of variation in the length of schooling without having to control for
signaling effects.
In one of the relatively few studies that consider the effects of the length of
schooling on human capital levels, Pischke (2003) investigates a school cohort from
several German states that lost two-thirds of a primary school year in 1966–1967
and hence graduated at an earlier age. He finds that those with shorter schooling
did not achieve less in terms of higher education, nor were their earnings lower,
although they did have a slightly higher grade repetition. Pischke (2003) argues
that this supports the notion that the duration of schooling can be shortened without
a concomitant decrease in human capital levels.
Two recent studies from Scandinavian countries investigate how extending
compulsory education can affect human capital outcomes and find this to have been
associated with higher wage levels (Aakvik et al., 2003; Meghir and Palme, 2003).
However, as these extensions of schooling resulted in the attainment of a higher
13A broader analysis of how school duration affects Swiss student performance is found in
Skirbekk (2006).
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educational qualification, signaling effects could at least partially explain observed
wage gains.
Meghir and Palme (2003) analyze the effects of a Swedish education reform un-
der which all students were required to complete nine years of schooling rather than
seven or eight years, as was previously the case. The reform was gradually imple-
mented across Sweden from 1949 to 1962. The reform was found to significantly
raise the level of education and income for certain groups, while for others it had
no effect. In particular, individuals from lower social classes with high productiv-
ity potential (revealed through their high ability levels) benefited significantly from
the reform. Without it, these individuals might not have pursued higher educational
attainment because of the costs involved (they had a low-skilled parent, which sug-
gests normative and financial restrictions to continuing in the school system beyond
compulsory schooling).
Aakvik et al. (2003) investigate the impact of an expansion of compulsory
schooling (from seven to nine years) in Norway in the 1960s on the amounts earned
by those aged 38–47 in 1995. They argue that the reform increased the propensity
to complete subsequent schooling and raised wage levels. However, in contrast to
Meghir and Palme’s (2003) analysis, the data set of Aakvik et al. (2003) lacks
information on the individuals’ cognitive abilities, which may reduce the validity
of their findings and bias their estimates.
Longer mandatory schooling may increase workers’ wages simply because it
leads to a temporary decrease in the labor supply: a relative scarcity of new labor
market entrants would increase the wages of those in the labor market, net of any
human capital gains (Oosterbeek and Webbink, 2003). Oosterbeek and Webbink
(2003) study the effect of a Dutch school reform that led to a temporary decrease
in the number of new labor market entrants and conclude that the reduced supply
increased the wage levels of those already in the labor market. They argue that if
studies, like that of Aakvik et al. (2003) and Meghir and Palme (2003), do not take
such effects into account, their estimates are likely to be biased.
2.4.1 The length of primary and secondary school in Norway
By international standards, there seems to be scope for a shift in the duration of
Norwegian education, as discussed in Section 2.1. Several countries have school
systems that allow children to leave secondary school one to two years earlier than
Norway does, without lowering human capital levels (Mullis et al., 1998). The
reasons why the same human capital level can be achieved at a younger age are
not fully understood, although the way education is organized is likely to play a
role. Efficiency gaps may be caused by the weight given to different subjects in
school, the role of the education system in achieving egalitarian aims, and the type
of teaching strategies being used.
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One reason for variations in school length could be that school systems with
shorter durations have more intense learning schedules with more hours of instruc-
tion per year. At the age of 7, Norwegian pupils receive only 570 hours of instruc-
tion per year; pupils of the European Economic Area (EEA) receive around 740,
while Scottish pupils receive 950. At the age of 10, Norway’s average is 770 hours,
the EEA’s average is 830, and Scotland’s is 950. In secondary education, Norway’s
average is 855 hours of instruction per year, the EEA’s is about 900, and Scotland’s
is 1,045 (Eurydice, 2000).
Separating students into practical and academic study tracks at a relatively late
age may cause inefficiencies in the school system and slow students’ progress, and
this can lead to an unnecessarily long schooling duration. Braathe and Ongstad
(2001) argue that the late age at which Norwegian students have to choose their
study track (15–16 years) is intended to increase social equality. Its unintended
consequence, however, is a school system that slows study progress, decreases the
amount of learning, and postpones the age of labor-market entry.
If students were to enter school one year earlier and have one year of schooling
less, they would need to make choices about specialization two years earlier than
has been the case to date. They would have to choose whether they wanted to
continue in an academic or vocational study track at the age of 13–14 instead of
15–16 years. Whether this would affect the quality of their choice is uncertain. By
international standards, making this choice at the age of 13–14 is relatively normal.
For example, in the Netherlands, the choice of study track is made after primary
school at the age of 12; in Austria and Germany, it is made when the students are
10.
2.4.2 Variations in the duration of schooling: The case of Switzerland
Different nations apply different learning strategies, some teaching relatively ad-
vanced material in the early years of schooling and others waiting until later.
This has the effect of a country’s ranking and relative performance changing with
each passing school year (Kjærnsli and Lie, 2002). Thus, studies that analyze the
scholastic performance of, for example, fourth or eighth graders—the grades usu-
ally studied in large-scale international student evaluation surveys such as PISA or
the Third International Mathematics and Science Survey (TIMSS)-Repeat (OECD,
2001; IEA, 2000)—would not be suitable for our research, as these surveys esti-
mate students’ performance in the intermediate school years, before education is
completed. This could give misleading results as students’ performance would not
be representative of the whole schooling period. A study on the performance level
of school systems should thus focus on scholastic outcome as late in the teaching
process as possible—in our case, the final year of secondary education. At this
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stage, a student’s educational achievement reflects the “end product,” the human
capital output of the full learning period we are interested in.
In effect, we need to investigate the impact of schooling variation in a set-
ting where differences exist in the length of schooling. In Norway and the other
Nordic countries, schooling length does not differ. We thus looked for a nation that
was similar to Scandinavian countries in terms of educational attainment patterns
and socioeconomic situation but where there was variation in the length of school-
ing. A nation that satisfied such requirements is Switzerland, where the length
of academic-track schooling differs between 12, 12.5, and 13 years according to
canton.
2.4.3 Description of data set
The measurement of the performance of Swiss students and their background vari-
ables is available from the TIMSS/III student evaluation data set (Mullis et al.,
1998). The TIMSS survey sampled a random selection of students across Switzer-
land to give a representative picture of the country’s school system. In addition to
test performance, TIMSS administrators collected information on students’ back-
ground characteristics, including the student’s family situation, his/her socioeco-
nomic background, leisure activities, and whether both parents were living at home.
The Swiss survey of the final year of secondary school students was part of the
international TIMSS study on student performance, conducted in 22 countries. The
survey was administered by the International Association for the Evaluation of Ed-
ucational Achievement (IEA), and experts from a number of countries participated
in the planning and implementation of the survey. Rigorous procedures were put in
place and extensive efforts were made to overcome the challenges of such a com-
parison of school systems. Quality control was given the highest attention in both
the collection and processing of the data, so that a valid and reliable measure of stu-
dent performance and background could be produced. The TIMSS survey was the
largest, most comprehensive study ever carried out to make student performance
and background information comparable at the national and international level.
The TIMSS data was collected in a way that emphasized the random selection
of the survey participants (Gonzalez et al., 1998). To ensure that the selection pro-
cess was unbiased, a two-stage sampling process was used. During the first stage,
TIMSS administrators chose schools from across the country in a nonselective way,
and in the second stage, students were randomly selected within each of the sample
schools to produce a representative sample for the whole Swiss student population.
The final year of Swiss secondary school students was tested in 1995. The
students were chosen regardless of whether they had followed an academic, tech-
nical, vocational, or other type of study track. To improve comparability among
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different cantons, we limit our sample to students from academic-track schools.14
Academic-track students are comparable because all receive an education that per-
mits direct access to university education.
The sample of Swiss academic-track students consists of 1,018 students, ran-
domly chosen across the nation to form a representative sample of the entire
academic-track student population of Switzerland. In the sample, 110 individu-
als entered school systems requiring 12 years of schooling, 382 entered systems
requiring 12.5 years, and 526 entered systems requiring 13 years. Information on
test scores,15 along with a large number of background variables is available for
all students. We investigated the results from both the mathematics and the science
literacy tests in the TIMSS survey.
As we are interested in the outcome in human capital terms from the complete
duration of primary and secondary schooling, input factors in the human capital
production function at the class and school levels are not investigated. Each stu-
dent’s performance in the final grade of secondary school is determined by a history
of many different teachers and class settings in several schools, and information on
these is not available in such a complete form. Moreover, even if teaching quality in
the final school year were particularly good or bad, the student’s human capital has
already been formed by a number of teachers over a long period, and the influence
of teachers in the final year is likely to play only a marginal role in the production
of human capital. Thus, although we can observe such class-level influences in
the last year of secondary school (which represents only a small proportion of the
student’s total schooling experience), controlling for these factors would not give a
correct impression of their influence.
On the other hand, characteristics specific to the canton, including educational
expenditure and the proportion enrolled in secondary school, tend to remain stable
over time, and we therefore include them in the analysis. The same holds true for
student-level background variables such as the language spoken at home and the
number of books owned by the student’s household.
2.4.4 Individual and canton-level data
The TIMSS data give information on student performance at the individual level.
The data set provides test results from mathematics and science, as well as back-
ground information on student characteristics that are potentially relevant to school
success, such as gender or family status. Canton-level variables were gathered from
14The TIMSS/3 final year of secondary school survey for Switzerland also sampled students who
were not in the academic track, such as vocational-track students.
15On the basis of the students’ answers to TIMSS questions, a score for each student is calculated.
The description of the design of the test and the procedure for developing students’ scores is found
in Gonzalez et al. (1998).
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Figure 2.10. The Swiss school system, academic-track schools.
Source: EDK (2003).
the Swiss national statistical office and include educational expenditure and GDP
per capita.
2.4.5 The Swiss school system
The Swiss school system is presented in Figure 2.10. After school entry, which
takes place around the age of 6 years,16 the students spend 9 years in compulsory
schooling, which comprises primary and lower-secondary school. Thereafter, indi-
viduals participate in academic-track upper-secondary education, leave the school
system, enter apprenticeships, or attend other schooling.
The variable we focus on—the duration of upper-secondary school in
academic-track schools (Maturita¨tsschulen)—varies according to the school laws
of the canton in which the school is situated. Each canton is allowed by law to set
the duration of schooling. The full duration needed to complete primary and sec-
ondary school differs between 12, 12.5, and 13 years, according to the canton. As
shown in Figure 2.10, the variation in the length of schooling comes from the length
of upper-secondary school. However, when we look at student performance in the
final year of secondary school, we are observing the human capital output from
both primary and secondary school; thus students’ performance could also reflect
human capital formation from the primary and lower-secondary school levels.
16The school entry cut-off date is, according to school entry regulations in Switzerland, as follows:
When an individual turns 6, he/she should enter school within four months either side of 30 June that
year. The school entrants are on average over 6 years when they enter school, as schools tend to start
in the fall. See also footnote 16 for information on school regulations.
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Table 2.6. Description of the cantons.
Main language
Canton is (G=German,
Population 19-year-old considered in F=French,
1995 population the analysis I=Italian)
Aargau 528,887 6,187
p
G
Appenzell Inner Rhodes 14,750 194 G
Appenzell Outer Rhodes 54,104 587 p G
Basel-city 252,331 2,668 p G
Basel-country 195,759 1,712
p
G
Bern 941,952 10,347
p
G
Fribourg 224,552 2,768
p
F
Geneva 395,466 4,254 p F
Glarus 39,410 413 G
Graubu¨nden 185,063 2,262
p
G
Jura 69,188 895
p
F
Lucerne 340,536 4,238
p
G
Neuchaˆtel 165,258 1,928 p F
Nidwalden 36,466 402 G
Obwalden 31,310 403 G
Schaffhausen 74,035 840
p
G
Schwyz 122,409 1,552
p
G
Solothurn 239,264 2,693 p G
St. Gallen 442,350 5,338 p G
Thurgau 223,372 2,546 p G
Ticino 305,199 3,428
p
I
Uri 35,876 477 G
Valais 605,677 6,721
p
G
Vaud 271,291 3,421 p F
Zug 92,392 1,131 p G
Zurich 1,175,457 12,494 p G
Source: Bundesamt fu¨r Statistik (1999), Mullis et al. (1998).
Of Switzerland’s 26 cantons, five were not tested in the TIMSS survey (see
Table 2.6), because the TIMSS data set did not take every canton specifically into
account. However, the cantons excluded are the relatively small and the least-
populated ones, constituting only about 2% of the Swiss population. A map of
Switzerland, indicating which cantons were excluded, and which have a 12-, 12.5-,
and 13-year duration of schooling, is given in Figure 2.11.
Descriptive statistics on canton-specific variables related to education, popula-
tion, and wealth, are presented in Table 2.7. These variables vary greatly across
cantons, with academic-track enrollment differing from 9% to 24%; calculated in
Swiss francs, GDP per capita differs from 26,817 (Jura) to 47,488 (Zurich), and ed-
ucational expenditure per capita differs from 6,368 (Thurgau) to 13,073 (Geneva).
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School length  
Canton not included in study
12 years
12.5 years
13 years
Zurich
GlarusSchwyz
Thurgovia
Zug
Solothurn Appenzell O.R.
St. Gall
Appenzell I.R.Argovia
Bern
Nidvalden
Obvalden
Lucerne
Basel-country
FribourgVaud
Geneva
Schaffhausen
Grisons
Ticino
Valais
Jura
Uri
Figure 2.11. Length of schooling according to canton in Switzerland.
Table 2.7. Swiss-canton-specific variables.
Percent of
School expenditure population in
per capita (5–19 GDP per capita academic-track
age group) in 1995 1995 (in Swiss school (Gymnasium)
(in Swiss francs) francs) in 1995
Aargau 7,340 38,708 12
Appenzell Outer Rhodes 7,317 32,019 14
Basel-city 8,402 41,279 19
Basel-country 13,031 40,396 19
Bern 9,489 34,676 11
Fribourg 7,590 32,199 20
Geneva 13,073 38,941 22
Graubn¨den 7,209 32,999 12
Jura 6,879 26,817 16
Lucerne 7,625 35,124 10
Neuchaˆtel 8,999 32,048 24
Schaffhausen 7,712 39,251 12
Schwyz 6,872 36,318 11
Solothurn 7,468 36,268 12
St. Gallen 7,651 35,106 11
Thurgau 6,368 34,180 9
Ticino 7,483 31,431 19
Valais 6,369 28,126 17
Vaud 8,648 37,366 18
Zug 9,162 45,802 14
Zurich 9,860 47,488 14
Source: Bundesamt fu¨r Statistik (1999).
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Table 2.8. Number of Swiss students surveyed in TIMSS according to duration
of schooling in academic-track education.
School duration (years) 12 12.5 13
Aargau 55
Appenzell Outer Rhodes 6
Basel-city 163
Basel-country 21
Bern 151
Fribourg 21
Geneva 69
Graubu¨nden 15
Jura 13
Lucerne 17
Neuchaˆtel 19
Schaffhausen 9
Schwyz 45
Solothurn 98
St. Gallen 30
Thurgau 7
Ticino 112
Valais 57
Vaud 28
Zug 6
Zurich 78
Total 110 382 526 (Full sample: N = 1018)
Source: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement.
Table 2.8 shows the number of students sampled from each school system ac-
cording to the duration of schooling. The number of students surveyed from each
region is closely correlated with the population size in each canton, as the aim of the
TIMSS study was to choose students randomly across the country. Moreover, the
number of students in 12-, 12.5-, or 13-year systems that were sampled varies con-
siderably, mainly because longer school durations are more common than shorter
ones.
Descriptive statistics for students’ test-score performances for the three school-
ing durations is given in Table 2.9. We observe that GDP per capita was highest
for those with 12.5 years of schooling, while education expenditure was highest for
those with 12 years of schooling. Participants with 12.5 years of schooling per-
formed the best, followed by those with 13 years, and those with 12 years. The re-
gions with a 12-year school duration had the largest population share in academic-
track education, while those with a 12.5-year school system had the lowest.
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Table 2.9. Descriptive statistics. Swiss students who participated in mathematics
and science literacy test.
Years of schooling 12 12.5 13
Mathematics literacy score 610.05 628.59 620.04
(Standard deviation) (68.08) (63.63) (72.15)
Science literacy score 603.90 630.51 617.11
(Standard deviation) (71.87) (72.54) (76.44)
Test language spoken at home (in %)
always 88.18 87.36 87.31
sometimes 4.55 4.75 4.81
never 7.27 7.39 7.88
Males 50.44 55.39 54.19
Students born outside Switzerland 11.95 7.35 8.60
Students living with both parents at home 81.05 82.89 82.37
Skipped a class
never 53.64 58.02 33.33
once or twice 32.73 34.22 40.7
three or four times 6.36 6.15 12.79
five or more times 7.27 1.6 13.18
Both parents have completed compulsory schooling 4.08 3.89 3.88
Student has computer at home 77.26 84.96 78.42
Study Track A and B (Greek and Latin) 20.41 31.72 23.37
Study Track C (mathematics and science) 47.81 29.3 41.18
Study Track D (modern languages) 13.12 10.89 12.58
Study Track E (economics) 17.78 27.31 21.89
Mathematics lessons 16.80 16.91 19.07
Physics lessons 7.21 7.87 8.14
School is situated in an isolated area 11.54 8.07 19.38
Parents have strong influence on curriculum 0 9.33 14.67
Teachers have strong influence on curriculum 9.91 4.35 7.15
Principal has strong influence on curriculum 0 13.91 11.04
GDP per capita (1995) 35,854 40,473 34,725
Educational expenditure 1995, per capita (those aged 5–19) 9,330 8,340 8,612
Proportion of 19 year old population attending academic-
track school (Gymnasium) 19.3 13.2 14.5
German-speaking cantons 18.37 100 61.96
Source: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
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2.4.6 Analysis
Multilevel Modeling
To examine the impact of the duration of schooling on student performance, care-
ful attention must be given to controlling for other influences at the student and
regional level. Individual-specific variables could, for example, be gender, while
regional-level variables could, for example, be educational expenditure in the can-
ton.
We use a multilevel approach, where both microlevel and macrolevel influences
are taken into account. An analysis that omits macrolevel influences could create
erroneous or misleading results if students’ outcomes are correlated within higher-
level entities. This could lead to incorrect estimation of the variance and give wrong
significance levels.17
Weighting of Students
Using stratified sampling techniques, a given number of students were sampled
within each canton from a selection of schools. The sampling procedure aimed to
make a representative selection of students from the different study tracks. The
TIMSS data also provided weightings that were used to take into account differ-
ences in the probability that a student, class, or school is selected. Using these
weightings allows us to take into account differences in the probability that a stu-
dent is selected across class and schools.
Adjusting for the Population Share Participating in Academic Track Education
The proportion of the population attending academic-track education varies ac-
cording to canton. We assume that the population’s abilities follow a normally
17If data is collected at different levels of aggregation, then the level of analysis should be at the
most disaggregated level. We therefore choose to study student performance differences at the indi-
vidual level, taking higher-level variables into account. When the data are analyzed at the lowest level,
for example, at the individual level, individuals’ group memberships need to be taken into account.
If one ignores the fact that these individuals belong to clusters, in which individual characteristics are
correlated, then the information needed to make an accurate estimate is omitted.
Analyses based solely on the lowest level would exaggerate the number of independent observa-
tions in the sample. Assume that there arem groups (independent observations), n individuals (who
belong to the different groups), and that n  m. Under these circumstances, analyses based solely
on the n level will tend to underestimate the true variance. Conversely, only considering data at
the highest level could exaggerate the variance and underestimate the significance levels, creating an
overly conservative estimate. If the hierarchical data structure is not taken into account, estimates
of the variance may be incorrect, which increases the risk of bias in the regression results (Moulton,
1990). See also Snijders and Bosker (1999) for a more detailed explanation of multilevel modeling
techniques.
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distributed function and that the individuals with the highest abilities follow
academic-track schooling. An increase in the proportion of the population par-
ticipating in academic-track schooling implies that the students are less selected,
so that their ability level on average decreases. We assume that students’ abilities
follow a standard normal distributed function, 	    , where  represents
the percentile of the normal distribution.18 Therefore, a decrease in the proportion
participating in the test is associated with a higher degree of student selectivity and
is reflected by an increase in 	.
Model Assumption
We assume that our regression model takes the following form:
T
ijh
  X
 
ijh

 
 Z
 
jh


Q
 
h


 R
ijh
(2.5)
In Equation 2.5, the dependent variable T
ijh
measures a student’s human capital
level performance (TIMSS test performance) for individual i in school j, living in
canton h. 
 
is the vector of coefficients that measures the influence of student-level
background variables X
ijh
, such as gender. 

represents school-level influences
Z
jh
, such as whether the school is situated in an isolated area. 

measures the
effect of canton-level influences Q
h
, such as educational expenditure in the canton.
The variable R
ijh
represents the error term.
Observable differences at the group level include wealth, resources spent on
education, and how selected the students are. To control for these cluster effects,
we use multilevel regression techniques when analyzing the data. The economet-
ric software package we apply to make the multilevel estimates is STATA (using
the survey set of commands available in the software). This software allows multi-
level data structures to be analyzed, with the standard errors being adjusted for the
existence of intragroup dependencies (Deaton, 1997; StataCorp, 2001).
2.4.7 Regression analysis
Each canton is likely to try to maximize the students’ education, as this is in the
interest of all agents involved in the education process: students, teachers, par-
ents, and school officials. We consider the extent to which length of schooling
is a variable that matters in the production of human capital. The individual and
canton-level variables used in the regression are briefly explained in Table 2.10. In
the regression analysis we use control variables at both the individual and canton
level, and weighting is used to make each canton equally influential. The findings
from the regression analysis are reported in Table 2.11 and Table 2.12.
18A similar adjustment for selection of students is applied in Ju¨rges et al. (2003).
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Table 2.10. Explanation of variables
Variable Explanation
Student performance Mathematics and science test results,
standardized values
Test language spoken at home Dummies indicating whether student speaks the
always language used in the test at home
sometimes
never
Males Dummy variable reporting student’s sex
Student born outside Whether the student was born outside Switzerland
Switzerland
Student lives with both Dummy variable indicating student’s response that
parents at home both mother and father live at home
Skipped a class Dummies indicating whether student skipped a class
never
once or twice
three or four times
five or more times
Both parents have completed Indicates whether both parents have only compulsory
compulsory schooling schooling as their highest level of completed education
Student has computer at home Indicates that the student has computer access at home
Study track Dummies indicating the type of study track the
student is following
Mathematics/physics lessons Number of weekly lessons of mathematics or physics
(data on other subjects are not available) in
upper-secondary school. The total for upper-
secondary school, from 10th to up to 13th grade.
School is situated in an Dummy indicating population density at school location.
isolated area Indicates that the school is situated in isolated
or rural area
Parents/teacher/principal Indicates whether parents, teachers, or the principal
strong influence have a strong influence on determining the school
on curriculum curriculum
GDP per capita GDP per capita, measured at the canton level (1995
monetary values)
Educational expenditure per Educational expenditure per capita (5–19 year age
capita groups), measured at the canton level, 1995
monetary values
Proportion of population aged Indicator of population share in academic track
19 attending academic-track school, defined as      , where a
school (Gymnasium) decrease in the proportion participating in the
test  is associated with better student
selection, so that  increases
German-speaking canton Indicates whether the student lives in a canton
where German is the main language
Years of school duration Dummies indicating the duration of primary and
12 secondary schooling, where the student is enrolled
12.5
13
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Table 2.11. Dependent variable: Mathematics literacy. Swiss final secondary
school year (academic track).
Coeff. Std. dev. Coeff. Std. dev.
Constant 454.37 41.53 *** 485.01 54.84 ***
Individual-level variables
Test language spoken at home
always Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
sometimes – 19.57 10.29 * –15.33 10.74
never – 19.07 11.66 – 1.31 13.62
Male 33.31 6.83 *** 29.79 8.05 ***
Student born outside Switzerland –1.39 7.37 –9.76 8.69
Student lives with both parents at home 1.71 7.53 –7.75 7.07
Skipped a class
never Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
once or twice –1.92 6.79 –2.96 8.32
three or four times 4.18 12.56 4.75 14.87
five or more times –2.51 9.38 –5.54 11.20
Both parents have compulsory schooling –8.11 9.30 –14.25 8.49 *
Student has computer at home 22.13 7.64 *** 27.65 8.13 ***
Study track A and B (Greek and Latin) Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Study track C (mathematics and science) 44.57 18.45 ** 48.91 20.40 **
Study track D (modern languages) –37.70 11.75 *** –21.00 11.36 *
Study track E (economics) –9.27 9.17 –0.59 9.95
Mathematics lessons –1.42 1.58 –1.11 1.88
School-level variables
School is situated in an isolated area 19.82 8.52 **
Parents have strong influence on curriculum 10.79 8.96
Teachers have strong influence on curriculum 6.43 13.13
Principal has strong influence on curriculum –5.14 14.05
Canton-level variables
GDP per capita (in 1,000 Swiss francs) 1.47 0.91 * 2.69 0.93 ***
Educational expenditure (in 1,000 Swiss
francs) –1.81 1.99 –5.82 2.10 ***
Share of population in academic-track
education () 124.64 25.67 *** 82.08 26.31 ***
Canton speaks German –14.49 10.63 –25.31 10.61 **
Years of school duration
12 Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
12.5 –4.09 12.63 –0.71 10.56
13 –4.46 11.40 2.66 13.60
Number of observations 814 650
Number of cantons 21 15
R (adjusted) 0.29 0.30
 = 10 % level,  = 5 % level,    = 1 % level
Coefficient; Standard deviation; Reference category
Source: Mullies et al. (1998); own calculations.
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Table 2.12. Dependent variable: Science literacy. Swiss final secondary school
year (academic track).
Coeff. Std. dev. Coeff. Std. dev.
Constant 393.28 34.51 *** 392.93 47.42 ***
Individual-level variables
Test language spoken at home
always Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
sometimes –37.05 13.27 *** –41.96 13.30 ***
never 5.44 10.95 30.21 11.48 ***
Male 49.97 7.29 *** 47.93 8.30 ***
Student born outside Switzerland –13.05 8.69 –22.04 8.43 ***
Student lives with both parents at home –4.73 7.45 –10.94 8.41
Skipped a class
never Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
once or twice –4.00 7.02 –2.59 6.10
three or four times –12.76 15.12 –12.18 11.85
five or more times –14.97 11.06 –22.86 13.72 *
Both parents have compulsory schooling 5.37 16.08 –9.95 12.79
Student has computer at home 21.52 8.02 *** 25.73 9.53 ***
Study Track A and B (Greek and Latin) Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Study Track C (mathematics and science) 34.64 13.54 ** 48.32 18.53 ***
Study Track D (modern languages) –28.58 9.97 *** –6.46 11.35
Study Track E (economics) –3.46 10.06 14.89 10.84
Physics lessons 0.21 2.49 0.76 3.40
School-level variables
School is situated in an isolated area 25.33 13.20 *
Parents have strong influence on curriculum 0.26 11.27
Teachers have strong influence on curriculum 19.17 18.26
Principal has strong influence on curriculum 3.99 14.21
Canton-level variables
GDP per capita (in 1,000 Swiss francs) 1.78 0.89 ** 3.82 1.25 ***
Educational expenditure (in 1,000 Swiss
francs) –0.56 2.11 –4.68 2.92
Share of population in academic track
education () 128.13 26.22 *** 75.26 34.84 **
Canton speaks German 2.16 9.99 –9.54 15.39
Years of school duration
12 Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
12.5 –9.81 12.41 –1.51 17.23
13 –4.20 9.38 6.50 14.79
Number of observations 814 655
Number of cantons 21 15
R (adjusted) 0.36 0.40
Coefficient; Standard deviation; Reference category
= 10 % level, **= 5 % level, ***= 1 % level
Source: Mullies et al. (1998); own calculations.
58
Length of Schooling
In none of the regressions is the length of schooling positively associated with the
quality of schooling. Differences in school duration of up to a year do not appear
to affect student performance, as neither mathematics nor science test results are
significantly affected, whether it takes 12, 12.5, or 13 years to graduate. Those
enrolled in a school system with a duration of 12.5 years scored slightly better (see
descriptive findings, Table 2.9), mainly because this length of schooling is common
in cantons with high student selection.
The result, namely, that the canton-based variation in schooling duration does
not matter for student performance, does not change if one excludes any of the
reported variables. The result is not sensitive to the removal of cantons with few re-
spondents (i.e., whether or not one omits cantons with fewer than 10 respondents),
and the results are also robust when other methods than weighted least squares
(WLS) are used (e.g., OLS regressions give similar results).
Language Spoken at Home
If the language normally spoken at home is not the same language as the test lan-
guage, this affects the student’s score. For the science test, those who report that
the test language is sometimes spoken at home, score about 0.5 standard deviations
below those who always speak the test language at home. This finding may be due
to the fact that those who sometimes speak the test language at home are second-
or third-generation immigrants, who tend to have lower subject scores than native
speakers.19
A somewhat surprising finding is that the effect of never speaking the test lan-
guage at home increases the science test results substantially. One potential ex-
planation for this is that the group which reports never speaking the test language
at home may contain a high share of migrants from other Swiss cantons, where
another of the official languages is spoken (French, German, Italian). If these are
internal migrants (or their children) across the Swiss language barriers, this could
be an indication of positive selection, which could explain their higher test scores.
Gender
Male students score significantly higher than female students in both the mathe-
matics and the science tests. A similar gender difference between male and female
students was also found in other international surveys of student performance (e.g.,
19For example, the PISA survey, which compared immigrant and native performance across a
number of countries, found that immigrant students in the majority of countries surveyed perform
significantly worse than the native students (OECD, 2001).
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Mullis et al., 1998; OECD, 2001). There is no clear consensus as to why such a gen-
der gap exists; societal expectations and norms, as well as biological differences,
could play a role [see Halpern (2000) for a discussion].
Student Born Outside Switzerland
Students born in a country other than Switzerland do not perform significantly dif-
ferently on the performance tests from students born in Switzerland. The lack
of significance level may reveal a large variation in student performance for first-
generation immigrants, as some immigrant groups may be positively selected and
outperform natives, while others may be negatively selected and underperform na-
tives (OECD, 2001).
Both Parents Live at Home
Some studies suggest that being raised in a household with only one parent under-
mines a child’s educational performance (Gruber, 2000; OECD, 2001). In contrast,
we find that the impact of having both parents living at home does not affect a
student’s performance in mathematics or science literacy.
Student Having Skipped a Class
As a measure of a student’s self-discipline and eagerness to learn, we consider
the impact on students’ school performance of having sometimes or often skipped
classes. We find that there is no significant impact of this variable on mathematics
or science literacy scores.
One possible explanation for this finding is that students skip classes because
they are either negatively selected (e.g., because of social problems) or positively
selected (and therefore skip classes because they do not feel they gain from partic-
ipating in them). Hence, the effects of skipping class have opposing consequences
on student outcomes and could lead to an insignificant net effect.
Both Parents Have Compulsory Schooling
The impact of parents’ having a low level of education is found to have a nega-
tive effect on student performance. However, this effect is significant only in the
mathematics test and only when school level variables are taken into account.
Student Has Computer at Home
The impact of having a computer at home has a strong positive effect on subject
tests in both mathematics and science. Not having a computer at home may reflect
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that the student comes from a less-wealthy background, with less access to infor-
mation and services available through computer use. This result contradicts earlier
findings by Angrist and Lavy (2002) who, in a study of Israeli schools, argue that
computer availability does not relate to student performance.
Study Track
The type of educational program in which the student is enrolled is of vital im-
portance for student success (in Swiss academic-track education). Students partic-
ipating in study tracks A, B (Greek and Latin), and E (economics) are not signif-
icantly different from each another. However, students in study track D (modern
languages) are found to perform less well in both mathematics and science, but
this becomes insignificant when school-level variables are controlled for. Students
specializing in mathematics and science programs (study track C) perform much
better in both subjects.
Number of Lessons
The number of lessons attended by students in mathematics and physics are not
found to affect student performance in mathematics or science. This finding is
somewhat surprising as one would expect that a longer time spent focusing on
problems would improve performance. However, as Ramseier et al. (1999) point
out, the variation in number of lessons taught may be too limited a factor to be rele-
vant to student performance in Switzerland. Moreover, unobserved factors, such as
efficiency and quality of education and how compatible the students are with each
other and their teachers, may explain why the number of lessons does not seem to
affect test scores.
School is Situated in an Isolated Area
In both subjects, students from rural or isolated areas perform substantially better
than other students. This is possibly the case because a smaller and more positively
selected share of the students attend academic-track schools in the more-rural areas
of the cantons.
Influence of Parents, Teachers, and Principals on Curriculum
Schools reporting that parents, teachers, or principals have a strong influence on
the curriculum do not perform differently from other schools. This finding suggests
that whether the curriculum is determined centrally or at the school level does not
affect student performance.
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GDP per capita
The wealth of the canton, measured as GDP per capita, has a positive effect on
both mathematics and science scores. The estimated coefficient suggests that when
GDP per capita rises by approximately 2,900 Swiss francs or 2,300 Swiss francs20
respectively, the corresponding test scores in mathematics and science go up by
0.1 standard deviations. This implies that the difference between the richest and
poorest cantons, Zu¨rich and Jura (around 20,671 Swiss francs) translates into about
0.7 (mathematics) and 0.9 (science) standard deviations.
Education Expenditure per capita
Higher per capita educational expenditure does not improve student performance
in either mathematics or science and is actually found to be associated with lower
test performance in the mathematics school-level regression analysis. This finding
suggests that higher school expenditure leads to variation in the use of education
factor inputs that are unrelated to student performance. This is in line with other re-
gional and international studies on student performance which show that resource
use does not improve, and can sometimes be negatively associated with, educa-
tional performance (e.g., Hanushek, 1997; Hanushek and Luque, 2003).
Population Share in Academic-Track Schooling
Based on the assumption that a student’s abilities follow a normally distributed
function, test performance improves when the share of the population participating
in academic-track education is smaller. The regression results strongly support
the fact that a higher population share participating in academic-track studies is
associated with decreased selection and weaker student performance. This is in line
with studies which conclude that heredity plays a strong role in determining ability.
For example, a committee of leading intelligence researchers from the American
Psychological Association argue that the share of heritability in intelligence lies
close to 75% (Neisser et al., 1996), although others have suggested a somewhat
lower estimate [e.g., Devlin et al. (1997) who estimate it to be 48%].
In Switzerland, the most-selected students come from Thurgau. These students
are high performers. As shown in Table 2.7, only 9% of the 19-year-old population
in Thurgau are enrolled in academic-track education, as opposed to Neuchaˆtel, the
canton with the lowest selection, where academic-track education encompasses as
much as 24% of those aged 19. This may partially explain why students in Thurgau
20The standard deviation for the whole sample is 80.8 for mathematics and 87.0 for science. Hence,
an increase of 2,900 Swiss francs (mathematics), 		  	
	   	 or 2,300 Swiss francs (science),
	  	   	 equals one-tenth of the respective standard deviations.
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score 0.6 standard deviations higher in mathematics and 0.9 standard deviations
higher in science than those in Neuchaˆtel.
Language Spoken in Canton
Living in a German-speaking canton is not found to have an overall effect on stu-
dent performance. The only exception is when the mathematics results are being
analyzed at the school level, with the German-speaking cantons being found to
perform considerably less well than the rest.
Sample Size and Adjusted R-Square Levels
The sample size in the regression is slightly lower than the full TIMSS sample
of 1,018 students. The reason for the omission of some of the students from the
regressions is that information on some of their explanatory variables is missing.
However, the students omitted represent only a small proportion of the total sam-
ple (about 2%), and including them (by excluding the explanatory variables with
missing information) does not alter the sign of the variables or their significance
levels.
Levels of adjusted R-squared in the analysis are relatively low: in the range 0.29
to 0.40, which is common in other analyses of test-score differentials. One example
is Hanushek and Kimko (2000) who report adjusted R-squared at levels below 0.26
in a micro-econometric study of educational differences. This result is likely to be
due to unobserved heterogeneity, as some of the most important determinants of
human capital are not taken into account. For example, as the evidence put forward
in Section 2.2 suggests, inherited influences on ability levels are one of the most
important sources of skill variation, and our lack of this type of information is likely
to substantially decrease adjusted R-squared values.
2.4.8 Conclusion
We assessed the effect of the duration of primary and secondary schooling on stu-
dent achievement in the final year of secondary school. The hypothesis tested is
whether having 12, 12.5, or 13 years of schooling affects student performance.
Student performance in mathematics and science tests was investigated, and no
significant impact of the school duration was identified. For the case of Switzer-
land at least, this evidence suggests that a primary and secondary school duration
of 12.5 or 13 years does not lead to better student performance relative to a duration
of 12 years.
3
Completing Education and the Timing of
Births and Marriage: Findings from a
Birth-Month Experiment in Sweden
This chapter investigates another effect of a school reform on public pension sys-
tems: the extent to which a younger school graduation age would bring down the
childbearing age and increase fertility. The chapter has two sections. First, we re-
view earlier studies on the relationship between graduation age and the timing of
demographic events; then, we present our own findings on the subject.
The age at entering parenthood has tended to increase in parallel with an ex-
pansion of education in most Western countries, but past investigations have been
unable to identify the causal effect of a change in the school-leaving age on the
childbearing age. To identify the effects on fertility of a shift in the school-leaving
age, we study the case of Sweden, where school-entry laws allow us to carry out
such an investigation. We apply a method that can overcome the problems of endo-
geneity inherent in earlier studies and identify any causal relationship between the
school-leaving age and the timing of demographic events in adulthood.
3.1 Graduation Age and the Age at Parenthood
Many analyses of changes in the timing of fertility in developed countries empha-
size the fact that women have made a substantially increased investment in higher
or professional education in response to increased returns to human capital, im-
proved access to the labor market, and more effective contraception [see, for ex-
ample, Westoff and Ryder (1977); Gustafsson (2001); Goldin and Katz (2002);
Kohler et al. (2002)]. Goldin and Katz (2002), for instance, argue that the con-
traceptive pill has enabled women to enjoy sexual relations without jeopardizing
the prolonged and expensive investments they have made in human capital by an
unwanted birth. Consistent with this argument, Blossfeld and Huinink (1991) show
that few women have children during their time in education. Demographic behav-
ior in early adulthood has therefore been characterized by a very typical sequence
in which the completion of education is followed first by entry into the labor market
and then by the birth of the first child (Marini, 1984; Blossfeld and De Rose, 1992;
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Corijn, 1996);1 moreover, the extension of education in recent decades has shifted
the onset of this sequence to increasingly older ages.
In explanations of the timing and level of fertility in developed countries, the
role of education and human capital investments has been emphasized. Despite this,
very few studies have succeeded in establishing any causal effects of “age at gradu-
ation” or “duration of education” on fertility patterns. Analyses of this question are
often hampered by methodological challenges pertaining to sample selectivity and
unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, studies of the relationship between com-
pletion of education and the timing of fertility are usually based on comparisons of
subgroups of women with different educational qualifications. A common problem
with these studies is that women whose ages differ at school graduation also have
differences in terms of potentially unobserved characteristics that affect educational
attainment, such as preferences, abilities, family backgrounds—all characteristics
that influence fertility and behavior with respect to marriage. Standard empirical
approaches therefore fail to identify the causal effect on fertility and marriage in
early adulthood of a longer duration of schooling and an older age at completion of
schooling.
Analyses that overcome the above problem frequently rely on instrumental vari-
able techniques, fixed-effect models, or “natural experiments” (Rosenzweig and
Wolpin, 2000). In this study we pursue the last approach—natural experiments—
and utilize the fact that the enrollment of children in school in Sweden occurs in the
calendar year in which they become 7 years old. Children born during two consecu-
tive months, December and the following January, therefore belong to two different
school cohorts and graduate from school in two different calendar years. They thus
differ by almost one year in the age at graduation from compulsory schooling, de-
spite being born an average of just one month apart. On the assumption that parents
cannot time the births of their children to the exact month, this characteristic of the
Swedish school system results not only in an exogenous variation in the age at en-
try and completion of compulsory education but also in the age at graduation from
higher levels of education among those who continue their education after compul-
sory schooling. This variation allows us to identify the causal effect of completing
schooling at a higher age on important demographic events during the transition to
adulthood, net of unobserved characteristics affecting schooling decisions and net
of variations in human capital that are otherwise associated with differences in the
age at graduation from school.2
1This sequence has been particularly strong in Sweden, as the benefits paid for up to 480 days
after the birth of a child increase with a woman’s income prior to childbirth (Riksfo¨rsakringsverket,
2002). Entering the labor market and gaining work experience prior to the birth of a child, therefore,
means higher benefits during maternity leave.
2Smith (1990) points out that natural experiments, such as the birth-month-induced age differ-
ences in school enrollment and graduation used in this paper, are powerful factors in terms of identi-
fying the causal effects of different ages at graduation on demographic behaviors in early adulthood;
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We find that small differences in the school-leaving age, while having relatively
profound effects on the timing of fertility and marriage, do not seem to affect com-
pleted fertility and the probability of marrying before the age of 45. An eleven-
month difference in the age at graduation between those born in December and
those born in the subsequent January, for instance, results in an almost five-month
difference in the timing of the first birth. About 45% of the difference in the age at
graduation from compulsory schooling is therefore not compensated for during the
average 8–10 years in early adulthood between graduation from ninth grade and the
birth of the first child. Moreover, our study finds that the changes in the age at first
birth (because of the different graduation years of women born in December and
in the following January) have remarkably little effect on the timing between the
first and second child, which indicates that there is no conscious compensation for
birth-month-induced variation in the age at first birth. Our study also finds that the
birth month has similar effects within birth cohorts, with women born in January
tending to experience births and marriage at an older age than those born in the
previous December.
The effects of this exogenous variation in the age at graduation on demographic
behavior in early adulthood are relevant for several reasons. First, our study reveals
the sensitivity of the timing and quantum of fertility and marriage behavior with re-
spect to “shocks” that delay or anticipate the age at which young women graduate
from compulsory schooling and subsequently make conscious decisions about 1)
further human capital investments, 2) entry into the labor force, and 3) leaving the
parental home. Second, our analyses are informative about the demographic impor-
tance of social age, defined as the average age of one’s school cohort, as compared
with biological age. In particular, in terms of demographic behaviors, our results
indicate the considerable relevance of social interaction among individuals of the
same school cohort as compared with interactions among persons of the same age.
Third, the results of this study throw light on some of the potential effects on the
timing and quantum of marriage and fertility of policies that are currently being
implemented or discussed in several European countries (including, for instance,
Germany) and that are intended to compress the duration of schooling without re-
ducing human capital levels. Fourth, our results are informative for assessing the
extent to which differences in the timing of fertility and marriage in cross-sectional
country analyses may be related to differences in the schooling system and the age
at which young adults complete compulsory education.
however, these experiments cannot necessarily identify the causal mechanisms for such influences on
behavior. As in other studies in the related experimental literature, our ability to empirically identify
the behavioral mechanisms generating the different demographic patterns by birth month are lim-
ited by data that do not include extensive information on the determinants of fertility and marriage
behavior and specifically do not include determinants related to the social environment in schools.
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3.1.1 A case study of Sweden
To assess the effects of the graduation age on the timing of demographic events,
we study a setting where variations in the timing of schooling are unrelated to
other factors. In Sweden students are subject to laws on the age of school entry and
graduation. The most important aspect of this system of enrollment and compulsory
completion of ninth grade education is that variations in the month of birth cause
systematic variations in the school graduation age and in the school cohort to which
an individual belongs. A more detailed description of the Swedish school system
is given in Section 2.3.
Based on the variations in enrollment and age at graduation, our study is able
to formulate a simple hypothesis to identify the effect of school enrollment on sub-
sequent fertility outcomes, net of unobserved characteristics affecting schooling
decisions and net of variations in human capital that are otherwise associated with
differences in the age at school graduation. Thus, if the school cohort and the age
at school graduation have an effect on demographic behavior in early adulthood,
the timing of demographic events—such as the birth of a child or a marriage—
should differ according to birth month. This effect should be most pronounced
between individuals born in December and individuals born in the subsequent Jan-
uary, where our analyses reveal the combined impact of graduating eleven months
older/younger and being in different school cohorts. In addition, a gradual decrease
in the age at graduation should occur within each birth cohort (e.g., women born in
February graduate one month younger than women born in January), and within-
cohort comparisons of the fertility and the timing of marriage by birth month can
reveal the impact of changes in the age at graduation that depend on belonging to
the same school cohort.
The basic assumption underlying the above interpretation is that the month of
birth affects the variation in the tempo and possibly the quantum of demographic
behaviors in early adulthood because of birth-month-induced variation in 1) the age
at entering compulsory school, 2) the school cohort, and 3) the relative age within
a school cohort. The school cohort also determines the age at graduation from
compulsory schooling as well as the age at graduation from higher secondary and
tertiary education for those who continue their education.
School cohort is also important because it determines the group of individu-
als who are likely to form the primary peer group in childhood and adolescence.
Moreover, the simultaneous progression through the various school grades is an
important factor that strengthens identification with peers in the same class and
heightens the importance of the social influence exerted by members of the school
cohort. If the influence of school cohorts is strong, then the social age should be
an important indicator for describing demographic events in early adulthood. The
variation in biological age between those born early and those born late in the year
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would matter less, as their social age is identical. Differences in social age would
be associated with notable differences in the timing, and perhaps also quantum, of
demographic behaviors.
The main competing hypotheses, other than the age at school entry and gradu-
ation, that can potentially explain the influences of the birth month on the timing of
fertility and marriage are preferences for a specific season in which these events oc-
cur. For instance, it is well known that births peak in the spring and that marriages
are concentrated in spring and summer. Preferences for such a seasonal timing of
events can lead to birth-month effects: individuals born earlier in the year will tend
to be older when they have children or marry later than persons born late in the
year. However, we are able to rule out seasonality as a major factor driving our
results. Preferences for a specific season cannot explain the stark differences in
the timing of fertility and marriage, documented by this chapter, between women
born in December and women born in the subsequent January. These women are of
virtually the same age and are born at almost the same time. Seasonal preferences
would suggest a similar timing of demographic events for those women. If this is
not the case, as we find below, it is likely to be due to the difference in their social
age, which stems from the cut-off-date mechanism pertaining to school entry.
3.2 Empirical Estimates of the Impact of the School-
Leaving Age on Fertility Patterns: The Case of
Sweden
Figure 3.1 shows the trend in the Swedish total fertility rate (TFR) and the mean
age at first birth from 1975 to 2000. In common with many other European coun-
tries, fertility in Sweden started to decline in the 1970s and stabilized by the end of
that decade. Whereas fertility levels continued to stagnate or decline in many Eu-
ropean countries during the 1980s, Sweden experienced a baby boom after 1985.
Between 1985 and 1990 the TFR increased from 1.74 to a level of 2.13, exceeding
replacement level. This substantial increase in fertility was caused by an increased
propensity for childbearing at very short birth intervals because of the introduction
of the so-called speed premium on childbearing that provided financial incentives
to space children closely (Andersson, 1999).3 The sharp economic downturn in the
early 1990s led to an equally swift baby bust in the late 1990s (Andersson, 2002;
Hoem, 2000), and by 1999 the total fertility rate had declined to a historically low
level of 1.5. This change in fertility levels over time was accompanied by a rapid
3The speed premium refers to rules introduced in the Swedish parental-leave system that allow
parents (typically women) to maintain an earlier (and often higher) level of income compensation
during leave if the next child arrives within a fixed period of time. In 1980 this period was set at 24
months and extended to 30 months in 1986.
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Figure 3.1. Total fertility rate (TFR) and mean age at birth of first child.
Source: Statistics Sweden; own calculations.
postponement of fertility. The (period) mean age at first birth, for instance, in-
creased from 24 to 28 years within the three decades from 1970 to 2000. The only
slowdown during this fertility postponement occurred during the period of the baby
boom, while the baby bust after 1990 coincided with a renewed increase in the pace
of fertility postponement.
Figure 3.2 shows that the average number of years of school for females over
the age of 25 also increased from about eight years in 1975 to about 11 years by
2000, that is, by almost the same amount as the mean age at first birth [see also
Barro and Lee (2000)]. Although compulsory schooling in Sweden ends at the age
of 16, most women and men stay in upper-secondary school for another three years
(Stanfors 2003, pp. 75ff). In 1998, for instance, 97.1% of boys and 97.3% of girls
entered upper-secondary school after completing their compulsory schooling. A
similar increase in the schooling level occurred across birth cohorts (Table 3.1).
This extension of schooling was even more pronounced among women than
men. For example, about one-third of all women in the 1929 cohort participated
in upper-secondary education, while only 10% participated in tertiary education.
These enrollment rates increased to 50% and 40% respectively for the cohort of
women born in 1974.
A detailed description of the data we use in our analysis is given in Section 2.3.
Our analysis primarily utilizes a woman’s educational attainment variables, her
month/year of birth, the month/year of birth of all her children, and the month/year
of her first marriage. A basic summary of the statistics for these variables is given
in Table 3.2.
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Figure 3.2. Years of education for women at age 45 and mean age at birth of first
child.
Source: Statistics Sweden; own calculations.
Table 3.1. Highest level of education by birth cohort.
Post– Post–
Upper- secondary secondary
Birth Compulsory secondary education education Missing
cohort education education   3 years  3 years values
1929 57% 29% 5% 6% 2%
1931 54% 31% 5% 8% 2%
1934 48% 34% 7% 9% 2%
1939 38% 39% 9% 12% 1%
1941 34% 41% 10% 14% 1%
1944 28% 44% 11% 16% 1%
1949 21% 46% 14% 18% 1%
1951 18% 47% 15% 18% 1%
1954 18% 46% 17% 18% 1%
1959 14% 51% 18% 16% 1%
1961 12% 53% 18% 16% 1%
1964 11% 54% 17% 16% 1%
1969 10% 53% 18% 19% 1%
1971 9% 51% 17% 22% 1%
1974 9% 49% 15% 26% 2%
Source: Statistics Sweden, Swedish Register of Education (Stanfors, 2003).
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Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics.
Sample size 863,304
Average number of children 1.95
(standard deviation) (1.19)
Birth cohorts
Percentage who, before 31 December 1999 1946–1951 1952–1957 1958–1962
had a first child 86.83% 84.94% 82.93%
had a second child 71.16% 70.80% 69.64%
had a first marriage 83.61% 75.06% 64.16%
emigrated 2.06% 1.89% 2.37%
died* 3.00% 1.70% 1.12%
Share of the Approximate no. of
Highest completed education level sample years of schooling**
Compulsory schooling (Pre-Reform)*** 4.50% 8.0
Compulsory schooling (Post-reform) 13.55% 9.0
Upper-secondary school, up to 2 years
(mostly vocational study tracks) 38.59% 11.5
Upper-secondary school, 3 years or more
(academically oriented study tracks) 9.20% 13.0
Tertiary education, up to 2 years 17.80% 5.0
Tertiary education, above 3 years 14.10% 17.0
Tertiary education, PhD/Licentiate degree 0.37% 21.0
Unspecified education 1.91%
Birth cohorts
Age at demographic events 1946–1951 1952–1957 1958–1962
First child 24.14 25.20 26.22
Second child 27.55 28.48 28.89
First marriage 25.18 26.88 27.14
* Of the individuals who died, 92 had first emigrated.
** Years of schooling estimated by the Swedish Level of Living Survey for 1945–1955 cohorts
(Meghir and Palme, 2001).
***Between 1949 and 1962, compulsory schooling was extended from seven or eight years to nine
years in Sweden (see Meghir and Palme, 2001 for details). Although the reform was introduced
gradually, this was not done in any way that affected the cut-off month and the age pattern of school
enrolment. We therefore do not distinguish between pre-reform and post-reform compulsory school-
ing in our analysis.
Source: Statistics Sweden; own calculations.
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While the subset of women experiencing a first or second birth does not change
substantially across birth cohorts, the percentage of women who marry declines in
younger cohorts. There have also been substantial increases in the age at first and
second birth across cohorts, paralleling the increase in the mean age at first mar-
riage. In addition, about 82% of all women in our data set continued their education
after finishing compulsory schooling, the most widespread levels of completed ed-
ucation being one or two years of upper-secondary education followed by tertiary
education.
3.2.1 Results
In this section we first discuss results pertaining to the effects of a woman’s birth
month on her age at the birth of her first and second child and the age at her first
marriage (Figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5; Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5). We also use logistic
regressions to report the probabilities of experiencing these events prior to age 37 or
45 (Table 3.6), and we provide an analysis of completed fertility and its relationship
to a woman’s birth month (Figure 3.6). To investigate the mechanisms mediating
the effects of the birth month on the timing of fertility and marriage, we also report
an analysis of the effect of the birth month on the level of completed education
(Tables 3.7 and 3.8).
Age at Birth of First Child
As our analyses are based on register data that include a large number of women,
even simple plots of the mean age at the birth of the first child by birth month
and cohort can reveal the influence of the birth month and of the age at school
graduation on the timing of fertility. In Figure 3.3 we therefore depict the (cohort)
mean age at first birth for women by birth month for the cohorts 1946–1962. Across
all cohorts, the mean age at first birth increases from 23.8 years to 26.3 years, then
stabilizes and declines for the youngest birth cohorts (those born 1960–1962). This
stabilization and decline, depicted in Figure 3.3, are due to our data having been
censored and to the fact that many women in the youngest cohorts had not, as of
1999, completed childbearing.
The two most important aspects of Figure 3.3 pertain to 1) the trend in the mean
age at first birth across birth months within each birth cohort and 2) the difference
in the mean age at first birth between the two consecutive months: December, at the
end of one calendar year, and January, at the beginning of the next. The first aspect
shows the effect of birth month on the timing of fertility within a school (and birth)
cohort, and the second aspect reveals the effect of different school cohorts and
graduation ages for individuals who are of almost identical age. Figure 3.3 shows
that the greatest difference in the age at first birth between any two successive
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Figure 3.3. Age at birth of first and second child.
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calendar months occurs between the December of one year and the January of the
next. On average, women born in December experience their first birth 4.9 months
earlier than women born one month later in the January of the next year. Adjusting
for the increase of 2.5 years in the age at first birth across the cohorts 1946–1962
does not affect this finding.4 Further, despite the trend toward delayed fertility
across cohorts, there is a decline in the age at first birth within every birth cohort.
On average, women born in January are 3.1 months older at the birth of their first
child than women born in December of the same calendar year, and the highest age
at first birth was found for those born in spring, in particular in April.5
In Table 3.3 we investigate the above pattern further and report the results of
a piecewise constant hazard rate model that includes dummies for birth cohorts.6
By introducing an interaction between the birth month and the age of a woman, we
4The average age at first birth increased by 28.5 months from the 1946 to the 1962 cohort, which
means that the monthly trend effect is 28.5 months/192 months = 0.15 months. Applying this will
decrease the effect on the December-to-January difference from 4.9 to 4.7 months. However, this
adjustment also means that the within-year January-to-December difference will increase from 3.1
months to 4.7 months.
One could also argue that the trend of increasing ages identically affects individuals born within a
year, as they all belong to the same social age group and are therefore similarly affected by factors
influencing the timing of demographic events. Hence, one should adjust for the effect of increasing
ages for every subsequent cohort and not for every subsequent birth month. In terms of age at first
birth this means that the age difference from December to the subsequent January would be 3.3
months instead of 4.9 months.
5A possible explanation of this could be that women from higher social classes, who tend to be
older when they have children, are more likely to give birth in spring. See Section 2.3 for a discussion
of this issue.
6Individuals are censored from these analyses when they emigrate or die.
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Table 3.3. Risk of having a first child (all women). Piecewise constant hazard
rate model (proportional hazard rates).
Baseline hazard Up to 25 years 0.022 ***
25–28 years 0.139 ***
28 years and above 0.073 ***
Born January–June: Up to 25 years 0.960 ***
Age-specific effect 25–28 years 1.012 **
28 years and above 1.031 ***
Women’s birth year 1946 (reference) 1.000
1947 1.000
1948 1.000
1949 0.992
1950 0.977 ***
1951 0.960 ***
1952 0.949 ***
1953 0.942 ***
1954 0.920 ***
1955 0.917 ***
1956 0.905 ***
1957 0.904 ***
1958 0.901 ***
1959 0.886 ***
1960 0.889 ***
1961 0.876 ***
1962 0.882 ***
***=Significant at p0.01. **=Significant at p0.5. *=Significant at p0.1.
Source: Statistics Sweden; own calculations.
allow the effect of the birth month to differ according to three age groups: below
age 25, age 25–28, and above age 28. These age categories roughly reflect first-
birth childbearing at relatively young ages, at “prime” ages, and at relatively late
ages.
Those born in the first half of the year and among the oldest in the class have
a lower risk of having a first child at relatively young childbearing ages compared
with those born in the second half of the year. As the first-birth risks increase with
age in this age period, women born during the first half of the year “act younger”
than those born later in the year. During the prime and relatively late ages of first-
birth childbearing, however, this pattern reverses: women born early in a calendar
year have a higher first-birth hazard than women born late in a year. As, at older
ages, first-birth rates begin to decline with age, this pattern again indicates that
women born early in a calendar year behave as if they were biologically younger,
while those born later in the year behave as if they were older than those born early
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in the year. These results suggest that it is the birth month of a woman that primarily
affects the timing of fertility, while leaving unaffected the overall probability of
experiencing a first birth (see also Table 3.6 that shows the absence of significant
birth-month effects in logistic regressions for the probability of having at least one
child prior to the age of 37 and 45).
The observation that women born early in a calendar year “act younger” and
that those born late in a year “act older” is consistent with our earlier interpretation
that relate birth-month effects to school-cohort influences. The social age is below
the biological age for those born early in a year, and it exceeds biological age for
those born late in a year. Within a birth cohort, the timing of fertility is therefore
“pulled” toward the timing that corresponds to the social age that is equal to the
average age within school cohorts. Furthermore, at the end of one birth year and
the beginning of the next, differences in biological age diminish, while differences
in social age are large because women belong to different school cohorts. This
difference in social age, occurring when the difference in biological age diminishes,
coincides with a “jump” in the age-specific risk of first birth (as can be observed
in Table 3.3) because it combines the coefficients for birth year and birth month.
Hence, differences in social—but not biological—age are associated with important
changes in fertility behavior in early adulthood.
In summary, our analyses of the timing of first birth reveal that the eleven-
month difference in the age at graduation from compulsory school at around the
age of 16 between children born in December and children born in January results
in a 4.9-month delay in the age at first birth. That is, 4.9/11 = 45% of the increase
in the age at school graduation that occurs between individuals who are of virtually
the same age but belong to different school cohorts is not caught up with in early
adulthood and is still reflected in the age at first birth. This effect is striking be-
cause the first birth occurs on average nine years after graduation from compulsory
schooling and 5.5 years after graduation from tertiary education.7 Moreover, our
analyses in Table 3.3 reveal that a woman’s birth month has different effects at dif-
ferent stages in life. Being born early in a calendar year decreases the risk of having
a first birth at a young age as compared with women born later in the year, and this
pattern reverses at older ages. Consequently, the birth month exerts an important
effect on the timing of fertility by shifting the pattern of first-birth fertility rates to
older or younger biological ages. The overall probability of having a first child,
however, remains unaffected by birth month (Table 3.6).
7Assuming uninterrupted educational careers and using data on the duration of education from the
Swedish Level of Living Survey, women with primary school (pre- and post-reform) wait 7 years after
leaving school before having their first child. Individuals with a short secondary-school education
wait 5.6 years, women with a long secondary-school education wait 6 years, while those with short
and long tertiary education (excluding the few individuals with Ph.D./licentiate degrees) wait 4.7 and
4.2 years, respectively. The mean duration from school graduation to first birth is 5.5 years.
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From a theoretical perspective, the above findings are important because many
economic or rational choice theories about the timing of fertility suggest that
women have specific preferences about what their age at first birth should be. If
this were the case, one would expect the period between leaving school and having
the first child to provide sufficient opportunities to make up for the difference in
the age at graduation. Our analyses suggest that it is the social age, as determined
by school cohort, rather than the biological age, that is an important determinant
of the age at first birth; this shows the long-term effect of belonging to different
school cohorts—despite a possibly very similar biological age—on the timing of
demographic events during the transition to adulthood.
Seasonality patterns in the number of children born could possibly provide an
alternative explanation for our results if women aimed to have their first births
in the summer. However, the highest number of first births is in spring, and the
lowest number is in late fall (the ratio of births in March to births in November is
1.27). The number of births gradually increases again after November until March.
The Swedish seasonality pattern of birth cannot therefore explain the almost linear
change in the age at first birth by birth month within calendar years. Moreover, a
preference for a specific birth season cannot explain the difference in the age at first
birth between women born in the two consecutive months, December and January,
as any sizable difference in the age at first birth between these women necessarily
implies different birth seasons.
Age at Second Birth
Figure 3.3 also shows that the age at second birth has increased from 27.2 years
to 29 years across the 1946–1962 cohorts, following a trend that is very similar to
that in the age at first birth. Underlying this overall trend across cohorts is again
a systematic variation across birth months that closely mirrors the pattern for first
births. Within the same birth (and school) cohort, women born in January are three
months older at their second birth compared with women born in December, despite
the fact that the 10–12 years between graduation from compulsory schooling and
the second birth would have provided an ample opportunity to compensate for birth-
month differences in school enrollment and graduation. The difference in the age
at second birth between birth months increases to four months if women born in
December are compared with women born in the subsequent January—women who
are of virtually the same age but belong to different school cohorts. This effect
is again sizable and implies that 4/11 = 36% of the age difference at graduation
from compulsory schooling is perpetuated to the age at second birth. This result
suggests that birth-month-induced differences in the timing of first births across
birth months are not compensated for by a differential interbirth spacing between
the first and second child. On the contrary, neither the duration between the first
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Figure 3.4. Length of time from first to second birth.
Source: Statistics Sweden; own calculations.
and the second child (Figure 3.4), nor the overall probability of giving birth to a
second child (Table 3.6), varies systematically with birth month.
The above findings can be further supported with event-history models.8 Ta-
ble 3.4 presents the results of a piecewise constant hazard rate model that includes
birth-year dummies and interactions between a woman’s birth month and age. In
common with our analysis of first births, the effects of the birth month on the haz-
ard of experiencing a second birth differ according to a woman’s age. Below the
age of 28 (i.e., at relatively young ages of second-birth childbearing) women born
in the first half of a calendar year experience a lower hazard rate than women born
in the second half of the year. This relationship reverses for women aged 28 to 32,
which is the age group with the highest risk of second childbirth; and this reversal
becomes even stronger for women over the age of 32. Just as for first births, this pat-
tern indicates that women born early in the year gravitate in their behavior toward
their social age and “act younger,” while those born late in the year “act older.” The
reversal in the effect of the birth month on the second-birth risk at young and older
ages also implies that, in terms of the overall probability of having a second child,
women born early in a calendar year tend to catch up with their cohort mates who
are born late in the calendar year, thus restricting the influence of birth month to a
pure timing effect. Our results therefore suggest that, as in the case of first births,
the age pattern of second-birth rates by birth month is shifted—without quantum
changes—toward the pattern corresponding to the social age that is determined by
the school cohort.
8For a description of event-history estimation techniques, see Blossfeld and Rohwer (1995).
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Table 3.4. Risk of having a second child (all women with one child). Piecewise
constant hazard rate model (proportional hazard rates).
Baseline hazard Up to 28 years 0.015 ***
28–32 years 0.122 ***
32 years and above 0.056 ***
Born January–June: Up to 28 years 0.958 ***
Age-specific effect 28–32 years 1.009 *
32 years and above 1.024 ***
Women’s birth year 1946 (reference) 1.000
1947 1.000
1948 1.010
1949 1.022 ***
1950 1.027 ***
1951 1.026 ***
1952 1.032 ***
1953 1.056 ***
1954 1.063 ***
1955 1.074 ***
1956 1.085 ***
1957 1.103 ***
1958 1.106 ***
1959 1.119 ***
1960 1.147 ***
1961 1.149 ***
1962 1.164 ***
***=Significant at p0.01. **=Significant at p0.5. *=Significant at p0.1.
Source: Statistics Sweden; own calculations.
Age at First Marriage
Figure 3.5 presents our analysis of the timing of first marriage, an important event
in early adulthood that is potentially related to a woman’s age at the birth of her
first child. Despite the fact that the share of out-of-wedlock births in Sweden in-
creased to 55% by 1999 (Statistics Sweden, 2000) and that marriage has become
increasingly disconnected from childbirth, most women in the 1942–1962 cohorts
eventually married: 82% in the cohorts born from 1946–1953 and 68% in the co-
horts born from 1954–1962. Across cohorts, women’s average age at first marriage
increased from 24.6 years to 27 years, following a pattern that closely resembles
the delay in childbearing.9
9In the youngest cohorts there is likely to be substantial censoring because not all women who
intend to marry have married (the youngest cohorts in our study have only reached the age of 37
by the end of the period studied), and the trend toward delayed marriage is likely to prevail in the
youngest cohorts despite the data in Figure 3.5 showing a leveling off.
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Figure 3.5. Figure 3.5. Age at first marriage.
Source: Statistics Sweden; own calculations.
The most striking fact of this trend toward delayed marriage—similar to our
analyses of the timing of fertility—is that the postponement of marriage does not
occur gradually across birth months. The biggest average increase of 3.5 months
is observed between women born in the two consecutive birth months, December
and January, that mark the transition from one birth and school cohort to the next.
Hence, 3.3/11=32% of the difference in the age at leaving school is still present
in the age at first marriage. Within a birth cohort, women born in January are on
average 2.1 months older when they marry for the first time than women born in
December. Event-history models for the entry into first marriage also show that
women born from January to June have a lower risk of marrying up to the age of
26 compared with women born in the second half of the year (Table 3.5). At age
26 and above, the risks of marriage exhibit a reversed pattern and are higher for
women born in the first half of the calendar year. This relative increase in marriage
risks at older ages for women born in the first half of the calendar year not only
compensates for the initially lower rates of marriage prior to the age of 26 but actu-
ally leads to a slightly higher overall probability of ever marrying prior to the age of
45 (Table 3.6).10 In addition, the divergent birth-month influences on the marriage
risk below and above the age of 26 are again consistent with the influence of school
cohort and social age, as hypothesized above. Again, the alternative explanation in
10This higher marriage probability for women born in January, which is not associated with higher
probabilities of having a first or second child, may be linked to issues of self-esteem caused by the
relative class-age effect. This effect, which refers to the higher self-confidence of those who are of an
older age in class, has been found to affect performance in school (Sharp, 1995; Alton and Massey,
1998), athletic performance (Thompson et al., 1991), and income levels (Plug, 2001).
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Table 3.5. Risk of first marriage (all women). Piecewise constant hazard rate
model. (Proportional hazard rates).
Baseline hazard Up to 26 years 0.023 ***
26 years and above 0.069 ***
Born January–June: Up to 26 years 0.991 ***
Age-specific effect 26 years and above 1.054 ***
Women’s birth year 1946 (reference) 1.000
1947 0.969 ***
1948 0.930 ***
1949 0.886 ***
1950 0.842 ***
1951 0.812 ***
1952 0.784 ***
1953 0.770 ***
1954 0.742 ***
1955 0.720 ***
1956 0.704 ***
1957 0.691 ***
1958 0.667 ***
1959 0.655 ***
1960 0.635 ***
1961 0.622 ***
1962 0.598 ***
***=Significant at p0.01. **=Significant at p0.5. *=Significant at p0.1.
Source: Statistics Sweden; own calculations.
terms of seasonality preferences in the age at marriage cannot explain the observed
effects of birth month. In particular, the “summer marriage effect”—the fact that
individuals are more likely to marry in summer time than other months of the year
(about 57% of the marriages in Sweden take place during the four-month period
from May to August)—is consistent with the observation that those born early in
the year would marry at an older age than those born later in the year. However, the
summer marriage pattern does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the differ-
ence in the age at marriage between women born in the two consecutive months of
December and January.11
11Seasonality preferences can explain this effect only if the summer preference is also coupled
with a wish to marry at the same time as one’s school cohort. Hence, the seasonality pattern needs to
be coupled with a school cohort influence.
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Table 3.6. Logistic regression for women’s overall probabilities of giving birth to
a first and second child and of getting married (odds ratio).
First child Second child Marriage
(assuming that there
is a first child)
Until age Until age Until age Until age Until age Until age
37 45 37 45 37 45
Birth month
January 0.988 1.016 0.959 *** 0.995 0.995 0.998
February 0.974 * 1.008 0.967 *** 0.998 1.010 1.015
March 0.971 ** 0.996 0.972 *** 0.988 1.000 1.014
April 0.976 * 1.016 0.991 1.001 1.004 1.030 *
May 0.987 1.008 0.993 1.033 * 0.993 1.026
June (reference) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
July 0.979 0.981 1.003 1.039 * 0.977 ** 0.972
August 0.977 0.991 0.978 0.978 0.972 ** 0.989
September 0.975 * 0.993 0.995 0.995 0.954 *** 0.955 **
October 0.972 0.979 0.986 0.997 0.951 *** 0.964 **
November 0.984 0.994 0.979 0.994 0.944 *** 0.947 ***
December 0.976 0.992 0.969 ** 0.976 0.924 *** 0.920 ***
Birth year
1946 (reference) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1947 0.991 1.000 0.979 0.998 0.904 *** 0.934 ***
1948 1.045 *** 1.064 *** 0.989 1.016 0.847 *** 0.905 ***
1949 1.006 1.032 0.999 1.035 ** 0.739 *** 0.809 ***
1950 0.943 *** 0.987 0.977 1.035 ** 0.654 *** 0.724 ***
1951 0.900 *** 0.945 *** 0.960 *** 1.035 ** 0.592 *** 0.671 ***
1952 0.866 *** 0.912 *** 0.965 ** 1.038 ** 0.551 *** 0.619 ***
1953 0.846 *** 0.898 *** 0.999 1.093 *** 0.650 *** 0.587 ***
1954 0.796 *** 0.849 *** 1.001 1.112 *** 0.590 *** 0.536 ***
1955 0.793 *** 1.020 0.544 ***
1956 0.773 *** 1.030 * 0.507 ***
1957 0.776 *** 1.065 *** 0.473 ***
1958 0.775 *** 1.071 *** 0.427 ***
1959 0.742 *** 1.094 *** 0.398 ***
1960 0.738 *** 1.152 *** 0.368 ***
1961 0.708 *** 1.155 *** 0.342 ***
1962 0.710 *** 1.196 *** 0.312 ***
N 863304 477862 734743 412706 863304 477862
***=Significant at p0.01. **=Significant at p0.5. *=Significant at p0.1.
Source: Statistics Sweden; own calculations.
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Figure 3.6. Figure 3.6. Completed fertility.
Source: Statistics Sweden; own calculations.
Completed Fertility
The number of children born to women—or completed fertility—is an additional
central aspect of demographic behavior that is potentially related to the birth month
of a woman. Figure 3.6, which shows the completed fertility of women by birth co-
hort and birth month, does not, however, confirm this expectation. While there are
substantial fluctuations in completed fertility across birth months within each birth
cohort, these fluctuations do not follow a specific pattern. Moreover, the differ-
ence in the age at first birth between women born in December and the subsequent
January is not associated with a systematic difference in completed fertility. This
absence of a systematic pattern is confirmed using regression analysis (not reported
here in detail), with fertility at age 45 (for cohorts born from 1946–1954) or age 37
(for cohorts born from 1946–1962) not being found to be systematically influenced
by the birth month. [For a detailed discussion, see Skirbekk et al. (2003).] In sum-
mary, therefore, the effect of the birth month and the resulting variation in the age at
entering/graduating from school is concentrated on the timing of fertility and does
not extend to completed fertility: neither the probability of having one or two chil-
dren (Table 3.6) nor the overall level of fertility (Figure 3.6) differs systematically
across women’s birth months.
Educational Attainment
In our final analyses we investigate whether the overall educational attainment of
women constitutes a mechanism that mediates the effect of the variation in the age
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at graduation from compulsory schooling on the timing of fertility and marriage
according to the birth month.
The basic assumption of our analyses is that the birth month does not affect
the school-leaving age through any other mechanism than the age at school entry,
as determined by the school enrollment laws. Because of the rigid Swedish school
system up to the completion of compulsory schooling, this assumption is very plau-
sible. For upper-secondary and tertiary education, however, women (and/or their
parents) make conscious decisions about continuing their education. These deci-
sions can potentially include the consideration of the birth month and its implica-
tions for the age at graduation and the timing of demographic events.
This possibility was investigated using logistic regressions, where we estimate
the probability that a woman completes primary school, fewer than two years or
at least three years of secondary school, and fewer than two years or at least three
years of tertiary education. The results of these logistic regressions are presented
in Table 2.4. This table reveals that the risk of attaining primary education or up
to two years of secondary school as one’s highest educational attainment is higher
for women born from July through December than for women born from January
through June. The opposite is the case for higher schooling levels, where those
born from January through June are more likely to complete secondary school or
any kind of tertiary education than those born later in the year.
We have no direct evidence on the underlying causal mechanism [see also,
Smith (1990)]. The difference in birth month in terms of the propensity to pursue
additional education after compulsory schooling can be attributed to the relative
class-age effect: those born late in the year are among the youngest in their school
class. This young age relative to classmates tends to reduce self-confidence and
school performance, which in turn can reduce the risk of completing tertiary edu-
cation. However, the observed educational differences caused by the birth month
could also be due to differences in the timing of education, where those born late
in the year are younger when they attend school, which could affect their perfor-
mance. For a discussion of the alternative theories as to why birth month could
influence educational attainment, see Section 2.3.
The moderate difference in level and duration of education observed between
those born early and those born late in a calendar year does not, however, explain
why the birth month affects the timing of demographic events. Two facts support
this conclusion. First, at all educational levels, women born early in a calendar
year are older at first or second birth and at marriage than women born late in a
calendar year across all educational levels (Table 3.7).12 In particular, the effect of
12Some of the effects of the birth month observed on the timing of demographic events is explained
by the higher educational attainment of those born earlier in the year. Adjusting for education in the
regression analyses produces somewhat smaller effects but does not alter significance levels. For
example, the January-to-December difference in the age at the birth of the first child for all women is
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the birth month tends to be even stronger, the higher the level of secondary edu-
cation achieved. The difference between those born in January and those born in
December is greater for women with a long upper-secondary education in compar-
ison with those with a short upper-secondary education, and it is longer for those
with a short upper-secondary school education relative to those with only compul-
sory schooling. The reasons for this effect are likely to be related to the fact that the
length of time between the school-leaving age and subsequent demographic events
is shorter for those with an older school-leaving age. This reduces the time avail-
able to compensate for the effect of the birth-month-induced variation in the age at
graduation on demographic events in early adulthood. In effect, it prolongs the in-
fluence of the school cohort—and thus the school-cohort-based influence of social
age—on the timing of fertility and marriage.13 Furthermore, despite the fact that
the educational attainment of a woman is associated with variation in the first birth
risk,14 additional analyses—not reported here in detail—show that 1) the slightly
higher educational attainment of those born early in the year is not significantly
related to the level of fertility and 2) controlling for education does not alter the
pattern and significance of birth-month effects in the analyses shown in Tables 3.3,
3.4, and 3.5.
3.2.2 Discussion
In recent years many theoretical and empirical studies have focused on explaining
the changes in the timing of demographic events during early adulthood and in
particular, the postponement of fertility and marriage. We utilize differences in
women’s age at graduation from school in Sweden, resulting from the combined
reduced to 2.4 months when education is adjusted for, as opposed to the unadjusted estimate of 3.1
months.
13Although the timing of demographic events for women with a tertiary education still supports
the cut-off-date hypothesis—those born in January are older than those born in December—these
differences are of a smaller magnitude than those for women with an upper-secondary education.
According to the above argument, we would rather expect an increase in the difference as those with
a tertiary education are older when they graduate. However, the fact that tertiary education comprises
a large variety of studies implies that the variance in graduation ages might be larger among women
with a tertiary education as opposed to those with an upper-secondary education.
This less-structured duration of tertiary education may therefore dilute the effect of the birth month
and partially explain the smaller difference in the age at experiencing demographic events across
birth months. The role of social interactions in the timing of demographic events may constitute
another argument for the lower age difference for demographic events among women with a tertiary
education. Women with tertiary education, unlike those with a shorter education, tend to study more
with individuals of different age groups and to a much lesser extent exclusively with individuals born
in their own calendar year.
14Percentage of women having a child: 86.4% of women with primary school as their highest
education; 88.4% of those with up to two years of secondary school; 83.9% of those with three years
of secondary school; 84.8% of those with a tertiary education.
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Table 3.7. Age difference (in months) between individuals born in January and
December in the same year.
Highest completed education First child Second child First marriage
Compulsory school, 8–9 years 1.27 1.74 1.78
Upper-secondary school,2 years 2.61 2.67 1.33
Upper-secondary school, 3 years 5.91 4.65 3.14
Tertiary education, any length 1.76 1.65 1.42
Source: Statistics Sweden; own calculations.
effect of birth month and the Swedish school-enrollment laws, to investigate how
variation in the age at finishing compulsory school (15.5 to 16.5) affects the timing
of demographic events in early adulthood for female cohorts born from 1946–1962.
A striking finding of these analyses is that differences in the age at graduation
from ninth grade have substantial and long-lasting effects. For instance, 45% of
the eleven-month age difference in graduation between women born in December
and women born in the subsequent January is still present in the age at first birth.
This happens despite the first birth occurring on average eight to ten years after the
graduation from compulsory schooling after the ninth grade. Moreover, 36% of
the age difference at graduation prevails in women experiencing their second birth,
and 32% of the age difference is reflected in the age at first marriage. Birth month,
however, has no influence on the probability of ever giving birth to a first or second
child, and birth month has only a weak effect on the probability of ever marry-
ing. Differences in the age at completion of compulsory education therefore have
repercussions on the timing of demographic events that follow several years after
the statutory nine years of education are over. These patterns of tempo changes by
birth month are surprising because the substantial time interval between finishing
compulsory school—at around age 16—and the first marriage or the first/second
birth would seem to provide ample opportunity to compensate for the age differ-
ence at completion of the ninth grade. The findings are therefore in contrast to
arguments that women’s childbearing preferences are limited to the age at which
they experience these demographic events in early adulthood.
In addition to stressing the importance of sequencing and duration from the time
of graduation, the above effects point to a potentially important social influence on
individuals of the same school cohort rather than on individuals of the exact same
age. In particular, the biggest changes in the timing of demographic events in early
adulthood occur between school cohorts, that is, between women born in December
and women born in the subsequent January, despite the fact that women born during
December and January differ on average by only one month in their age. Hence,
women tend to synchronize the timing of demographic events—such as fertility
and marriage—with women in their school cohort rather than with women of a
similar age. Consequently, for women born early in the year, a woman’s social age
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is lower as compared with her biological age, and for those born late in the year it
is higher. Our findings suggest that the timing of fertility and marriage for women
is strongly influenced by this social age, and women born early (late) in a calendar
year gravitate in terms of the timing of demographic behaviors toward the lower
(higher) social age defined by their school cohort.
These findings suggest that a change in the school-leaving age would be likely
to affect fertility patterns and that a younger school-leaving age would be likely to
lead to a younger childbearing age. However, the impact of a school reform on fer-
tility may be higher than the evidence presented here implies. When one considers
within-class differences in the school-leaving age, one does not capture the effect
of variation in the social age, as the social age is constant within the class. A school
reform that lowers the school-leaving age would not only decrease the individual’s
school-leaving age but also the social age of the individual’s school cohort. The net
effect of these factors may be to cause a stronger shift in the timing of demographic
events and also, potentially, an increase in the childbearing outcome.
4
Age and Individual Productivity1
This chapter considers another issue relevant to the question of shifting the age at
entering and leaving the labor market: the shape of the age–productivity profile. If
workers are at their most productive early on in their careers, then a school reform
that lowers the labor-market-entry age could extend the most productive part of
a worker’s working life. If, however, senior workers are more productive, then
raising the retirement age may be the more efficient policy option.
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first describes findings from
earlier studies regarding how productivity varies according to age. In the second
section we attempt to evaluate the effect of structural changes in the economy on the
age–productivity profile by making job performance measurements endogenous,
based on ability levels and industry-wide task demand.
4.1 Age and Productivity: A Review of the Literature
In this section we focus on age differences in individual productivity and why such
differences are observed. Studies on how job performance differs according to age
come from several disciplines, including social psychology, medical science, and
labor economics. The type of research angle used to address this question varies
widely and frequently according to the discipline of the researchers. For instance,
psychologists tend to use managers’ performance ratings, while economists primar-
ily analyze matched employer–employee data sets.
In general, there is no definitive way of estimating how productivity varies
according to age, with findings that are valid without restrictions or that do not
entail a large degree of uncertainty. Many studies rely on strong assumptions that
are likely to bias the estimates, while other investigations consider only a narrow
set of jobs and may not be valid for other occupations. In this section we discuss
several different approaches to measuring how job performance differs according
to age. We also focus on the causes of such productivity variations, particularly age
differences affecting cognitive abilities.
1A slightly different version of Section 4.1 is published in Skirbekk (2004).
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Figure 4.1. Outline of key factors affecting job performance.
4.1.1 Age and cognitive ability levels
Figure 4.1 outlines the main causes of productivity differences: physical abilities,
mental abilities, and education and job experience that, in combination with the
characteristics of individual firms, can determine an individual’s job performance.
How these different factors influence job performance has changed over time. Cog-
nitive abilities have become increasingly important and physical abilities less so.
As several of the factors that affect job performance, including mental abilities
and experience, differ in their functional level over the life cycle, the shape of the
age–productivity curve could vary according to the changing importance of these
different abilities in the labor market. If abilities more common in older workers
grow increasingly important, then the relative job performance of the older workers
will improve. The same applies if there is an increased demand for abilities that are
more common in younger workers.
Cognitive abilities2 are likely to be among the most important determinants of
job performance (see Section 2.2). However, mental ability levels differ across
age groups, and there is much evidence that they decline in late adulthood, which
could influence the shape of the age–productivity profile. Verhaegen and Salthouse
(1997) analyze 91 case studies and conclude that important cognitive abilities, such
as reasoning, speed, and episodic memory, decline significantly by the age of 50.
That cognitive abilities decline according to age seems to be a relatively univer-
sal phenomenon that holds good for both men and women: individuals with high
ability levels are subject to the same changes in cognitive function as those with
low ability levels, and similar patterns are observed in different countries (Park et
al., 1999; Deary et al., 2000; Maitland et al., 2000). Age-related reductions in
2Cognitive or mental abilities refer to broad aspects of intellectual functioning. They include
reasoning, spatial orientation, numerical capabilities, verbal abilities, and problem solving. The most
commonly used measurement of cognitive abilities is the IQ score.
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memory and learning capabilities have also been documented among many nonhu-
man species, ranging from fruit flies to primates (Minois and Bourg, 1997; Bunk,
2000).
Certain cognitive abilities tend to be relatively robust against age-induced de-
clines (Schaie, 1994). A division can be drawn between crystallized abilities, which
remain at a high functional level until late in life, and fluid abilities—mental abili-
ties that are strongly reduced over the life span (Horn and Cattell, 1966 and 1967).
Crystallized abilities concern the accumulation of knowledge, such as the meaning
of words and vocabulary size, which tends to increase or be stable until late in life.
The second group, fluid abilities, concerns the performance and speed of solving
tasks related to new material and include perceptual speed and reasoning abilities.
Based on psychometric test results of men in different age groups, Schwartz-
man et al. (1987) find that verbal skills (crystallized abilities) remain virtually un-
changed, while reasoning and speed (fluid abilities) decline with age. In a test–
retest study of twins, Blum et al. (1970) provide similar findings: vocabulary size
is observed to remain constant from youth to old age, despite a general reduction
in other cognitive abilities.
Cross-sectional analyses describing the current population’s abilities typically
find a younger ability peak than longitudinal data, which follow a panel of indi-
viduals’ ability levels over their life cycle. This is the case, for example, in the
“Seattle Longitudinal Study” (Schaie, 1996), where data on both longitudinal and
cross-sectional ability differences according to age are collected. Findings from
the longitudinal data set indicate that word fluency does not decline before the age
of 53, while according to cross-sectional data from the same study, word fluency
starts to decline after the age of 25.
Both longitudinal and cross-sectional approaches to measuring age–ability dif-
ferences are problematic. The weaknesses of longitudinal studies could suggest
that the age–ability estimates are upwardly biased (Willis and Baltes, 1980); large
attrition, where those who are lost are likely to be negatively selected, means that
the sample remaining in later waves is positively selected.3 Another source of error
stems from test practice, meaning that individuals who participate in the survey in
subsequent waves perform better simply because they have taken similar tests be-
fore and are therefore more used to being in a test situation as well as trained as to
the type of questions being asked.
On the other hand, analyses of data based on a cross-sectional approach could
lead to a downward bias in the age–ability curves. This is because average ability
levels for young individuals have increased over time, possibly because of increas-
ing educational attainment (see Section 2.2).
3In one of the most influential longitudinal studies of how cognitive abilities develop over the life
cycle, the Seattle Longitudinal Study (Schaie, 1994), more than half of the initial sample was lost by
the time of the third wave, after 21 years.
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4.1.2 Experience and learning
Advancing age is typically associated with a decrease in the functional level of
the fluid cognitive abilities (related to learning and speed); but it is also generally
related to a longer work experience. Warr (1994) suggests a categorization of pro-
fessions based on whether workers become more or less productive according to
age; the author argues that for occupations where more experience is important,
senior workers can be at least as productive as younger ones, while in jobs where
fluid abilities matter, senior workers’ job performance declines. Typing is one ex-
ample of a job where experience is important. In this occupation, older workers
compensate for their reduced speed by developing more efficient work strategies
for typing, so that their productivity remains stable over the life cycle (Salthouse,
1984).
The decline in functional ability levels over the life cycle can be mitigated, and
targeted training may provide a way of halting the decline in cognitive abilities.
Schaie and Willis (1986a and 1986b) conclude that targeted training can stabilize,
or even reverse, age-specific declines in inductive reasoning and spatial orientation
in many individuals. Ball et al. (2002) also find that older individuals who fre-
quently exercise their perceptual speed, reasoning, and memory can enhance the
performance of these abilities.
Fewer training opportunities are offered to older workers than to younger ones,
something which could affect human capital and productivity levels. Companies
often make a decision as to whether to invest in their workers’ human capital based
on the expected number of years left in the working life before retirement. As senior
workers have less time to repay firms’ investments in human capital and produc-
tivity, they are offered fewer opportunities to participate in training programs. If
the retirement age increases, however, the company’s expected payoff from human
capital investments would be higher, which could increase the amount of training
offered to older individuals and improve their human capital levels.
Older individuals tend to learn more slowly, particularly if what they learn is
qualitatively different from what they already know. Rybash et al. (1986) argue
that as people grow older, they undergo an encapsulation of job know-how, imply-
ing that individuals’ skills are increasingly attached to certain work domains. This
means that senior employees can remain highly productive within a field that they
know well and where long experience is beneficial. Colonia-Willner (1998) asserts
that managers can maintain a high productivity level at an older age because of the
age robustness of their tacit knowledge (i.e., procedural knowledge used to solve
everyday problems). However, when they perform unfamiliar work their perfor-
mance decreases, as they have to rely on the ability to learn and adjust, which are
the skills that decline most with age. Senior individuals are less able than their
young counterparts to reorient themselves to new task requirements and to solve
90
novel problems (Smith, 1996), which could explain why age-related productivity
reductions tend to increase with the complexity of the work task (Myerson et al.,
1990).
The productivity profile may change over time as a result of structural changes
in the labor market. Accelerating technological progress can increase the impor-
tance of being able to learn and adjust to new ways of working. This can make
lengthy work experience less important, which is particularly problematic for older
employees because of age-related declines in the speed at which they can process
information and in their learning capacities (Baltes and Lindenberger, 1997; Hoyer
and Lincourt, 1998).
Work experience is one characteristic that can improve older employees’ pro-
ductivity relative to that of their younger counterparts. However, there comes
a point at which further experience no longer has any effect on productivity.
Ilmakunnas et al. (1999) assess a broad sample of Finnish manufacturing employ-
ees and find that the length of time in a job improves job performance for only up
to 3.8 years. Ericsson and Lehmann (1996) argue that it takes roughly 10 years
to achieve expert competence in games and situations where strategic and analytic
competence is important. The 10-year estimate is supported by findings from a
variety of job domains, ranging from livestock evaluation and x-ray analysis to sci-
entific performance in medical and natural sciences (Raskin, 1936; Lehman, 1953;
Phelps and Shanteau, 1978; Lesgold, 1984).
4.1.3 Measuring productivity of individuals at different ages
This section surveys the main approaches used to measure job performance dif-
ferences according to age. The approaches discussed include supervisors’ ratings,
piece-rate samples, employer–employee matched data sets, as well as age-specific
employment and earnings structures.
Studies based on supervisors’ ratings typically find that the employee’s age
has no effect or a weak negative impact on productivity. Medoff and Abraham
(1980 and 1981) studied workers at large corporations and identify that their length
of tenure is either unrelated to or negatively associated with performance evalu-
ations. A meta-analysis by Avolio and Waldman (1994), based on 18 supervisor
assessment samples, found a slightly negative productivity impact. Analogously,
McEvoy and Cascio (1989) review 96 studies on the impact of the employee’s age
on supervisors’ assessments and sales records and find no clear effect of age on pro-
ductivity. Facts and figures about the work capacity of older individuals should be
highest in firms with a higher share of older workers, as this is where there should
be the best insight into older workers’ performance. Remery et al. (2003) survey
1,007 Dutch personnel managers and show that older individuals are seen as less
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productive than young ones, particularly in workplaces with a high proportion of
older employees.
A general disadvantage of using supervisors’ ratings to assess individuals’ pro-
ductivity is that it is a subjective measure. Managers may wish to reward older em-
ployees for their loyalty and past achievements, which can inflate the evaluations
of senior employees and bias the results (Salthouse and Maurer, 1996). Dalton and
Thompson (1971) investigate performance evaluations not only from supervisors
but also from other employees in six large companies undergoing rapid technolog-
ical change. The results from the combined ratings of employees and managers
suggest that workers in their thirties put in the most effort and perform the most so-
phisticated technical work, while, as they move into their forties and beyond, their
productivity declines.
A second approach to measuring the impact of age on job performance is based
on piece rates: measuring the quantity and quality of a worker’s output. Studies
based on this approach tend to find that older employees have significantly lower
productivity levels. For example, a study by the U.S. Department of Labor (1957),
based on a broad range of industries, finds that job performance increases until
the age of 35, then steadily declines. At the end of the career, productivity is re-
duced by 14% in the men’s footwear industry and 17% in the household furniture
industry. Mark (1957) and Kutscher and Walker (1960) find that factory workers’
productivity fell after the age of 55, while mail sorters and office workers kept their
productivity relatively stable until late in their working life. Eva (2002) finds that
the productivity of medical doctors declines substantially from around 50 years of
age.
These task-quality/speed tests are potentially more objective, as they rely less
on subjective managerial assessment; but they may be influenced by the fact that
the workers are selected in terms of age groups and occupational types (Rubin
and Perloff, 1993). Furthermore, the time limit common in such studies biases
results. For example, older employees may maintain a higher work speed in the
short period they are studied than they would be able to maintain in a normal job
situation (Salthouse and Maurer, 1996).
The productivity of individuals doing “creative” jobs, such as researchers, au-
thors, and artists, can also be measured by the quantity as well as the quality of their
output. Stephan and Levin (1988) study quality-adjusted publications in the natu-
ral sciences (quality being measured as the standard of the journal) and find that
individuals’ young years are the most productive ones. Similar evidence is found
in the field of economics, where Oster and Hamermesh (1998) conclude that older
economists publish less in leading journals than younger ones and that the rate of
decline is also the same for top researchers, among others. Miller (1999) analyzes
how age affects creative output by studying the number of paintings, albums, and
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books produced by a sample of artists (739 painters, 719 musicians, and 229 writ-
ers). He finds that artists tend to produce the most when they are in their 30s and
40s.
A third way of measuring productivity according to age is based on the analysis
of employer–employee matched data sets,4 where individual productivity is mea-
sured as workers’ marginal impact on the firm’s value-added. Such data sets tend
to give information on both wages and productivity, enabling a comparison as to
whether individuals’ productivity curves differ from their wages. These studies are
likely to be less subjective than those based on supervisors’ ratings, and there are
fewer sample selection problems than in investigations based on piece rates. The
main challenge in this approach is to isolate the effect of employees’ ages from
the other influences on the firm’s value-added. In effect, such studies tend to have
strong identifying assumptions. They also demand high-quality longitudinal data
on the characteristics of both the firm and individuals.
An overview of employer–employee studies is given in Table 4.1. For most
employer–employee studies, an inverted U-shaped work performance profile is
found (Haltiwanger et al., 1999; Hægeland and Klette, 1999; Ilmakunnas et al.,
1999; Andersson et al., 2002; Cre´pon et al., 2002; Hellenstein and Neumark, 2004).
Individuals in their thirties and forties tend to have the highest productivity levels.
Employees over the age of 50 are found to have lower productivity than younger
individuals, in spite of their higher wage levels.
Exceptions to findings suggesting that productivity decreases according to age
include Hellerstein and Neumark (1995), whose findings suggest that productivity
increases over the life span in Israel. However, the authors stress that no conclu-
sions about age and productivity can be drawn because of the high influx of young
immigrants to Israel and because their manufacturing-firm data set is of a relatively
poor quality.
In another study of American firms (Hellerstein et al., 1999), productivity is
estimated to increase with age, with those above 55 contributing the most to out-
put levels. However, the authors find that peak productivity shifts to workers aged
35–54 when the firms’ value-added—rather than output levels—is used as an in-
dicator of productivity. Moreover, an earlier analysis based on the same data set
(Hellerstein et al., 1996) concludes that workers’ productivity also decreases with
age in cases where the firms’ output is used as an indicator of productivity.
Analyses of employer–employee data sets could be biased if a firm’s success
leads to an increase in the number of new young employees working there. The
fact that a young age structure may be the consequence rather than the cause of
the firms’ success could affect the validity of the estimates. An important problem
4A survey of analyses based on matched employer–employee data can be found in Abowd and
Kramarz (1999).
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Table 4.1. Overview of employer–employee data sets
Authors Region/
country
Sample size Individual
variables
Age
categories
Control
variables
Productivity
measurement
Age–productivity
profile
Remarks
Hellerstein
and
Neumark
(1995)
Israel 933 firms Occupation  35, 35–54,
 54
Industry type,
no. of
employees,
firm’s capital
and input
factors, R&D
spending
Firm’s output Productivity peaks
at 55 years and
older
Poor quality of
data and high
inflow of
young
immigrants;
lower study
validity
Haltiwanger
et al. (1999)
Mary-
land/
USA
Not stated
(all firms in
Maryland
1984–1997)
Gender,
education,
immigrant
status
 30, 30–54,
 54
Firm’s age and
size, industry
type, period
effects
Sales per
employee
Workers above 55
have lowest
productivity
All industries
Hægeland
and Klette
(1999)
Norway 7,122 firms,
270,636
employees
Education,
experience,
no. of hours
worked
Dependent
on length of
education
and length
of
experience
Firm’s age,
industry type,
region, public
ownership,
foreign
ownership
Firm’s
value-added
Productivity peaks
in the thirties,
declines for those
with over 15 years’
experience (in their
late thirties and
older)
Manufacturing
Hellerstein
et al. (1999)
USA 3,102 firms,
128,460
employees
Gender,
race,
occupation,
whether
married,
education
 35, 35–54,
 54
No. of
employees,
region, type of
establishment,
industry type
Firm’s output
or value-added
Productivity peaks
at 55 years and
older if output is
used as estimate.
Productivity lowest
for 55 years and
older if value-
added is used
Manufacturing
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Table 4.1. Overview of employer–employee data sets (continued)
Authors Region/
country
Sample size Individual
variables
Age
categories
Control
variables
Productivity
measurement
Age–productivity
profile
Remarks
lmakunnas
et al. (1999)
Finland 3,882
firms,
279,181
employees
Education,
experience,
no. of hours
worked
Average
employee
age at each
firm
examined
Firm’s age,
capital
Firm’s
value-added
Productivity peaks
around age of 40.
Manufacturing
Andersson
et al. (2002)
Sweden 2,874 firms Education 16-29,
30–39,
40–49,
50–59,
60–64, 64
Period, plant,
and industry
effects
Firm’s
value-added
Workers above 50
with primary and
secondary
education have
lower productivity;
tertiary-educated
above 50 have
higher productivity
Manufacturing
and mining
industries.
Longitudinal
analysis
confirms
findings.
Cre´pon et
al. (2002)
France 77,868
firms,
 3,000,000
employees
Gender,
occupation,
no. of hours
worked
 25, 25–34,
35–49, 49
Firm’s age and
size, industry
type, capital
Output Productivity peaks
for those aged
25–34, lowest for
those over the age
of 50
Manufacturing
and non-
manufacturing
Hellerstein
and
Neumark
(2004)
USA  3,101
firms,
 265,412
individuals
Occupation,
race,
education,
marital
status
 35, 35–54,
 54
Capital,
materials,
region, no. of
employees
Firm’s output Productivity
highest for 35–54
age group
Manufacturing
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with cross-sectional evidence is that seniority leads to occupational shifts. Good
workers get promoted, while inefficient workers lose their jobs or are demoted.
This can cause estimation bias, as a higher age implies increased selection. Using a
lagged measure of the firm’s age composition to estimate current productivity can
partly overcome this problem, as it can limit the bias induced by age-specific influx
and outflow of workers. Andersson et al. (2002) use such lagged measures in their
analysis of employer–employee data, and their findings support the findings that
older workers tend to be less productive than younger ones (with the exception of
tertiary nontechnical workers who have a later productivity peak).
Age–earnings profiles can provide information on productivity profiles in set-
tings where wages reflect current productivity. Boot (1995) describes age–earnings
profiles for British workers in the first half of the nineteenth century when the la-
bor market was hardly regulated. For the physically demanding work analyzed,
men reach their peak earnings at the beginning of their thirties, and wages decrease
substantially from around 40 years of age. Another example is a study by Lazear
and Moore (1984) that examines the difference between the earnings profiles of
the self-employed (who are paid according to productivity) and salaried workers
(who have long-term contracts). They find that the self-employed tend to have little
wage variation across ages, while salaried workers have increasing wages through-
out their career; this suggests that productivity remains stable over the life cycle,
while seniority-based wage systems can imply that earnings nonetheless increase
according to age.
Changes in the labor market attachment of workers from different age groups
could also provide evidence on how workers from different age groups perform in
the labor market. If older workers cope less well with technological change, this
should be observable by an increase in the risk of job loss. Bartel and Sicherman
(1993) put forward evidence that when the rate of technological change is highest,
most job losses do, in fact, take place among older workers. Similar results are also
found in analyses of interindustry and international data (Clark et al., 1999; Ahituv
and Joseph, 2000).
Investigations of the relationship between changes to the age structure of the
population and aggregate measures of performance, such as technological progress
or economic growth, can also provide insights into worker productivity. Nishimura
et al. (2002) investigate the impact of age structure on technological progress and
value-added growth in Japanese industries for the years 1980–1998. They find
that the share of educated workers over 40 years of age was positively correlated
to the firm’s technological progress in the 1980s but that this relationship became
negative in the 1990s. One possible explanation for the changing relationship over
time is that the skills needed to promote technological progress, such as speed and
the ability to learn, are those that younger workers tend to be relatively good at.
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Lindh and Malmberg (1999) and Malmberg and Lindh (2002) find that the ini-
tial size of the share of those aged 50–64 in the labor force is positively correlated
to economic growth in each subsequent five-year period in the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for the period 1850–1990. No
clear effect is ascertained for younger age groups. Although the causal mechanism
of this correlation is not identified, it could suggest that productivity peaks late
in the working life. However, there may be other, more plausible reasons. One
possibility is an unobserved factor that affects both the level of economic progress
and demographic indicators such as life expectancy and thus influences economic
growth and age structure. Furthermore, life cycle investment and consumption pat-
terns could explain why economic growth is associated with a high share of older
workers. Hence, the association between age structure and growth is not necessarily
due to a productivity peak late in the working life.
In the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) (GEM Consortium, 2004),
age and entrepreneurship is measured using Total Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA).
TEA, based on surveys of representative samples of the adult population in each
GEM 2004 country, is the sum of 1) those individuals involved in the business start-
up process (nascent entrepreneurs) and 2) individuals who are active as owner–
managers of firms established for a period shorter than 42 months. Those qual-
ifying for both definitions are counted only once. In all 34 countries where the
survey was carried out,5 individuals aged 25–44 are most likely to contribute to
entrepreneurial activity and those above 50 are least likely. The share of the popu-
lation under 35 years and TEA correlates strongly and significantly in cross-country
analysis (GEM Consortium, 2004).
4.1.4 Age–earnings profiles
A wage analysis provided by the OECD (1998) shows gross wages peaking for
those aged 45–54 in 17 of 19 countries observed.6 The age–earnings profile is
characterized by a relatively steep increase in wage levels until the peak is reached,
followed by a mild reduction in earnings in the last years before retirement. The
average earnings of those aged 25–29 and those aged 55–64 is 72% and 91%, re-
spectively, of the earnings of the 44–54 age group.7 Age differences in wages also
5Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Uganda, United Kingdom, and United States.
6The countries in the study were Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and United
States. For Czech Republic and United Kingdom, the wages peak for the 35–44 age group.
7These percentages represent unweighted averages for the countries in the study.
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increase with educational level. Individuals aged 25–29 with less than an upper-
secondary education earned 81% of the earnings of the 45–54 age group; and those
aged 25–29 with a university education earned only 53% of the earnings of the
44–54 age group.
4.1.5 Age–earnings and age–productivity profiles
Based on the evidence presented in previous sections, the late peak in the age–
earnings profile does not overlap with the relatively young peak in productivity
levels. This suggests that there is a discrepancy between productivity and wages,
with wages being lower than productivity levels at younger ages and higher at older
ages.8
Several theories have emerged to explain the reasons behind age–earnings pro-
files tending to peak later than age–productivity profiles. One important reason
is employers’ initial uncertainty about new employees’ productivity levels (Harris
and Holmstrom, 1982). Older workers are paid above their marginal productivity
because upward-sloping wage profiles 1) strengthen the employees’ work effort by
raising their shirking costs, 2) lower the firms’ need to train new workers, and 3)
decrease the risk of sensitive information about the firm being shared with com-
peting firms if workers leave the company. Furthermore, when older workers re-
ceive higher wages as a reward for past productivity, junior workers’ loyalty to the
firm may rise, as they will also wish to reap the rewards of a long-service bonus.
Hutchens (1989) notes that this type of incentive system, delayed payment con-
tracts, is used most frequently when workers’ performance is difficult to observe
and measure.
An important reason why it is in the interest of firm owners to have a wage
peak at a relatively high age is that, on average, workers used to be rather young
(because of the population’s age structure). This means that the firms, until recently,
have gained from having a delayed payment contract, as the average worker, who
is young, has been paid below his/her marginal productivity. However, as Lazear
(1988) asserts, population aging challenges the financing of such systems, by in-
creasing firms’ incentives to either lower older workers’ wages or to lay the workers
off.
Figure 4.2 shows a stylized situation in which younger workers are assumed to
be underpaid and older workers overpaid relative to their productivity, making it
profitable for firms to employ the young. In the case of population aging, profits
8Alternatively, one could argue that wages and productivity levels match at all ages. Age–earnings
profiles indisputably slope upward, while there is uncertainty about the shape of the age–productivity
curve. One could therefore assume that wages reflect current productivity, that the age–productivity
profile is incorrectly estimated, and that the true productivity profile is identical to the age–earnings
profile.
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Figure 4.2. Stylized presentation of productivity and earnings across the life span.
Based on Lazear (1979) and Jackson (1998).
decrease as the share of unprofitable older workers increases; hence, the incentive
for firms will be either to lower the workers’ wages or lay the workers off.
Delayed payment contracts may implicitly require individuals either to have
lifelong contracts with their employees or that job switches are made between firms
with similar wage systems. However, if a worker could choose between working in
firm A, where the wages peak early in life and firm B, where the wages peak late
in life, this type of payment system becomes unsustainable. The profit-maximizing
worker could spend his/her younger years in firm A with high initial wages, then
switch to firm B with high seniority wages in the middle of his/her career, and
firm B will lose workers who would otherwise bear the costs of seniority wages.
Moreover, the frequency of shifting jobs has increased (Burgess and Rees, 1996;
Bergmann and Mertens, 2002), which suggests that the age–earnings profiles of
firms employing the same type of workers would need to be harmonized. This can
affect the shape of the age–earnings profile, making it more similar to the age–
productivity curve, where wages peak at younger ages.
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4.1.6 Summary of the literature review
Studies that estimate the influence of age on individual productivity base their anal-
yses on different job performance indices, including piece-rate studies, analyses of
employer–employee data sets, and supervisors’ evaluations. Most piece-rate stud-
ies, measuring the quantity and quality of the workers’ output, and analyses of
employer–employee data sets, where the marginal effect of the workers’ on the
firms’ productivity is estimated, suggest that productivity follows an inverted U-
shaped profile, with significant decreases in productivity being found after the age
of 50. Supervisors’ evaluations on average show little or no relationship between
the assessment score and the age of the employee. However, these subjective per-
formance indicators may be biased; for example, the management’s opinions of
older employees may be inflated for loyalty reasons.
One problem with estimates of how productivity varies according to age is the
high degree of uncertainty associated with measuring productivity. For example,
older individuals who remain in the workforce longer are likely to be positively
selected and have higher productivity than those who leave the workforce early.
This would mean that a cross-sectional study of workers’ productivity-related age
differences could suggest an upward bias in the estimates.
Older workers may, however, possess characteristics that are important to the
success of the firm but difficult to measure. Senior employees can have a wider
professional network, give training and guidance, provide tacit knowledge, uphold
norms that prevent shirking and opportunistic behavior, and know better how to
deal with problems that arise only infrequently. Such influences are difficult to
quantify, particularly in studies of quantity of output, such as studies of piece-rate
firms. However, analyses of employer–employee data sets should be able to capture
such effects. These studies still tend to find that productivity declines with age.
4.2 Age and Individual Productivity Potential: New
Evidence Based on Ability Levels and Industry-Wide
Task Demand
Studies on age and productivity tend to use “output” measures of productivity, such
as the quantity and quality of goods produced by workers of different ages. Few
analyses have given weight to the question of why productivity varies according to
age. In this section, we estimate the relationship between age and productivity po-
tential by looking at the causes of age-related productivity differences, basing our
analysis on age-related variations in individuals’ abilities and the changing impor-
tance of these abilities in the labor market. This framework is used to show that the
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age–productivity curve can vary as a result of changing labor market requirements
and is not necessarily static.
Previous investigations of age and productivity may have several shortcomings
that could decrease their validity:
  They usually neglect causal factors as to why productivity varies according to
age;
  Earlier studies have not considered that the shape of the age–productivityprofile
can change over time;
  Investigations based on piece-rate samples or supervisors’ ratings are restricted
to a limited set of occupations. Findings from these approaches are therefore
not necessarily relevant for other jobs; and
  Analyses of employer–employee data sets rely on strong assumptions regarding
the relative impact of the workers’ age on firms’ value-added, which can bias
results.
Our investigation may overcome some of these shortcomings by focusing on the po-
tential causes of age-related productivity differences. We acknowledge, however,
that our approach has shortcomings. One cannot take into account all possible fac-
tors that determine productivity and accurately model each factor’s importance in
determining job performance. Furthermore, several influences that determine the
shape of the age–productivity curve cannot be taken into account. In spite of these
weaknesses, we believe that an attempt to understand how causal, time-varying fac-
tors affect the shape of the age–productivity curve could provide new insights into
life-cycle variation in productivity. This work can be best understood 1) as a pos-
sible framework for use in assessing the impact of changing labor-market demand
on age-related productivity differences and 2) as a tool to promote understanding
of the role of some of the factors relevant to determining age-related variations in
job proficiency.
4.2.1 Factors affecting productivity: Work-related abilities
The data on the age-specific supply of abilities are taken from the General Aptitude
Test Battery (GATB), a workforce survey carried out by the U.S. Department of
Labor [the data is presented in Avolio and Waldman (1994)]. The GATB consists
of detailed ability scores from 16,134 white American male and female workers
from a wide range of educational and professional backgrounds. The subjects are
aged 16–74, but those over 65 are excluded from this study.
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Table 4.2. Description of Aptitude Test Battery of the matched ability supply and
demand
Supplied Ability Demanded Ability
(Source: General Aptitude Test Battery, (Source: Dictionary of Occupational Titles,
Avolio and Waldman, 1994) Census data [cited in Autor et al. (2003)]
Numerical ability GED* mathematics
Managerial ability Direction, control, and planning of activities
Clerical perception Set limits, tolerances, or standards
Finger dexterity Finger dexterity
Manual dexterity Eye–hand–foot
*General Education Development
We take into account the abilities for which there is knowledge about relative
labor-market importance.9 The relative labor-market demand for five abilities is
provided by Autor et al. (2003), who estimate how the demand for work tasks has
changed over the last 40 years in the American labor market. The “matching” of
the supply and demand of abilities is given in Table 4.2, where numerical ability,
managerial ability, clerical perception, finger dexterity, and manual dexterity are
matched estimates of ability demand.
A description of the GATB abilities, taken from Hartigan and Wigdor (1989),
follows. Complementing the findings of Autor et al. (2003), additional studies on
the relevance of these abilities to the labor market are reported in some cases.
Numerical ability. This measures the extent to which arithmetic and advanced
mathematics are required on the job and the speed and accuracy with which an in-
dividual is able to perform such tasks. Numerical abilities and quantitative skills
are relevant to a large number of professions, ranging from accounting to engi-
neering. Several studies have documented the importance to the labor market of
mathematics and have identified a close association between numerical skills and
wage levels (Murnane et al., 1995; Mitra, 2002).
9The General Aptitude Test Battery subtests comprise nine abilities: We use five of these abilities
in this study: numerical ability, verbal aptitude, clerical perception, finger dexterity, and manual dex-
terity. The four abilities we do not use are: general intelligence (this is an aggregate of all cognitive
abilities), spatial aptitude (the ability to comprehend geographic forms and visualize two-dimensional
objects on a three-dimensional form), form perception (ability to perceive relevant detail in objects
and graphic material), and motor coordination (ability to coordinate eyes and hands when making
precise movements).
We omit general intelligence; this is an aggregate that is not well suited to age studies, as it includes
both verbal aptitude, which is relatively age-robust. We also omit numerical ability, which declines
substantially over the life cycle. The other abilities we omit tend to overlap with the abilities we
include; we exclude motor coordination, as we use finger dexterity and manual dexterity. Moreover,
form perception and spatial aptitude are closely related to clerical perception; thus, we do not consider
them in our study.
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Table 4.3. Average ability levels. Measured as share of those aged 25–34 years,
standard deviation.
Numerical Managerial Clerical Finger Manual
Age ability ability perception dexterity dexterity Experience
0–19 –0.30 –0.17 0.14 0.05 0.16 –0.40
20–24 –0.11 0.00 0.17 0.10 0.35 –0.40
25–34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
35–44 –0.39 0.00 –0.28 –0.40 0.05 0.27
45–54 –0.63 0.00 –0.55 –0.92 –0.49 0.27
55–65 –0.85 0.00 –0.80 –1.42 –0.94 0.27
Source: Avolio and Waldman (1996); Ericsson and Lehmann (1996); Colonia-Willner (1998); OECD
(1999); and own calculations.
Managerial ability. This measures the extent to which interpersonal and commu-
nication skills, managerial skills, and nonroutine communication are needed in the
workplace, as well as the extent to which a person is able to understand the mean-
ing of words and language. This ability is relevant for most jobs, particularly where
communication, transmitting information, and making strategic decisions are a cen-
tral occupational task. Managerial skills are often required in the labor market,
and various measures of verbal aptitude are closely associated with income levels
(e.g., International Adult Literary Survey, 2001). Increases in managerial abil-
ity at younger ages are due to an increase in verbal aptitude, as suggested by the
GATB survey. Thereafter, verbal aptitude is unaffected according to age, as found
in Colonia-Willner (1998).
Clerical perception. This is the ability to discriminate and perceive relevant detail
in visual and tabular stimuli. This ability is relevant for those who oversee routine
clerical tasks to check for errors in transcribing or who do simple filing.
Finger dexterity. This is a measure of the accuracy and speed at which one can
manipulate small objects with hands and fingers. It shows how well one is able to
use one’s hands to carry out repetitive movements over time. It could be relevant
for jobs where finger skills are important, such as shoemaking or shirt production.
Manual dexterity. This is the ability to coordinate hand and foot movement. This
measure is important in occupations that require coordination and physical agility,
for example, fire fighting.
The age-specific test-score results for these abilities are presented in Figure 4.3
and Table 4.3. Crystallized abilities (such as verbal abilities) decline the least, while
fluid abilities (such as numerical competence) decline the most, which is consistent
with findings from other studies (Blum et al., 1970; Schaie, 1996). However, the
age decline is of a considerably smaller magnitude than that found in other similar
cross-sectional studies [as shown in a survey article by Verhaegen and Salthouse
(1997)].
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Figure 4.3. Ability levels according to age.
Source: Avolio and Waldman (1996); Ericsson and Lehmann (1996); OECD
(1999).
4.2.2 Demand for abilities
To estimate the labor-market value of the different abilities, we apply data on how
the importance of different job tasks has changed over time (Autor et al., 2003).
The data are considered appropriate for this study as they present the level and
change of task demands for all employees in the labor force. The information
on task-demand structures can also be matched with information on age-specific
ability levels, as shown in Table 4.2.
Autor et al. (2003) analyze how task input for total U.S. employment has
evolved during the period 1960–1998. They use data from the Dictionary of Oc-
cupational Titles (U.S. Department of Labor, 1972) that describe the average task
input required by labor in the economy, and they merge this with data from popula-
tion censuses that describe how the job structure is changing over time. The labor
input of American workers aged 18–64 in more than 450 job categories is exam-
ined. By combining information on both the skill intensity and the composition of
employment structures with within-job estimates, Autor et al. (2003) are able to
produce estimates on the extent to which each task input changes over time.
In addition to the five abilities discussed above, we include an estimate of ex-
perience in the model. The supply of experience is calculated in a similar way to
the abilities, with age-specific supply being measured relative to the standard de-
viation of the 25–34 age group. There is no direct evidence as to how important
experience is in the labor market. To look at the effect of experience, we assume
that it is rated as highly important, which is in line with surveys on employers’
valuation of workers’ skills, where experience is ranked as the most important trait
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Table 4.4. Demand for abilities. Scale: 0 to 10, where 10 represents the most
important.
Source: Autor et al., 2003; own calculations
Ability 1960 1970 1980 1990 1998
GED math 3.61 3.72 3.76 3.87 3.97
Direction, control, and planning 2.40 2.40 2.46 2.68 2.89
Set limits, tolerances, or standards 4.53 4.70 4.61 4.40 4.11
Finger dexterity 3.78 3.90 3.90 3.83 3.75
Eye–hand–foot coordination 1.37 1.29 1.24 1.17 1.16
Experience 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
Decreasing importance of experience 8.00 7.50 7.00 6.50 6.00
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Figure 4.4. The relative importance of job abilities in the U.S. labor market (1998).
Source: Autor et al. (2003); own calculations.
(e.g., Golini, 2004); and we thus assign to it the value 8 on a scale from 0 to 10. To
estimate the effect of a decrease in the importance of long experience, one of the
scenarios estimates the effect of a labor-market rating of experience that decreases
from 8 to 6 over the period analyzed (see Table 4.4).
The relative importance of these abilities in 1998 is shown in Figure 4.2, and the
changes in their relative importance between 1960 and 1998 are shown in Table 4.4
and Figure 4.4. We look at the time period 1960–1998 because this is the period for
which we have data. The time period allows us to look at past and current patterns
in the demand for abilities. We use the development of five task categories to assess
changing the labor-market demand for the abilities, as described in Table 4.4.
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4.2.3 Supply of experience
The number of years for which additional experience increases work performance
is uncertain, and estimates vary between 3.8 years and 10 years, as discussed in
Section 4.1. The outcome for the productivity profiles estimated later in this section
is, however, not substantial. All the estimated age–productivity curves decrease,
while wages continue to rise for senior workers.
To identify for how many working years experience increases productivity, we
use Ericsson and Lehmann’s (1996) 10-year estimate,10 combined with data on
age of labor-market entry and data on age-specific labor-force participation from
OECD (1999), as well as age-specific experience levels from Avolio and Waldman
(1994). This means that members of the 20–24 age group are categorized as having
no job experience, as the average person in this group has not yet entered the labor
market. In 1996 the median age of labor-market entry was 22.9 years, and the
average individual in this age group was aged 22.5 years. The average worker in the
25–34 age group, taking age-specific labor-force-participation rates into account, is
estimated to have 6.04 years of experience (with a standard deviation of 5 years).11
Individuals aged 35–65 have at least 10 years of labor-market experience and have
thus acquired the maximum productivity-enhancing effect of experience. The effect
of experience on potential productivity is shown in Figure 4.1.
4.2.4 Method
The productivity measurement is based on the functional level of cognitive and
noncognitive abilities at different stages across the life span. The strength of the
impact of each ability on the productivity level is determined by the demand for
that ability in the labor market. This may be a strong assumption, as many jobs are
not affected by ability variation, unless, for example, the ability level drops below
a certain threshold. We therefore relax this assumption later in the section.
We start by postulating the equation for the age-specific supply of abilities.
	a
XSg
 

a
XSg
 
a
XS25–34 year olds

a
XS25–34 year olds
(4.1)
In Equation 4.1, 	a
XSg
is the estimate for the supply S of ability X for age
group g. The mean ability score for those aged 25–34 years is subtracted from
10The 10-year estimate as to how long experience raises productivity for is supported by findings
from a variety of job domains, ranging from livestock evaluation and X-ray analysis to scientific
performance in medical and natural sciences (Raskin, 1936; Lehman, 1953; Phelps and Shanteau,
1978; Lesgold, 1984).
11The length of experience that the different age groups have is calculated from responses to the
question: “How much experience (in years and months) have you had in your present occupation?
Include time with both your present and previous employers” (Avolio and Waldman, 1994).
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the average ability score for each age group and the difference is divided by the
standard deviation of ability X for the 25–34 age group. Thus, 	a
XSg
expresses
the ability level X of an average individual from age group g in relation to the
mean of the 25–34 age group in proportion to the standard deviation. The standard
deviations of 	a
XSg
are found in Table 4.3 and the various age-specific abilities are
given in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.1.
	a
XDt
 
a
XDt
P
X
a
XDt
(4.2)
Equation 4.2 gives the estimate for the demand for abilityX at time t. By divid-
ing the importance of ability X , a
XDt
, by the sum of all task scores
P
X
a
XDt
we obtain a measurement of the relative importance of task inputX in the economy
	a
XDt
. The values for the relative demand are given in Equation 4.4 and shown in
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6.
	a
Xgt
  	a
XSg

	a
XDt
(4.3)
In Equation 4.3 the supply of each ability 	a
XSg
by age group g is multiplied
by its demand 	a
XDt
. This equilibrium index is used to give an estimate of the
market value of the amount of ability X possessed by each age group.
	a
gt
 
X
X
	a
Xgt
(4.4)
Equation 4.4 estimates 	a
gt
, the sum of the equilibrium index scores. The vari-
able 	a
gt
is the potential productivity index, an estimate of potential job perfor-
mance that takes all considered abilities into account. If one of the abilities is less
demanded than the others, its impact on the potential productivity index is lower.
To illustrate the way in which the potential productivity index is constructed,
let us assume an average person from the 55–65 age group works in an occupation
that requires 50% numerical abilities and 50% finger dexterity. An average person
from this age group scores 85% of a standard deviation below the 25–34 age group
mean on numerical abilities and 142% lower on finger dexterity. This means that
the person from the 55–65 age group has a potential productivity index score that
is 114% of a standard deviation below the average of the 25–34 age group. If there
were more demand for numerical abilities, the potential productivity of the senior
employees would increase relative to younger individuals, as numerical abilities
decline less than finger dexterity.
Assume a given maximum productivity index level 
t
is needed, and when
	a
gt
 
t
, the impact of a higher productivity potential on job performance is
reduced. This situation is given in Equation 4.5, where the variable P
gt
represents
the adjusted productivity index. The indicator function I
ab
c is 1 when c is
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Figure 4.5. Variation in task demand, change in job task input, 1960–1998.
Source: Autor et al. (2003); own calculations.
between a and b, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient  is positive but below 1, and
the lower it is, the stronger the reduction in the adjusted productivity index.
P
gt
  I

t

	a
gt
	a
gt
 I

t

	a
gt
	a
gt
 
t
  
t
 (4.5)
The opposite can be the case if a certain minimum productivity level needs to
be fulfilled, with a lower productivity potential strongly reducing performance. In
Equation 4.6, when 	a
gt
 
t
, the adjusted productivity is more rapidly reduced
when ability levels are below the minimum level. Here,  is a coefficient above 1,
and the higher its value, the more a productivity index below the minimum level
will reduce productivity.
P
gt
  I

t

	a
gt
	a
gt
 I

t

	a
gt
	a
gt
 
t
  
t
 (4.6)
4.2.5 Results: Productivity potential by age
The estimates of the age–productivity index, taking experience into account, are
shown in Figure 4.7. The potential productivity continues to increase until around
40 years of age, when the productivity-reducing effects of lower ability levels out-
weigh the productivity gains from long experience. Thereafter, a linear decline
until retirement age occurs, with the productivity potential of the 55–65 age group
being 0.34 standard deviations lower than that of the 25–34 age group, although it
is still above the productivity potential of those aged 24 or younger. The effect of
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Figure 4.6. Age potential productivity index, based on 1960 and 1998 task demand
profile.
Source: Own calculations.
changing labor-market demand, with an increasing importance of verbal abilities,
is very slight. The relative potential productivity of workers aged 55–65 in 1998
(the solid line) is only marginally higher than that of workers in 1960 (dashed line).
Figure 4.8 shows the effect of a decline in the importance of experience (as
shown in Equation 4.4). This leads to a shift in the peak of potential productivity
toward younger ages, where it reaches its maximum for the 25–34 age group and
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Figure 4.7. Age potential–productivity index, with decreasing importance of ex-
perience.
Source: Own calculations.
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declines thereafter. The potential productivity for those in the 55–65 age group is
0.44 standard deviations lower than for the 25–34 age group.
Figure 4.9 shows the situation where experience does not influence potential
productivity. The highest productivity is then found for the 20–24 age group.
Thereafter, it falls, and the oldest age group 55–65 has a productivity of 0.61
standard deviations below that of the 25–34 age group. If experience raises pro-
ductivity for a period that is positive but shorter than our 10-year estimate, the
productivity profile would peak somewhere in between the two scenarios presented
in Figure 4.9. The scenario where experience does matter is, however, not likely to
be realistic, as it plays a role in job performance in almost any profession.
Figure 4.10 shows the impact of a maximum index threshold, based on Equa-
tion 4.5. When the productivity index is higher than the threshold, we observe only
a very moderate productivity-increasing effect, as shown by the adjusted produc-
tivity index (dashed line). This could apply to simple light work, where only a min-
imum cognitive and noncognitive ability level are needed, with abilities above this
threshold only very moderately improving productivity. Such a threshold would
decrease age differences in productivity and could even lead to a flat productivity
profile.
Figure 4.11 displays the case of a minimum-productivity-index threshold, that
is based on Equation 4.6. When the productivity index is below the minimum
threshold, there is a stronger decrease in productivity. An example of a profession
with such a threshold could be computer engineering, where a too-low productivity
potential may have a strong negative effect on job performance. We observe that
such a threshold would increase age differences in productivity.
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4.2.6 Discussion
Earlier studies tend to neglect the causes of age-related job performance differences
and the impact of changing labor-market demands when measuring age-related dif-
ferences in productivity. In the present study we estimate the productivity potential
by weighing age-specific ability levels against the labor-market demand for these
abilities.
Basing the estimates on the causes of productivity differences allows us to
make an estimate of the impact of structural changes in the labor market. The
age–productivity profile is found to vary over time in accordance with changing
labor-market needs. Assuming a reasonably strong effect of experience, we es-
timate that productivity peaks for the 35–44 age group.12 If the demand for ex-
perience falls, the productivity peak shifts toward younger ages. Conversely, if the
minimum ability requirement should drop over time, age differences in productivity
would decrease.
Our approach does contain simplifications that need to be addressed: simpli-
fications that increase the uncertainty level of the estimates. It is impossible to
take all individual job-related abilities into account, and identifying the length of
experience needed to reach peak job performance levels entails particularly great
uncertainty. The matching procedure is also an approximate method, and several
relevant issues, such as those related to disability and health, are not taken into
12A productivity peak in the late thirties and early forties is in line with several previous studies,
including Davies and Sparrow (1985).
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account. Actual work potential could be influenced by other factors, such as moti-
vation.
The estimates of the potential productivity profile reflect that job performance
on average tends to decrease in the latter half of the working life, given almost
any calibration of the equations. The only exception to this is that individuals who
have more than a decade of experience still substantially increase their productivity
for every additional year of experience, and this effect more than outweighs the
decreased functioning of other job-related abilities. Given the available empirical
evidence on the effect of experience on productivity, this may seem unlikely.
Age–productivity profiles, where productivity drops from mid–working life,
may contrast with current late peaks in the age–earnings slopes. Age–earnings
profiles can stem from seniority-based earnings schedules rather than productivity
increases over the life cycle. In effect, it will be more costly for the firm to employ
older individuals than younger ones. Therefore, population aging decreases firms’
profits and creates incentives to abolish the use of seniority-based wage systems.
Accelerating technological progress may represent an additional factor that could
shift the peak of age–earnings schedules toward younger ages, as it can increase
the demand for workers that learn and adjust quickly—abilities that young rather
than older individuals tend to have. This may imply a change in the shape of the
age–earnings schedules toward the shape of the age–productivity curve, which may
lower the relative wages of senior workers.
5
Projections of the Effects of Education
Reforms on Norwegian Public Pensions
In this chapter we use a microsimulation model to project the impact on the Nor-
wegian public pension system, up to the year 2100, of a reform that lowers the
school-leaving age. The assumptions we make concerning the effects of a shift in
the timing and duration of schooling on human capital and fertility and our esti-
mates for the age–productivity curve are, to a large extent, based on the findings
from Chapters 2, 3, and 4.
5.1 MOSART
To project the effects of education reforms on the Norwegian public pension sys-
tem, we apply MOSART, a large-scale dynamic microsimulation model that bases
its projections on a representative cross-sectional sample of the Norwegian popu-
lation. MOSART includes detailed information for every individual in the sample,
and it simulates each person’s life course. For each passing year, individuals are ex-
posed to risks (transition probabilities) of experiencing a set of events including mi-
gration, deaths, births, marriages, divorces, educational activities, retirement, and
labor-force participation. Whether an individual experiences an event will depend
on his/her personal characteristics. Transition probabilities are based on empirical
observations from recent periods.
MOSART takes into account a number of characteristics affecting an individ-
ual’s status as a contributor to or receiver of public pensions. These characteristics
include education, labor-market characteristics, age, marital status, number of chil-
dren, and a range of other variables. Individual pension rights are based on relevant
information, including the number of years worked, age–earnings profile, health,
and household status.
Pension payments are financed through a share of the working population’s
earnings, referred to as the contribution rate. Public pension benefits are calculated
from labor-market earnings and other characteristics included in the simulation.
As aging takes place, a larger share of the population will be entitled to a pension,
and the average pension eligibility will increase. The fact that pension benefit levels
cannot be adjusted will increase pension expenditure and raise the contribution rate.
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The model is designed to give precise estimates of long-term developments
in the public pension system in Norway. It is therefore well suited to evaluating
specific research questions of the kind we address here, that is, changes in the length
of the working life as a result of education reforms. The model uses microlevel
units (single individuals and households) as its basic units of analysis, which allows
predictions to be made with a high degree of detail. As the simulation is based
on individuals rather than aggregated entities, it gives exact projections for each
individual’s pension status according to the laws and regulations of the Norwegian
public pension system (national insurance system). An overview of the model is
provided here. A more technical description and an explanation of the model’s
assumptions can be found in the Appendix.
Making a model more focused, and thereby concentrating on a more limited
set of research questions, can provide more detailed insight than an analysis of
broader economic parameters. Models that attempt to predict the functioning of a
whole economy need to rely on a large number of assumptions and simplifications.
This increases the risk of errors at startup, either because the model is wrongly
calibrated, or the behavioral functions are falsely specified, or the economic inter-
dependencies are incorrectly postulated.
A microbased model such as MOSART can simulate behavioral shifts and
individual-level changes in characteristics and entitlements in a way that would
be difficult to achieve with a macrobased model. Micromodel approaches can, with
a very high degree of accuracy and detail, capture changes in, for example, produc-
tivity levels, labor-force participation rates, and fertility outcomes at the individual
level.
On the other hand, our microbased approach means that we cannot take certain
macroeconomic phenomena into account. As MOSART is not a general equilib-
rium model, we cannot, for example, model the effect of changes in the capital
stock and real business cycles and their effects on wage levels. Such effects, how-
ever, may be of secondary importance for our specific research question. Wage
variations will, because of the risk-sharing nature of the Norwegian pension sys-
tem, be shared by pensioners and income receivers and will not have any first-order
effects on many of the most important outcome variables in which we are primarily
interested, such as the contribution rate.
The trade-off over time between the gains of a longer working-life, higher fer-
tility, and the costs of lower productivity can be estimated with MOSART. The
model provides sufficient demographic detail to reproduce 1) the effects of vari-
ation in the timing and outcome of fertility and 2) changes to individual human
capital and labor-market behavior resulting from a younger school graduation age.
The choice of Norway as our country of investigation has been made for sev-
eral reasons. Norway has a relatively generous pay-as-you-go public pension sys-
tem with high pensions and an extensive coverage of the population. Norway also
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Table 5.1. Assumptions of the MOSART projections
Net immigration per year 13,000 persons
Life expectancy at birth Men 76.3 years, increasing to 84.2 years in
2050, and increasingly linearly thereafter
Women 81.6 years, increasing to 88.1
years in 2050, and increasingly linearly
thereafter
Total fertility rate 1.75 increasing to 1.8 by 2005, and
constant thereafter
Average number of years as pupil or
student after nine years of primary school
Men 6.6 years
Women 8.2 years
Average number of years as disability
pensioner
Men 5.6 years
Women 7.0 years
Average number of years in the labor force Men 41.7 years
Women 38.2 years
Average labor market earnings Men 239,000 NOK
Women 145,000 NOK
Basic pension unit 50,603 NOK
has a relatively high life expectancy (at birth): 76.3 years for men and 81.6 years
for women, which implies that individuals spend a long time as pension receivers
(Statistics Norway, 2003a). These facts make demographic aging a substantial chal-
lenge to the Norwegian public pension system.
5.1.1 Assumptions
This model is based on a number of assumptions regarding retirement laws, net
immigration, fertility, mortality, education, and the skill composition of the labor
force. For example, new births and immigrants are added to the population every
year, and those who die are removed. Some of the most important of these vari-
ables are summarized in Table 5.1, and a more detailed description is found in the
Appendix.
The demographic variables, including immigration, fertility, and mortality es-
timates, are to a large extent based on the “medium” scenario from Statistics Nor-
way’s population forecasting model (NOS, 2002). The formal retirement age, as
well as income and the size of the basic pension unit, come from the current pen-
sion laws, while educational transition rates come from Norwegian administrative
register data.
The estimates for the pension benefits (which the contribution rate finances)
include major pension types covered by the national insurance scheme, which
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comprises early-retirement schemes, old-age pension systems, widowhood pen-
sions, and disability pensions.
In our projections, expenditure on public education is assumed to remain con-
stant and not to decrease, despite the reduction in the number of years of schooling.
This assumption is made for several reasons. To keep the school quality output
constant, the intensity of learning per school year may need to be increased, and
a greater learning intensity can require more resource use per school year. More-
over, the proposal to compress schooling is more likely to be ratified in a political
setting where the employment of education workers is guaranteed (i.e., where no
reductions in schooling resources were foreseen).
Childbearing is assumed to influence parental labor supply in accordance with
empirical observations of labor-market behavior and Norwegian laws (a couple in
Norway is allowed net parental leave of at least 42 weeks). In the simulation model,
childbearing will particularly affect the participation of the mother in the labor
force, which depends on the age of the youngest child and the total number of
children she has.
5.1.2 Transition probabilities
The transition probabilities are shown in Table 5.2, which is based on the level
and distribution of demographic events. For example, the level and distribution
of mortality is determined by sex, age, marital status, educational attainment, and
disability status.
5.1.3 The effects of educational reforms on the pension system
Figure 5.1 shows how an individual’s life course is simulated in MOSART. The
age at school entry is represented by the variable u; s is the school-leaving age; q
the age of retirement; and T the age at death. The schooling period is s  u; the
working life is q  s; and retirement is T  q.
If a person enters the labor market at a younger age because the graduation
age is lowered, then s would decrease and the working life q  s would be ex-
tended. This could increase the lifetime income and the amount of taxes that are
paid. Extending the working life could, however, also raise the eligibility for pen-
sion benefits, as a longer working life can increase pension entitlements. The use
of the simulation model MOSART allows the net impact of a longer working life
to be estimated by taking into account pension-related effects, such as variations in
pension eligibility and lifetime income.
In simulations where the education reform is considered, the first individuals
subject to the reform are those born in 1994 who will leave secondary school in
2011. This birth cohort, and all subsequent ones, finishes school two years earlier
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Table 5.2. Explanation of estimation periods and covariates for each event
Event Estimation methods and
periods
Covariates
Migration Based on observations
1990–2001
Sex and age
Mortality Based on observations
1970–2000
Sex, age, marital status, educational
attainment, and disability pension
Fertility Based on observations
1980–2000
Mother’s age, number of children, and
age of youngest child
Household status
(nuptiality/
divorce)
Observed 1989 rates Woman’s age, children, and marital
status
Educational
activities
Observed 1999 rates,
distribution from 2001
Sex, age and educational activities,
and attainment
Entry into
disability pension
Logit function 1986–1989,
distribution from 2001
Sex, age, marital status, educational
attainment, pension status, and
labor-force participation
Other transitions
in pension status
Observed rates 1986–1989,
distribution from 2001
Sex, age, pension status, educational
attainment, labor-force participation,
widow/widowerhood
Labor-force
participation
Logit function, etc.,
1985–1988, 1991,
distribution from 2001
Sex, age, children, marital status,
educational activities and attainment,
pension status, and previous year’s
labor-force participation
than happened previously: one year because of the lower school-entry age and a
second year because of the shorter length of primary and secondary education.
If the school reform, by changing the timing and duration of education, influ-
ences the amount of learning, this could have consequences for wage and pension
levels. The studies presented in Chapter 2 suggest that human capital is unaffected
by a compression of schooling, while the younger entry age may imply a 1% lower
productivity level.1 A lower productivity level could, as the pensions are indexed
to wages, decrease both income and pensions. Norwegian public pension benefits
depend on the current wages of the working population, as the laws regulating pen-
sion benefits under the national insurance scheme aim to raise/lower pensions at
the same rate as the wage level. This means that marginal variations in productiv-
ity levels are unlikely to cause any substantial effects on the contribution rate (the
share of the income that workers pay to finance pension benefits).
1This finding was based on the female population, and we assume that a similar effect is also valid
for the male population.
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Figure 5.1. Stylized diagram of an individual’s life course in the MOSART model.
Variable description: u = age at entering school, s = school-leaving age, q = retire-
ment age, T = age at death.
The earlier graduation age of the reform cohort is assumed to cause a parallel
shift in the childbearing age or age at labor-market entry (see Sections 2.1 and 3.2
for a discussion of this issue). The spacing of events in adulthood is taken to be of
a rigid character, with a shift in the school-leaving age leading to a parallel shift in
the timing of subsequent events.
Whether a lower school-leaving age increases childbearing numbers is uncer-
tain. Our study in Chapter 3 does not identify any higher fertility outcome for those
who graduate at a younger age. However, our study is based on within-class ev-
idence of individuals with the same social age. A school reform that reduces the
school-leaving age would affect the social age of those affected by the reform, as
the whole class would graduate at a younger age—and this could have the effect of
raising fertility levels.
We base our projections on two fertility scenarios, one where only the timing
of fertility changes and one where the outcome of fertility also changes. In the
scenarios where the fertility outcome is assumed to be affected, leaving school
two years earlier leads to a 6% increase in fertility outcome. This is based on
estimates by Kohler et al. (2001), who analyze the fertility patterns of monozygotic
twins. This research approach allows a wide range of genetic influences on both
educational and fertility outcomes to be held constant. For every earlier year of
entering parenthood, fertility outcome levels are found to increase by 3%.
The retirement reforms discussed are within the internationally observed lim-
its. Countries such as Iceland or Japan do follow retirement patterns, having a
retirement age that is roughly five years later than that of Norway (Blo¨ndahl and
Scarpetta, 1998).
5.1.4 Names of variables
Where monetary outcomes are used, we use the values from the year 2001.
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Contribution Rate = The Norwegian pension system is essentially a pay-as-
you-go system, with taxes on the workforce funding current pensions. The contri-
bution rate—the part of the worker’s income that is used to pay for the pensions—is
calculated as:
Contribution rate  
P
Pension benefits
PLabor-market earnings + 0.5PPension benefits
The pensioners pay lower taxes on their pension benefits because of special tax
rules that aim to compensate for lower income, old age, and health problems (see
Arneberg and Gravningsmyhr, 1994).
Size of labor force = Population according to age multiplied by age-specific, labor-
force participation rates.
Person–years = The number of full person–years worked in the economy per year.
A full person–year is counted in Norway as 1,687.5 working hours.
Pensioners = Number of old-age pensioners.
Pension = Average pension benefit for a pensioner. The pension benefit depends on
the individual’s work history, marital status, and widowhood status.
Population size = Number of individuals in the country.
Total income (in billions) = Sum of the average income for 16–74 year olds. This
measurement is sensitive to how productive the cohorts affected by the education
reform are.
5.1.5 Description of scenarios
A set of scenarios has been selected to estimate the effects of an education reform
and later retirement age on variables related to the public pension system in Nor-
way. The scenarios vary in their assumptions regarding the reform’s effects on
fertility, human capital levels, and age–productivity profiles. The outcome vari-
ables that we investigate include the age, structure, and size of the population. We
also look at the effects on the workforce, pensions, and income. Particular empha-
sis is placed on understanding the extent to which the education reform affects the
balance between the working and the retired share of the population, and the impact
this has on the contribution rate.
A brief description of the scenarios is given in Table 5.3, and a more detailed
description follows. S1 refers to the benchmark case, while S2–S4 consider the
impact of the education reform on the basis of different assumptions regarding fer-
tility and productivity levels. Scenarios S5–S7 apply to the case where the retire-
ment age increases and labor supply and productivity vary, and S8–S10 consider
the combined effects of the education reform and a later retirement age.
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Table 5.3. Scenario description
Younger
workers’ Older Older
Scenario Education productivity Fertility Retirement workers’ workers’
(S) reform level level reform labor supply productivity
S1 No Not affected Not affected No Not affected Not affected
S2 Yes, 2 years Not affected Not affected No Not affected Not affected
S3 Yes, 2 years Not affected Increases No Not affected Not affected
S4 Yes, 2 years Decreases Not affected No Not affected Not affected
S5 No Not affected Not affected Yes, 2 years Not affected Not affected
S6 No Not affected Not affected Yes, 2 years Increases Not affected
S7 No Not affected Not affected Yes, 2 years Not affected Decreases
S8 Yes, 2 years Not affected Not affected Yes, 2 years Not affected Not affected
S9 Yes, 2 years Not affected Increases Yes, 2 years Not affected Not affected
S10 Yes, 3 years Not affected Not affected Yes, 5 years Not affected Not affected
Scenario 1: Benchmark scenario—acts as the reference case. It shows the situ-
ation where the school-leaving and retirement ages remain constant and no reform
is introduced. This scenario is used to compare the effects of an extended working
life with the situation where no reforms take place.
Scenario 2: Educational reform, fertility stable—the school-leaving age is low-
ered by two years in an education reform that lowers the school-entry age by one
year and compresses the duration of primary and secondary schooling by another
year. The earlier school-leaving age leads to a parallel decrease in labor-market
entry and childbearing ages (see Chapters 2 and 3 for a discussion of these issues).
There are no effects on the cohort fertility level. The school reform expands the
working life and consequently increases the size of the labor force.
Scenario 3: Educational reform, fertility increase—identical to Scenario 2, ex-
cept that fertility levels are assumed to rise. In accordance with the findings in
Kohler et al. (2001), the school reform leads to a 6% increase in completed fer-
tility levels. The higher fertility resulting from the education reform will increase
the size of the population and lead to a somewhat younger age structure. This will
have a cumulative effect on fertility in the long run, as the larger cohorts will also
have higher fertility. In effect, the difference between scenarios with and without a
fertility effect on the population’s size and structure increases over time.
Scenario 4: Educational reform, negative productivity effect—if the earlier ed-
ucation reform adversely affected human capital formation, then a lower produc-
tivity level would be expected to be found among those affected by the reform.
The lower school-entry age may slightly decrease productivity levels. Assuming
that the adverse effect on human capital of lowering the school-entry age from 7
to 6 years (which is the case in the study presented in Section 2.3) is the same as
lowering it from 6 to 5 years, we find that wage levels are reduced by 1%. The
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compression of schooling from 13 to 12 years, on the other hand, in accordance
with findings from Section 2.4, does not decrease human capital accumulation.
Scenario 5: Retirement reform—considers the effects of a two-year-later exit
from the workforce. The retirement age increases from 2010. Both the risk of
entering old-age-pension status and the transition risk to disability pension (which
is the highest pensioner status for those below the minimum old-age retirement
age) is shifted to two years later. The later entry into retirement status decreases
the number of pensioners, increases the number of taxpayers, and consequently
lowers the contribution rate.
Scenario 6: Retirement reform, labor supply increases—predicts that the later
retirement age will be accompanied by higher labor-force participation rates. The
assumptions for this scenario are similar to those of Scenario 5, except that there is
an increase among older age groups in the amount of time worked. It is assumed
that all individuals aged 45 and above will work more and that they will behave in
the labor market as if they were two years younger.
Scenario 7: Retirement reform, older workers less productive—assumes that
the relative labor-market performance of older individuals substantially drops and
that their wages are reduced as a result (as discussed in Chapter 4). This is reflected
by the income characteristics of those above 45 years, whose wages shift as if they
were eight years older. This means that the current relatively late age at which
wages peak can shift toward earlier ages, resulting in the income levels of senior
workers dropping markedly.
Scenario 8: Educational and retirement reform—shows the combined effect
of extending the working life at both ends. Individuals enter the labor market two
years earlier (because of the education reform) and leave it two years later (because
of the increase in the retirement age).
Scenario 9: Educational and retirement reform, fertility increases—identical to
Scenario 8, except that there is an increase in fertility levels for the cohorts affected
by the education reform.
Scenario 10: Education reform (3 years) and retirement 5 years later—to illus-
trate the potential capacity of extensions to the working life, we include a scenario
with a five-year increase in the age of retirement and an education reform that
leads to a school-leaving age that is three years lower. Fertility, labor supply, and
productivity levels are assumed to remain constant.
5.2 Projection Results
This section presents the forecasts up to the year 2100 of the dynamic microbased
projection model, MOSART. Findings for population characteristics, workers, and
the number of pensioners and workers are presented first. Thereafter, forecasts for
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Figure 5.2. Population size of Norway from 2000–2100.
Source: Own calculations.
pension-related variables are shown, including the average pension size and how
the contribution rate develops.
5.2.1 Population size
The size of the population is affected by the education reform if the timing of fer-
tility or the fertility outcome changes. Even relatively small changes in fertility
levels have large effects on future population sizes. It is estimated that the popu-
lation will increase substantially by the year 2100, as demonstrated in Figure 5.2,
although fertility lies below reproductive levels. This is a result of increases in life
expectancy and positive net immigration.
If the education reform is implemented, the population will increase to
6,556,000 (S2), while, without the education reform, the population will rise to
a level of 6,498,000 in 2100 (S1). Most of the increase in the population size due
to the school reform takes place until 2030, as the impact of a younger childbearing
age on fertility outcome is strongest for this period (as shown in Figure 5.3).
If the education reform increases fertility outcome levels (S3), the population
size will increase to 7,072,000. This means that the school reform will increase the
size of the population by either 58,000 or 574,000 individuals by 2100, depending
on whether the younger school-leaving age affects the timing of fertility or the
fertility outcome as well.
These projections are relatively similar to other population projections, such as
those of the United Nations (2005). In the UN projections the population will in-
crease to 5,435,000 individuals by 2050 (medium estimate), which is slightly less
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than S1 in Figure 5.2. The reason why the UN projects a slightly lower popu-
lation size in Norway is that it assumes lower net immigration and a shorter life
expectancy, albeit a slightly higher fertility level.
5.2.2 Age composition of the population
The school reform can affect the size of the population and also the age composi-
tion of the population. In Figure 5.3 the number of births throughout the projected
period can be observed. The school reform (S2) leads to a temporary increase in
the number of births from 2011 (when those affected by the reform start to graduate
from school) relative to the reference case (S1). A few decades after the education
reform is implemented, the timing of childbearing has stabilized at younger ages,
which means that fertility levels are similar in the two scenarios S1 and S2. How-
ever, if fertility levels increase as an effect of the school reform (S3) this would, by
2100, lead to 15.6% more births than in the reference case (S1).
In Figure 5.4 the age structure of the population is shown. The population is
divided into five age categories, 0–19, 20–29, 30–54, 55–74, and 75–120. These
age categories would roughly equal the potential number of pre–labor market indi-
viduals, young workers, prime-age workers, senior workers, and retirees.
In the reference scenario there is a sharp increase in the number of individuals
in the two oldest age categories (S1). The number of prime-age workers (30–54)
increases slightly throughout the period, while the two youngest age groups remain
relatively constant in size. When the education reform is introduced (S2), this
increases the size of the different age groups, starting with the younger cohorts.
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The increase in the size of the different age groups is, to a large extent, temporary
and is weakened in the years following the implementation of the school reform.
If the education reform raises fertility outcome levels (S3), the size of the differ-
ent population groups grows cumulatively and the population size increases more
over time relative to the reference scenario (S1). Furthermore, the increase in the
size of the population takes place first for younger age groups, while the size of the
older age groups is affected only toward the end of the simulated period.
5.2.3 Workforce size
The evolution in the size of the workforce is shown in Figure 5.5. If no school
reform is implemented, the reference scenario predicts that the labor force will
increase to a level of 2,805,000 workers (S1) by the year 2100. Implementation of
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Figure 5.5. Size of the workforce in Norway, 2000–2100.
Source: Own calculations.
the education reform would increase the number of workers to 2,929,000 (S2) in
2100. If fertility levels increase as a result of the education reform (S3), then the
workforce size will increase to a level of 3,257,000 individuals in 2100.
This is a slightly higher number than would be caused by retiring two years
later, which leads to 2,907,000 workers by 2100 (S5). However, should the retire-
ment reform be accompanied by higher rates of labor supply among older workers
(S6), the effect would be similar to that of a younger labor-market entry, and the
number of workers would be 2,941,000 in 2100.
5.2.4 Age composition of the workforce
The number of workers in the 16–29 age group will remain relatively constant in
the reference scenario and will reach 680,000 by 2100 (S1), as shown in Figure 5.6.
Increasing the retirement age (S5) has only a very modest effect, as there are only a
limited number of old-age pensioners in this young age group (among the few that
belong to this category are mainly pensioners on disability allowance).
The education reform, however, considerably increases the number of workers
aged 16–29. By 2100 the reform has increased the size of this category to 764,000,
assuming constant fertility (S2). If the effect of the school reform is to increase
fertility levels, then the number of workers aged 16–29 would be 849,000 by 2100
(S3).
The growth in the size of the 30–54 age group of workers is shown in Figure 5.7.
In the benchmark case (S1) a modest increase in the number to around 1,551,119
is projected to take place by 2100. Starting earlier in the labor market (S2) and
increasing the retirement age when labor supply increases (S6) have about the same
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Source: Own calculations.
effect on the labor force, which increases to around 1,580,000 prime-age workers
in 2100. If the education reform leads to an increase in fertility levels (S3), the size
of this age category will increase to 1,734,000 workers by the year 2100.
The number of workers in the 55–74 age group increases through population
aging, as seen in Figure 5.8. The reference scenario predicts that the number of
workers will increase to 574,000 by 2100 (S1). The education reform has a very
small effect on the number of workers in this category and results in 582,000 in-
dividuals by 2100 (S2). However, if the education reform leads to higher fertility
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Figure 5.8. Number of workers aged 55–74 years in Norway from 2000–2100.
Source: Own calculations.
levels, this would mean an increase in the size of this group to 623,000 individuals
by 2100 (S3).
A later retirement age has a strong effect on the number of workers in this age
category and would increase the number to 637,000 workers (S5) by 2100. If later
retirement is combined with an increase in the labor-force participation rates of
older workers, the number of workers in the 55–74 age group increases to 676,000
(S6).
5.2.5 Old-age pensioners
Figure 5.9 portrays the number of old-age pensioners in Norway until 2100. The
reference scenario shows an increase from 619,000 pensioners in 2000 to 1,822,000
by 2100 (S1). If the education reform is introduced, the number of pensioners
increases to 1,864,000 (S2) by 2100, while a stronger effect is found if fertility
increases, when the number of pensioners rises to 1,949,000 (S3).
As we can see, the effect of higher fertility is relevant only from a late stage
in the forecasting period, from around the year 2080. If the age of retirement is
postponed by two years, the number of pensioners is reduced to 1,691,000 (S5). If
retirement increases by five years and the school-leaving age drops by three years,
there would be 1,453,000 old-age pensioners in 2100 (S10).
5.2.6 Average pension size
Figure 5.10a and b shows the developments in the average size of pensions un-
til 2100. These figures show that there will be a massive increase in the average
127
N
um
be
r 
(m
ill
io
ns
)
2080 21002020 2040 20602000
Year
2.0
1.6
0.8
1.2
0.4
0.0
S1
S2
S3
S5
S10
Figure 5.9. Number of pensioners in Norway from 2000–2100.
Source: Own calculations.
pension until 2030 because the pension system “matures,” as younger cohorts,
with their higher labor-force participation and higher wages, will become entitled
to higher pensions. To highlight the differences between the different scenarios,
Figure 5.10b shows in detail the developments from 2030 to 2100, a time period
when pension benefit levels will have stabilized.
In the benchmark case the pension payments stabilize at around 140,000 NOK
(S1). If the education reform is implemented, pensions will increase to 141,409
NOK (S2) because the longer working life leads to higher pension entitlements.
If the reform decreases human capital and productivity levels, this will lead to a
slightly lower pension level of 141,235 NOK (S4) in 2100. If the working life is
extended by increasing the retirement age, then pensions will increase to a level of
141,035 NOK (S5) or to 141,293 NOK if the supply of senior workers in the labor
market also increases (S6).
5.2.7 Person–years
The number of person–years worked increases in all scenarios, as shown in
Figure 5.11. The reference scenario predicts that there will be 2,238,000 person–
years in 2100 (S1). An education reform increases the number of person–years to
2,411,000 (S2) in 2100. If fertility outcome levels increase, the number of person–
years increases to 2,613,000 (S3) in 2100.
If the retirement age increases by two years there will be 2,341,000 individuals
by the end of the projection period (S5). If a later retirement is accompanied by
higher labor-force participation on the part of older workers, the number of person–
years will reach 2,371,000 (S6) in 2100.
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5.2.8 Total income
The total income in the economy increases slowly in the benchmark case to a level
of 736 billion NOK (S1) in 2100 (Figure 5.12). The education reform increases
income to a level of 793 billion NOK (S2). If the reform leads to higher fertility, this
results in an increase to around 861 billion NOK per year (S3). If the productivity
of the labor-market entrants decreases after an education reform, then the income
will increase to only 779 billion NOK (S4).
An increase of two years in the age at retirement produces a total income value
of 770 billion NOK (S5). The later retirement age will increase income to a level
of 780 billion NOK (S6) if the labor supply increases.
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5.2.9 Contribution rate
The development of the contribution rate up to 2100 under a range of different
scenarios is shown in Figure 5.13. The contribution rate is projected to increase
considerably as the population ages and more people enter retirement. The rela-
tively large cohorts born in 1945–1965 increase the numbers of pensioners until
around 2030. At the same time, the national insurance scheme matures, which
means that those who become pensioners will have acquired more pension rights
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and are entitled to higher pensions. This causes a sharp upward shift in the contri-
bution rate. Continued increases in life expectancy and fertility levels that remain
below replacement exacerbate increases in the contribution rate until 2100.
The contribution rate increases to 38% in the benchmark case in 2100 (S1).
When an education reform is implemented, the contribution rate increases by less
and reaches a level of 36.9% (S2) by 2100. However, the greatest relative impact
of the school reform is found in a shorter time horizon, with, for example, in 2040,
the reference scenario giving a contribution rate of 30.7% and the school reform
scenario a contribution rate of 28.7%. The gap between the reference case and the
education reform becomes somewhat narrower toward the end of the period, as the
larger cohorts—those born in the years after 2011—retire.
Changes in workers’ productivity do not have significant effects on the contri-
bution rate, as pensions are wage-indexed and pension levels adjust to productivity
shocks. When the education reform decreases productivity, the contribution rate
reaches 36.6% by 2100 (S4).
Given that the school reform leads to an increase in fertility, the contribution
rate is substantially lower at the end of the period and reaches a level of 35.4%
(S3) in 2100. A retirement-age reform could have a stronger effect on the contribu-
tion rate than the school reform. Leaving the workforce two years later leads to a
contribution rate of 34.8% (S5) in 2100 or 34.5% (S6) if the labor supply decreases.
The combined effect of increasing the retirement age by two years and bringing
forward labor-market entry by two years is also analyzed (S8), and it is found to
lead to a contribution rate of 33.8% in 2100. If both the education and the retirement
reform are implemented and fertility levels increase, the contribution rate drops to
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32.9% (S9). Delaying the retirement age by two years when the older workers are
less productive leads to an increase in the contribution rate of 36.2% in 2100 (S7).
In the scenario with a five-year increase in the age of retirement and an edu-
cation reform that leads to a school-leaving age that is lower by three years, the
contribution rate is 32.5% in 2100, given no effects on fertility outcome (S10).
This implies that if such a change took place, with the working life being extended
at both ends, the contribution would increase by only half as much as that in the
reference scenario from 2005 to 2100.
6
Conclusions
In Chapter 1 we argued that if individuals spent more years in the labor market,
the sustainability of public pension systems in aging European economies might
increase. An extended working life would increase the size of the labor force, ease
the burden of a growing dependency ratio, and increase the sustainability of pay-
as-you-go pension systems. One possible way of achieving this, which, to date,
has not been given much research attention, would be to lower the school-leaving
age. We approach this issue by analyzing the effects of an education reform that
compresses the length of schooling and lowers the age at school entry, thereby
lowering the school-leaving age.
Chapter 2 presented evidence to the effect that shifting the timing and duration
of schooling to allow for a younger school-leaving age would be unlikely to cause
substantial losses in terms of human capital levels. In Chapter 3, based on birth-
month-induced variation in the school-leaving age, we concluded that a younger
school-leaving age is likely to lead to an earlier start to childbearing. In Chapter 4
we discussed findings suggesting that workers are most productive at younger ages,
thus emphasizing the advantages of rejuvenating the labor force by lowering the
age of entry to the labor market. Chapter 5 considered the effect of a lower school-
graduation age on the future of Norwegian public pensions, using a microbased
projection model. In this chapter, the effects of the lower graduation age are dis-
cussed in relation to other policies that have been suggested for strengthening the
public pension system.
The school-leaving age in Norway has increased substantially in recent years,
as increasing shares of the population attain secondary and/or tertiary education
(Statistics Norway, 2004). There are large differences in the number of years re-
quired to attain different schooling levels in different countries, and the late school-
leaving ages in Norway can, at least in part, be attributed to the long periods of
time required to complete different educational levels (UNESCO, 2004). A late
entry to the labor market involves social costs in terms of possible adverse effects
on public pensions. However, it can also involve individual costs in the form of a
shortened working life, fewer years to achieve fertility plans, and a later timing of
childbearing that may be suboptimal in terms of the health of mother and child.
The individual and social costs associated with a late school-leaving age raise
the question as to whether similar educational standards could be achieved at a
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younger age. We consider the impact of a reform that lowers the age of gradu-
ation by two years, by decreasing the age of school entry from 6 to 5 years and
compressing the duration of primary and secondary schooling from 13 to 12 years.
The reform is likely to lower the school-leaving age and, at least over time, lower
the age of entry to the labor market. According to our estimates of the effects on
student performance of marginal variations in the timing and duration of schooling,
the human capital effects are likely to be either nonexistent or very small.
To analyze the effects of the reform, we ran projections with MOSART, a large-
scale microbased dynamic model designed to forecast the development of the Nor-
wegian public pension system. We find that the reform can have an alleviating
effect on the sustainability of the public pension system and could soften the in-
crease in the contribution rate by 1%–2% in comparison with the case where no
reform takes place. This implies that the reform could reduce the aging-induced
growth in the contribution rate by one-tenth in the period from 2000 to 2100. If
fertility were also to increase, the beneficial effect would be about twice as strong.
To sum up, policies that aim to lower the school-leaving age while maintain-
ing educational quality could play a role in expanding and rejuvenating the labor
force and may represent an important contribution to the sustainability of the public
pension system in Norway.
Appendix
The Dynamic Microsimulation Model, MOSART, and the
Norwegian Public Pension System
From the beginning of the twenty-first century, Norway, like most developed coun-
tries, has been faced with an aging population. A system for general public pension
benefits, the national insurance scheme, was established in Norway in 1967. As
new pensioners have been earning pension entitlements for a longer period than
current pensioners, the average pension benefit from this scheme will continue to
grow until 2035. These two situations—a growing percentage of older people and
improved pension benefits—represent a challenge for the future financing of public
expenditure. For a proper analysis of these phenomena (especially supplementary
pensions, which are calculated from labor-market earnings each year throughout
the working career), we use an approach based on microdata. This chapter presents
a dynamic cross-sectional microsimulation model, MOSART, that can be used to
analyze the composition and development of population size, as well as the con-
sequences of these for education levels, labor supply, and public pension benefits.
The appendix is partly based on Fredrikssen (1996), which provides a more detailed
description of MOSART.
The choice of microsimulation
Orcutt (1957) was the first to suggest microsimulation modeling in social planning,
with the idea of representing a socioeconomic system by a sample of decision units,
for example, persons or firms. Parameters such as behavior are modeled at the
micro level and then aggregated up to total quantities for the economic system,
rather than the relationships between aggregated quantities being modeled directly.
In some cases it is easier to model behavior at the micro level, and it may often
be inappropriate to model relationships between aggregated quantities because of
the heterogeneity between micro units, nonlinearities, and complexity. One exam-
ple may be a nonproportional tax system (which most tax systems probably are).
In this case total taxes will depend, in a somewhat complex manner, on both in-
come level and income distribution. A sound analysis of the effects of changes in
tax rules on tax revenue, income distribution, and labor supply may thus require an
approach at the micro level. A major distinction between microsimulation models
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is whether they are static or dynamic. Static microsimulation models are usually
based on a sample of persons with detailed information that comes, for example,
from income declaration forms.
The sample is aged by reweighing and indexing all income amounts in such
a way that the sample can be perceived as representative of the population in, for
example, the next budget year. Two of the usual advantages of static microsimula-
tion are moderate development costs combined with a very detailed representation
of the tax and benefits system. However, static microsimulation is of little help in
long-term projections and analysis of aspects of the life course, such as pension
schemes. In dynamic microsimulation the population is aged by drawing events
based on each person’s characteristics and implementing the effect of those events
on that person’s relevant characteristics. It is thus possible and relevant to age a per-
son for his/her full life span and thus make long-term projections following each
person over the life course. Dynamic microsimulation covers a large variety of life-
cycle models; in this context the MOSART model is based on discrete time and a
real sample of a cross-section of the Norwegian population.
Furthermore, all aspects of the population in one year are simulated before the
model starts simulating the next year, so-called cross-sectional simulation. One
disadvantage of (dynamic) microsimulation modeling is the development cost, as
none of the major existing applications include a cross-section of persons, firms,
and other institutions from a real socioeconomic system. Microsimulation models
also require a large sample of decision units to achieve sufficiently small sample
errors, and the subsequent computer runtimes may be unacceptable for several pur-
poses.
The first dynamic microsimulation used in socioeconomic policy studies was
the DYNASIM model (Orcutt et al., 1976), fathered by the same individual who
developed modern microsimulation techniques almost two decades earlier (Orcutt,
1957). At present, there are a number of other dynamic microsimulation mod-
els similar to MOSART in existence. These also focus on dynamic projections
of population and socioeconomic features. They include Frankfurt (with a focus
on Germany), DYNASIM (United States), CORSIM (United States), DPMS (Ger-
many), NEDYMAS (Netherlands), and PENSIM (United Kingdom). [For reviews
of the evolution of microbased modeling, see Spielauer (2002); Van Imhoff and
Post (1998); and this Appendix].
Only NEDYMAS and MOSART are based on population registers, while the
other models apply data from surveys or samples. In DPMS and MOSART, the
demographic output is independent of nondemographic modules. MOSART is the
only micromodel devoted to linking macrobased population projections and socio-
economic variables.
Moreover, Norway is an interesting country for research purposes because
of the availability of centralized personal register systems, where the individual
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characteristics of those in the pension system are stored centrally and made avail-
able for scientific analysis. These individual records are of high quality, both in
terms of data coverage and information depth. The data has been carefully exam-
ined and analyzed regarding the causal relationships between individual character-
istics and the events of which the simulation makes use.
The MOSART model
MOSART is a dynamic microsimulation model using a cross-section of the Norwe-
gian population and a comprehensive set of characteristics. The model starts with
a representative sample of the population in a base year and simulates the further
life course for each person in this initial population. The simulation is carried out
by drawing if each person each year makes certain transitions from one state to
another, with transition probabilities depending on each person’s characteristics.
Each of these transition probabilities will normally constitute an event and is esti-
mated from observed transitions in a recent period. The MOSART model is based
on microdata of a higher quality than data used in other dynamic cross-sectional
models at the international level. It includes fewer covariates for some of the tran-
sition probabilities, and the theoretical foundation may also be weaker. The model
includes fewer characteristics because of our reluctance to include in it character-
istics for which genuine microdata are unavailable. The number of subjects in the
MOSART model are an average, but some comparable dynamic microsimulation
models also include taxes, consumption and savings, and a geographical dimension.
Events included in the simulation are migration, deaths, births, marriages, di-
vorces, educational activities, retirement, and participation in the labor force. Pub-
lic pension benefits are calculated from labor-market earnings and other charac-
teristics included in the simulation. Newborns and new immigrants are added to
the initial population each year. The result of the simulation is a model population
comprising the life course of each individual. The MOSART model projects the
Norwegian population and its characteristics for the coming decades. Before these
projections can be made, however, the model user has to make some assumptions
as to how the behavior and other factors underlying each event will develop in the
future.
The projections can be used in several ways; one interpretation is that the base-
line alternative shows the development ahead if “everything continues as it is to-
day.” This interpretation assumes that the projections are a prediction of the devel-
opment ahead, given the underlying assumptions. Policies or other circumstances
leading to changes in the underlying assumptions can be analyzed by comparing
two or more projections. The MOSART model can also analyze income distribu-
tion in the context of the life course. The initial population, the “accounting for” of
people, and the transition probabilities show the potential of the MOSART model as
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a relevant tool for social planning. Several personal characteristics are either stable
or easy to predict, for example, gender, age, educational attainment for adults, and
pension entitlements that have already been earned. The initial population will
therefore contain a great deal of information about the Norwegian population for
several decades ahead. The modeling of behavior at the micro level constitutes
a population-related accounting system; for example, the number of cohabiting
men will automatically equal the number of cohabiting women. A microsimulation
model is also a tool for presenting and synthesizing the knowledge contained by a
set of transition probabilities about a socioeconomic system.
Initial Population
This version of the MOSART model starts with a 1% random sample of the pop-
ulation in Norway comprising about 40,000 persons. Data include actual informa-
tion on marriage, birth histories, educational level, and activities, pension status,
and pension entitlements under the national insurance scheme. The information is
gathered from registers run by the directorate of taxes, the national insurance ad-
ministration, and Statistics Norway. The sample is stratified according to gender
and age, and the sample includes the spouses of all married persons. Ten disjunct
1% samples are available as initial populations for the MOSART model.
Transition Probabilities
A dynamic microsimulation model with discrete time is based on the assumption
that each person in each period has certain probabilities of experiencing transitions
from one state to another. Each of these transition probabilities will normally con-
stitute an event and will depend on each person’s characteristics. The model is then
simulated with stochastic drawing, often called the Monte Carlo technique. Usually
this means the computer generating a so-called random number with uniform dis-
tribution (0.1), and if this random number is smaller than the transition probability,
the transition occurs.
The drawing method in the MOSART model is similar, except that the un-
certainty generated by stochastic drawing is lower. If the simulation comprises a
sufficient number of persons or replications, the model will describe the population
or groups of the population and confer the central limit theorem.
The transition probabilities in the MOSART model are estimated mainly by
using event-history analysis on actual events in recent periods. Important tran-
sition probabilities in the MOSART model are summarized in Table 5.2 and in-
clude covariates and estimation periods and methods. Andreassen et al. (1993)
and Fredrikssen and Spurkland (1993) give a more detailed description of how the
different transition probabilities are estimated.
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Underlying Assumptions
Before any projections can be made, the user of the model must make some under-
lying assumptions as to how the transition probabilities will develop in the future.
The projections may then be interpreted as a prediction of the expected develop-
ment, given the underlying assumption. A baseline alternative will typically allow
all probabilities to remain at the same level as in the latest year with available data.
This may also be interpreted as the expected population changes if “everything
continues as it is now.” The baseline alternative is often used as a reference track
when alternative projections with other underlying assumptions are made. The
baseline alternative in this study is summarized in Table 5.1. The number of events
in the simulation of historical data equals the actual numbers each year for each
subject in Table 5.1; this is accomplished by adjusting the transition probabilities
from Table 5.2. The simulated number of events with the drawing method in the
MOSART model is the sum of the transition probabilities.
Technical Notes
The MOSART model simulates the whole population each year before starting on
the next year. This year-by-year simulation makes it is easy to maintain the rela-
tionships between persons in the model population, for example, between spouses.
The MOSART model is based on discrete time using the calendar year as the time
unit. Our approach is to simulate one event at a time in a fixed order, often called
recursive simulation. In the example above, this gives 8 binomial logit functions,
which is easy to handle. The 8 transitions can also be represented by 8 tables where
only the interesting covariates are represented. Simulating one event at a time com-
bined with the year-by-year simulation also makes it easier to adjust the projections
against any exogenous constraint on the number of events. If the probabilities are
properly conditioned on the results of events drawn previously for the same year,
as is the intention, then recursive simulation will, in principle, not affect the result
using the identities:
P ABjX   P AjX P BjAX   P BjX P AjBX (A.1)
In Equation A.1, A and B describe changes in two arbitrary characteristics dur-
ing the calendar year, and X is a vector of personal characteristics at the beginning
of the calendar year. The choice between discrete/continuous time and simulta-
neous/recursive simulation is therefore more important than the equation suggests.
When we exclude some covariates or use simple mathematical functions, these are
intended simplifications. Moreover, the problems of estimating the proper parame-
ters will also be present in models with discrete time and simultaneous probabilities
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and in models with continuous time. The order of the events reflects several con-
siderations. For practical reasons, demographic events are simulated to first define
each year’s population before the other events are simulated. Furthermore, we have
considered that, provisionally, some of the transition probabilities are estimated un-
conditionally. And last, the order reflects our beliefs about the causality between
the events, and this eases the interpretation of the conditional probabilities. For
example, we find it more natural to say that a person left the labor force because
he/she has become a disability pensioner than vice versa. The simulation model is
written in the object-oriented language Simula [see Kirkerud (1989) for a presenta-
tion of Simula]. Fredrikssen (1995) gives a technical documentation of the model,
except for some improvements on the production of the model population. The
MOSART model is mainly used in analyses by Statistics Norway and by the Nor-
wegian government in white papers and so forth. Development and maintenance of
the model is financed partly through general funding from Statistics Norway and
partly through special projects financed by the Norwegian Research Council and
the Norwegian government.
Demographic events and population size
The modeling of demographic events and the underlying demographic assumptions
of the MOSART model are to a large degree based on the official population pro-
jections of Statistics Norway. [See Texmon (1992) and Statistics Norway (1994)
for details.]
Migration
One problem relates to the number of Norwegians living abroad and pension enti-
tlements earned in other countries, as MOSART uses net rather than gross migra-
tion estimates.
Migration is currently included in the MOSART model only because it renders
the development in population size more accurate. Two major simplifications are
made. First, the MOSART model includes only net immigration rather than gross
immigration and emigration. This means that an exogenous number of “net immi-
grants” by gender and age are added to the model population each year. Second, net
immigrants are mainly assigned the same characteristics as the average Norwegian
population. The only exception is educational attainment, which is set to “un-
known” for new immigrants, as in the educational registers. This also reflects the
actual distribution of educational attainment among “net immigrants.” Unknown
educational attainment implies a higher risk of disability and lower labor-force par-
ticipation rates than arise in the average population. In age groups with positive net
140
50
10
30
20
40
0
19
61
–
6
5
19
71
–
7
5
19
81
–
8
5
Gross immigration
Gross emigration
Net immigration
N
um
be
r 
(t
ho
us
an
ds
)
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
Year
Figure A.1. Migration patterns in Norway, 1961–2000. Five-year averages up to
1985; annual averages thereafter.
Source: Statistics Norway.
emigration, a given number of random persons are removed corresponding to the
exogenous level of net immigration.
The evolution of inward and outward migratory patterns over the past 45 years
for Norway is reported in Figure A.1. An important component of the tendency to-
ward larger positive net immigration are the immigrants from third-world countries
in the seventies, and later, refugees and people taking part in family reunifications.
The abrupt changes in net immigration since 1985 are caused in part by large fluc-
tuations in unemployment between Norway and Sweden.
Mortality
Mortality depends on gender and age; the baseline mortality rates are adjusted pro-
portionally corresponding to life expectancy at birth each year. The development of
life expectancy in Norway from 1960 to 2000 is given in Figure A.2. Furthermore,
mortality is higher in the simulation for single and disabled people and those with a
low level of education. The covariates are roughly estimated from various sources
of mortality statistics; they are included because these differences are of signifi-
cance for pension expenditure. Baseline mortality is simultaneously adjusted to
ensure that these covariates do not influence the average mortality by gender and
age. If a married person dies, the surviving spouse is made a widow/widower.
141
90
50
70
0
30
10
20
60
80
40
Li
fe
 e
xp
ec
ta
nc
y 
(y
ea
rs
)
Life expectancy at birth, men
Life expectancy at birth, women
Life expectancy at age 65, men
Life expectancy at age 65, women 
20001965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 19951960
Year
Figure A.2. Norwegian life expectancy for men and women, 1960–2000.
Source: Statistics Norway.
Brunborg (1992) discusses mortality in Norway for the last 200 years. From
1890 to 1950, life expectancy increased by 22 years or at an annual growth rate of
0.4 years. Life expectancy has increased less since 1950, especially for men in the
first decades after World War II. To date, this increase has mainly been the result of
lower mortality below the age of 60, with roughly one-quarter resulting from lower
infant mortality.
Fertility
Births are simulated for women with fertility rates from 1989 depending on age,
number of children, and the age of the youngest child. Every time a birth occurs, a
child is added to the model population. In the simulation of historical data, fertility
rates from 1989 are adjusted proportionally each year so that the simulated number
of births is equal to the actual level each year. This adjustment is roughly the same
as adjusting the fertility rates against the periodic total fertility rate (TFR). The
development in TFRs over the last 100 years is reported in Brunborg and Mamelund
(1994) and Kravdal (1994). The actual cohort TFRs are estimated from real data
for female birth cohorts born before 1940.
“Actual” cohort TFRs for later birth cohorts are estimated from actual data
extrapolated with fertility rates from the base year. The large decrease in fertility
from the end of the nineteenth century is the so-called demographic transition that
most developed countries have experienced, first with lower mortality and then with
lower fertility. The evolution of period fertility is given in Figure A.3.
The reduction is caused mainly by fewer women giving birth to three children
or more, as well as more women having only one child. The actual cohort TFRs are
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Figure A.3. Norwegian total fertility rate, 1960–2000.
Source: Statistics Norway.
poorly predicted by the simulation of historical data. One explanation may be that
decreasing TFRs are caused by lower fertility among women with two children or
more, while fertility rates here are adjusted independently of the number of chil-
dren. This is especially problematic as the current fertility rates show most women
stopping at two children. Another explanation may be that periodic variations in
fertility have a different impact on contemporary birth cohorts of fertile women,
while we adjust all fertility rates in one year by the same factor, independent of
age.
The large variations in the annual number of births are an important key to
understanding the dynamics of the projections using the MOSART model. One
aspect of Norwegian fertility is the low number of births that occurred between
World War I and World War II, probably because of economic depression. Contrary
to many other developed countries, this will give low or no growth in the number
of old persons toward 2010.
Nuptiality
Marital status and choice of spouse are simulated with the focus on women. Mar-
riages are simulated for unmarried women, depending on age and marital status
(unmarried, widowed, divorced). If a marriage occurs, the age of a woman’s hus-
band is drawn depending on her own age, while an unmarried man of this age is
chosen at random. Divorce is simulated for married women; if a divorce occurs,
a woman’s husband is also divorced. Marriages and divorces are simulated with
transition probabilities from Kravdal (1986) for the year 1984 with no adjustments.
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Figure A.4. Norwegian population size, 1960–2001.
Source: Statistics Norway.
Nuptiality has changed since 1984, but the intention is to use marriage as a
proxy for the total number of cohabiting couples, and this may have changed less.
The simulation of nuptiality will be replaced in 1996 by a simulation of household
status and relationships, including marriages and divorces. The focus will be on
two-sex couples and their children. Household formation will be implemented in
the MOSART model based on a project described in Keilman and Brunborg (1995).
Population Size
The population size will be proportional to the number of net immigrants, and the
age composition of the population will be decided by the total fertility rate and,
to some degree, by the age distribution of net immigrants. Figure A.4 displays the
population size for the period 1960–2001. Norwegian population growth is outlined
in Figure 5.2. The growth in population size toward the year 2050 will mainly be
among people aged 55 and older. Both larger birth cohorts and lower mortality will
contribute to the growth in the number of older persons after 2010.
Education
The MOSART model simulates educational activities and examinations for each
person depending on gender, age, and the previous year’s educational activity and
attainment. The current educational transition probabilities are estimated from all
transitions in the Norwegian education system [see Andreassen et al. (1993) for
details].
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It is planned to replace the educational model reported here by educational tran-
sition probabilities that also depend on unemployment, relative wages, and capacity
in the education system. Education is an important covariate for other events in the
MOSART model, such as mortality, disability, and labor-force participation. One
aspect of education as a covariate is that most adults keep the same educational
attainment throughout their life course. A person with a low or high educational
level will therefore have systematically low or high labor-force participation across
his/her life course. Measured against the cross-section of the population, the num-
ber of additional years of education increased from 2.2 in 1960 to 4.7 in 1987.
During 1988, unemployment increased from 2% to almost 5% of the labor force,
and this may explain the abrupt increase in the number of pupils and students since
1988. The number of pupils and students according to educational subjects has
also become unequal, with a smaller growth in pupils and students in vocational
training, technology, and economics.
Projections: The Number of Pupils and Students
The number of pupils and students continues to increase even with a “constant”
propensity to study. One explanation may be that we have adjusted gross flows into
and out of the education system with a large net inflow. The number of pupils and
students must then continue to increase before the gross outflow—as a percentage
of the total stock—matches the constant and high gross inflow. Another reason may
be that a strongly increasing education level will lead to a higher propensity to study
among persons older than 25 years. The efficiency in the education system being
low does not imply that the average Norwegian will reach university graduate level.
To a large degree, the low efficiency is caused by pupils and students changing
subjects rather pursuing the education they set out to pursue.
This may have changed because of recent reforms in the education system.
Persons with unknown educational attainment comprise young people who have
not yet finished primary school and (new) immigrants. In the MOSART model
all young people are assumed to have finished primary school before the age of
17, while 2% finish later (mostly young immigrants). This explains why too many
young people have unknown educational attainment in the simulation of historical
data.
All “net immigrants” are assigned unknown education as their educational at-
tainment. However, many young immigrants finish primary school after coming to
Norway, without being registered as a pupil or student. The MOSART model does
not capture this transition, and this explains why too many persons over 30 have
unknown education in the simulation of historical data.
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Public pension benefits
The national insurance scheme (NIS) was established in 1967 and handles all gen-
eral public pension benefits in Norway. See Norwegian Ministry of Health and
Social Affairs (1995) for an overview. The MOSART model simulates entry into
public pension schemes based on old age, disability, widow(er)hood, and early re-
tirement. Disability pensioners are recruited from a wide age group, and the risk of
disability has shown large variations during the last decades. The entry into disabil-
ity is therefore an important transition in the MOSART model. Other transitions in
pension status, including exits, are either more rare or related to other events such
as age limits or widow(er)hood.
The MOSART model calculates NIS pension benefits for pensioners in the
model population based on simulated labor-force participation and other charac-
teristics included in the simulation. Several important benefits are not included in
this version of the MOSART model. Persons with severe health problems often
participate in a rehabilitation program for several years before drawing a disability
pension.
This version of the MOSART model includes labor-force participation but not
absence due to unemployment and sickness (at the personal level). In any case,
spells of unemployment and sickness are often too short to be handled properly by
the time unit used in the MOSART model, that is, the calendar year. Many persons,
typically white-collar workers, supplement their NIS pension benefits with other
pension schemes, among which are the pension scheme guaranteeing all civil ser-
vants a pension benefit including NIS of 66% of the final salary. Pension schemes
outside the NIS are not included in this version of the MOSART model.
Disability Pension
Persons with a permanently reduced ability to work due to disease or accident can
be granted a disability pension from the national insurance scheme. The ability
to work must be reduced by at least 50%. The benefit equals the old-age pension
benefit that the person would have received if he/she had continued to work until
retirement age. Persons who are not working at present may be granted a disability
pension on the basis of domestic work or the anticipation of future jobs. Never-
theless, most disability pensioners were participating in the labor force when the
disability occurred.
After one year of sick leave and often an attempt at rehabilitation, the disabled
person can apply to the national insurance administration for a disability pension.
If the benefit is granted, projections using the MOSART model indicate that more
than 95% of the disabled continue to draw disability pensions until retirement age
(67 years) or until they die. Until recently the social insurance system in Norway
has lacked the general concept of early retirement, and the disability pension may
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well have served as a flexible retirement age. By the retirement age of 67, 45% of
the population were disability pensioners, while survivors’ pensions accounted for
7%, implying that 52% of the population were receiving an NIS pension benefit
before drawing their old-age pension. Early retirement, however, accounted for
only 4% of the population at the age of 66 in 1993. See NOU (1990:17) for a broad
discussion on the disability pension in Norway.
Transition Probabilities for Disability Pension
The model draws for all persons aged 16 to 66 who are not already disabled which
individuals will draw a disability pension. For those who are already disability
pensioners, the model draws the degree of disability and whether they will reenter
the labor force. The risk of disability depends on gender, age, year, marital status,
educational attainment, and labor-force participation. The covariates are estimated
separately for men and women using maximum likelihood over a logit function
based on microdata from the period 1986 to 1989:
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The variables in Equation A.2 have the following meanings:
- p
it
is the probability that person i will enter disability pension in year t;
- X
it
is a row vector of characteristics for person i in year t;
- 
it
is a column vector of coefficients for each characteristic;
- 
t
is an adjustment factor/dummy variable for each year t.
Education level is important: those with only a primary-school education have
a tenfold-greater risk of drawing disability pension than university graduates. See
Fredrikssen and Spurkland (1993) for a more detailed presentation.
Old Age Pension, Survivors’ Pension, and Early Retirement
The general retirement age is 67 years in Norway, and the pension benefit is tested
against any labor-market earnings the pensioner may have until he/she reaches the
age of 70. After 70 the benefit is granted unconditionally, and employees are often
obliged to retire at this age, for example, from the public services. The retire-
ment age was reduced from 70 years to the current level of 67 years in 1973. All
persons already receiving a pension benefit or who have no labor-market earnings
are assumed to have become old-age pensioners when they reach 67 years. The
MOSART model draws if employees retire at age of 67 years, and two out of three
do this in the simulation.
Toward 2040 the number of old-age pensioners will increase by 80%, with
nearly half the increase caused by lower mortality. Early retirement was introduced
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around 1989 as an agreement between the government and the labor-market or-
ganizations, and approximately two-thirds of the labor force are entitled to early
retirement at the age of 64. The benefit equals the old-age pension benefit that a
person would have received from the NIS if he/she had continued to work until the
general retirement age of 67. Less than 25% of those entitled to do so retired before
67 in 1993, but the arrangement is growing in popularity. Widows and (widowers)
may be granted a survivor’s pension from the NIS until they reach the age of 67 and
begin drawing the old-age pension. The benefit includes the late spouse’s pension
entitlement and is tested against the pensioner’s own labor-market earnings.
How Pension Entitlements Are Calculated
Pension benefits from the national insurance scheme are based on the entitlements
that each person achieves during his/her working life. These entitlements are guar-
anteed by the government and cannot be rescinded, although their value can be
changed through adjustments to the basic pension unit (see below). Existing pen-
sion entitlements will therefore have an impact on the Norwegian economy for
decades ahead. A description of how pension entitlements are calculated is given
in this section.
Basic Pension Unit
NIS has its own pension measurement unit called the basic pension unit (BPU),
with a value of 50,603 NOK in the initial period. The BPU is used to calculate
pension entitlements and adjust pension benefits according to inflation and general
growth in wealth. The intentions of the current laws regulating NIS are a BPU in-
creasing at the same rate as the wage level. Other rules for calculating entitlements
and benefits are held constant, including the special supplement.
Pension benefits
NIS benefits to old-age, disability, and survivor pensioners consist of three ele-
ments:
Pension benefit = basic pension + maximum (special supplement, supplemen-
tary pension)
A pensioner married to a pensioner receives a basic pension of 0.75 BPUs,
while other pensioners receive 1 BPU. The special supplement was 0.6 BPUs for
most pensioners in 1995. The sum of the basic pension and the special supplement
is the minimum pension benefit that all pensioners are guaranteed. The supple-
mentary pension is based on previous labor-market earnings, including wages, in-
come as a self-employed person, sick-leave benefits, unemployment benefits, and
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maternity-leave benefits. Each year, from the age of 17 to 69, a person’s labor-
market earnings are translated into pension points using the BPU of the year the
income was earned. The main rule for calculating the pension point is that labor-
market earnings exceeding 1 BPU, the basic pension, are divided by the BPU.
Labor-market earnings exceeding 6 BPU are divided by 3 BPU, and labor-market
earnings exceeding 12 BPU are ignored, constituting an income ceiling on the earn-
ing of pension entitlements. The final pension point is calculated as the average of
the 20 largest positive pension points, while pension point years are the number
of years with labor-market earnings above 1 BPU. The supplementary pension is
calculated using the BPU at the time the pension benefit is received
Supplementary pension = supplementary pension rate  [minimum (pension-
point years, 40) /40] BPU final pension point
The supplementary pension rate represents a (marginal) benefit–wage ratio with
a current value of 42%. The second term, pension-point years divided by 40,
represents the earning-time percentage. The last term, BPUfinal pension point,
represents an income base and is very approximately the former income level as
employee indexed with the growth in the BPU. This approximation is rough be-
cause income below 1 BPU and over 6 BPU weighs little or nothing. Equation A.3
shows how pension benefits vary with previous labor-market earnings under cer-
tain strict conditions, especially that prices, labor-market earnings, and the BPU are
held constant over the career. The equation also represents the case where labor-
market earnings and the BPU grow at the same rate and all nominal amounts are
wage-deflated. Note that the NIS is progressive, meaning that the ratio of benefits
to wages decreases strictly with increasing income level. Average full-time earnings
were roughly 210,000 NOK in 1993, implying that most persons are unaffected by
the income ceiling of 6 and 12 BPUs.
Pension point  
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If: BPU  Income  12 BPU
 If: Income  12 BPU
(A.3)
The ratio of the NIS pension benefit to previous labor-market earnings will
be 50%–55% with a previous income of 180,000 NOK and 40 pension-point years.
After tax the ratio is roughly 60%–65% at this income level, depending on personal
tax deductions. The properties of the supplementary pension show the importance
of the distribution of labor-market earnings among persons and over the life course.
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Other Sources for Pension Entitlements
Disability pensioners are granted a computed pension point for each year of dis-
ability until retirement age as a compensation for lost opportunities in terms of
earning pension entitlements. The computed pension point is either the average of
the pension points over the three years before disability occurred or the average of
the best half of all pension points the person may have earned. The latter alternative
is omitted in this version of the MOSART model. If disability occurs before the
age of 23 years, the disability pensioner is granted a computed pension point of 3.3,
as if he/she were born disabled.
Persons with children younger than 7 years or other extensive family-care obli-
gations are granted a pension point of 3.0 each year if their own labor-market earn-
ings yield a lower pension point. The level corresponds roughly to the average pen-
sion point for unskilled women working full-time; this family-care pension point
was introduced in 1992. Widows (and widowers) can choose between their own
supplementary pension and 55% of their own or late spouse’s supplementary pen-
sion. If the late spouse died before retirement age, the supplementary pension is
calculated as if he/she had started to draw disability pension the same year.
Transitional NIS rules were established in 1967 under which only labor-force
participation after 1967 yields entitlements to a supplementary pension. People
born before 1937 are partly compensated for missing the opportunity of earning
full pension entitlements (the same as earning 40 pension-point years). For these
birth cohorts, the supplementary pension in Equation A.3 is divided by the maxi-
mum possible number of pension-point years instead of the usual 40 years, with a
minimum of 20 years, and only for the part of the pension point not exceeding a
level of 4.
The NIS was reformed in 1992 to make the system less favorable to those with
high incomes. The income limit in Equation A.3, where labor-market earnings are
divided by three times the BPU, was reduced from 8 BPUs to 6 BPUs in 1992,
though it did not affect pension entitlements already earned. The supplementary
pension rate was reduced from 0.45 to 0.42, without affecting entitlements already
earned. Pension-point years earned before 1992 are multiplied by 0.45, while the
remaining years in Equation A.3 are multiplied by the new rate of 0.42. The reform
also affected the future computed pension points of existing disability pensioners.
As mentioned, the national insurance scheme was established in 1967, and it
took decades before the system of supplementary pensions matured. The differ-
ences in supplementary pension according to gender and birth year excluded inher-
ited entitlements. This figure is based on a projection with a simulated initial pop-
ulation and a projection with the real initial population; the discrepancies between
the two projections are discussed later. Both projections use the 1993 perspectives.
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The supplementary pensions are decided by entitlements already earned for
persons in the real initial population born until 1923. To an increasing degree,
supplementary pensions for younger birth cohorts are decided by the simulation,
and birth cohorts born after 1972 are purely simulated. The supplementary pensions
are larger for younger birth cohorts because these birth cohorts have a longer series
of pension points in the NIS. The transition rules give favorable pension benefits
to those born after 1917 who have worked every year from 1967 until they are 69
years old, while some years without labor-market earnings can reduce the pension
benefits very strongly. Theoretically, persons born in 1937 can achieve full pension
entitlements.
Those born in 1950 will, however, be the first birth cohort whose full working
career is included in the calculation of supplementary pensions, and the system
will continue to mature until then. The aforementioned 1992 reform explains why
men born after 1950 will receive smaller supplementary pensions than men born
in the forties. The gender differences in wages also decrease in the projection
period because of a stronger growth in the education level of women. When average
wages per man–year remain constant, the income level decreases by 3% for men.
Supplementary pensions continue to grow for women born after 1950, the reason
being the large increase in female labor-force participation over the last 25 years.
The short-term variations in the average old-age pension benefits over the last
25 years are caused by adjustments in the BPU and the special supplement. Even
when birth cohorts with full entitlements reach retirement age in 2020, the average
old-age pension benefits continue to grow until all pensioners have full entitle-
ments.
While the NIS today is far more favorable to male patterns of labor-force par-
ticipation, the matured NIS is clearly more favorable to women than men compared
with an actuarially correct system. When the NIS is fully matured, the average fe-
male old-age pensioner will receive a benefit that will be 92% of that of the average
male pensioner, even though her labor-market earnings would have been only 67%
of his. Several aspects of the NIS contribute to this equalization.
First, the system is progressive in the sense that the benefit/wage ratio decreases
with increasing income. A variable income is also favored because the system con-
siders only the 20 best income years and does not give extra credit to working
careers that are longer than 40 years. This means that a limited period with reduced
income has no direct effect on the pension entitlements, for example, women work-
ing part-time during the years they have small children.
Supplementary Pensions for Male Birth Cohorts Born Before 1960
For these birth cohorts the pension entitlements that have already been earned
are important, and any discrepancies can be explained by shortcomings in the
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simulation of labor-market earnings. The difference is roughly 5% for male birth
cohorts born around 1930 and 10% for men born around 1945. There are several
possible reasons for this. Older persons earn too little in the labor market, while
those under 30 earn too much. As labor-market earnings before 1967 are ignored
in the NIS, supplementary pensions for the older birth cohorts are reduced. For
younger birth cohorts this effect evens out, as the calculations include both the
too-high earnings before the age of 30 and the too-low ones after 30.
As only the 20 best pension points are used to calculate the level of the sup-
plementary pension, the supplementary pension level is reduced for all male birth
cohorts in the simulations. The two aforementioned errors in the distribution of
earnings across age groups/the life course may explain the discrepancies in supple-
mentary pensions for men born between 1910 and 1960. We believe that the effect
of this will be for female pensions to be relatively well predicted in the future and
for male supplementary pensions to be underpredicted. The latter discrepancy may
be of the order of 4% if the distribution of earnings in the future is the same as in
the 1967–1993 period, with widow(ers) receiving 55% of the sum of their own and
their late spouse’s supplementary pension, if this exceeds their own supplementary
pension.
Indexing of the basic pension unit changes in the value of the BPU will, in
effect, represent the indexing of all existing pension entitlements in the NIS from
the point in time at which the entitlements were earned. If the BPU and wages
increase at the same rate, people in the labor force and existing NIS pensioners
will see their entitlement grow at roughly the same rate. Pensioners with only
minimum pension benefits may be compensated through an increase in the special
supplement. Although the value of the minimum pension benefit increased relative
to wages per man–year until 1980, it has changed little relative to the wage level
since then.
At the same time, the special supplement time will increase to compensate
those pensioners who receive minimum pension benefits; thus, in the long run, the
maximum supplementary pension will be worth less than the special supplement.
By 2090 no supplementary pensions will exceed the value of the special sup-
plement, and the average old-age pension benefits will be the average minimum
pension benefit, at that time 57,000 NOK. Until recently, most pensioners have
received only the minimum pension benefit and therefore had little interest in the
BPU as long as the special supplements increased sufficiently. This is changing,
and interest in the BPU on the part of pensioners and labor-market organizations is
increasing. The high and unstable inflation during the period 1970–1981 may also
have complicated the indexing of the BPU. The final pension points are calculated
from the 40 rather than the 20 best income years, with no transitional rules. A real
reform cannot affect entitlements that have already been earned, and with proper
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transitional rules the full effect would not have taken place until the year 2060 [see
Fredrikssen and Koren (1993) for examples].
Labor-force participation
Labor-force participation is simulated in two steps in the MOSART model. First,
the number of persons in the labor force and person–years are projected based on
definitions and data from Statistics Norway’s Labor-Force Sample Surveys. Sec-
ond, each person’s earnings are simulated in such a way that the number of income
recipients and their earnings are consistent with the labor force projected above.
The difference between the labor force and the number of those receiving income
is caused by the first being a yearly average and the latter also including all those
who have worked only for parts of the year. Each of the two steps is described in
the next two sections, while Fredrikssen and Spurkland (1993) also describe the
estimated parameters.
Labor-Force Projections
The MOSART model projects the labor force and number of person–years by
adding each person’s calculated labor-force participation rate (LFPR) and expected
working hours. The LFPR and working hours are estimated from the labor-force
sample surveys from 1991 and depend on gender, age, children, marital status,
educational activities, educational attainment, and pension status. The LFPR and
working hours calculated for each person do not, however, depend on their previous
year’s participation in the labor-force. The projections show only the effect on the
labor force of changes in population size and composition. In the projections the
estimated LFPRs and working hours are adjusted to the respective level and then
held constant.
The effects of educational activities and a disability pension on the LFPR and
working hours are estimated by combining the labor-force sample survey with ad-
ministrative registers. The labor-force sample survey in Norway has only condi-
tional questions about educational activity or disability; it therefore overlooks the
fact that a person working (part-time) may also be a student or disability pensioner.
After combining the two sources, we find that disability pensioners have an average
LFPR of 16%, while pupils and students have an average LFPR of 39%.
The effect on the labor force of one more person taking the disability pension is
the difference in LFPR before and after the disability occurred, roughly 65 percent-
age points in the MOSART model. For example, if the risk of taking the disability
pension increases, then 100 more disability pensioners reduce the labor force by
approximately 65 people. The same figure for pupils and students is 40 people in
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the short term and none in the long term because people with greater educational
attainment remain in the work force for longer.
Labor-Force Participation Rates
Historic figures and projections regarding employment in Norway from 1960 to
2020 are given in Figure A.5a and Figure A.5b, which show the development in
the number of hours worked and the employment rate. For men there is a strong
decrease in the number of hours worked, while for females the number of hours
worked increased slightly in the first half of the period, which leads to a gender con-
vergence. Moreover, employment rates increased for women from 1960 to 1990,
while men’s employment rates fell somewhat in the same period. Female participa-
tion in the labor force increased in spite of changes in educational activities and the
disability pension. The gender differences in LFPRs have decreased dramatically,
but they are still bigger in Norway than in the other Nordic countries. The LFPRs
in the projections increase because the age composition of the population changes
and the education level increases. The education level increases more for women
than for men, and this explains the decrease in gender difference in the projections.
Labor Supply
The projection of the future labor force is described in Figure 1.6. The strong in-
crease in the 1970s resulted from the increase in female labor-force participation,
already mentioned. The year 1987 was a peak year both in terms of the number
of people entering the labor force and the LFPRs. The problems in the labor mar-
ket since 1988 have especially affected people aged 16–24, leading to LFPRs that
are 12 percentage points lower and a corresponding increase in the propensity to
study. The labor force increases by 200,000 people toward 2020 with the year 2000
perspectives (see Table 1.6); two-thirds of the increase is due to there being more
people in the 25–66 age group, and the rest is explained by an increasing level of
education.
The education level will be higher among women than among men, and nurs-
ing and teaching will especially contribute to this. Gender differences, however,
remain, with caring professions dominated by women and vocational training and
technology dominated by men. Within secondary school the percentage of three-
year courses (skilled labor) will increase at the expense of the percentage of one-
year courses (basic education).
Labor-Market Earnings
The simulation of labor-market earnings is divided into two substeps. The first
step simulates if or not a person receives labor-market earnings, and the second
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Figure A.5. Hours worked (a) and employment rate (b), 1960–2020.
Source: Statistics Norway.
step decides how large this income is. Labor-market earnings comprise wages,
self-employed income, sick-leave benefits, unemployment benefits, and maternity-
leave benefits. The probabilities of receiving labor-market earnings depend on the
same characteristics as the LFPRs, for instance gender, age, children, marital status,
educational activities, educational attainment, and pension status. Labor-market
earnings also depend on previous years’ earnings, and in this sense the simula-
tion describes gross flows into and out of the labor force. The probabilities are
estimated using maximum likelihood over a logit function with microdata for the
period 1985–1988:
p
it
 
expX
it
  
t

  expX
it
  
t

(A.4)
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where:
- p
it
is the probability that person i will enter disability pension in year t;
- X
it
is a row vector of characteristics for person i in year t;
-  is a column vector of coefficients for each characteristic; and
- 
t
is an adjustment factor/dummy variable for each year t.
The probabilities in Equation A.4 are adjusted each year by changing the “con-
stant” term 
t
such that the number of recipients of labor-market earnings in the
simulation is consistent with the projected labor force. Each person is assigned a
probability r
i
of being in the labor force if he/she is a wage earner, and this prob-
ability can be interpreted as the percentage of the year this person is working. For
most people, r
i
is 100%, while pupils, students, disability pensioners, and those
beginning or quitting work during the year have lower percentages. Consistency
is achieved when the projected labor-force year t   P
i
p
it
r
i
. The value of 
t
is
found by an iteration over a first-order Taylor polynomial with pit as a function of

t
. With the drawing method in the MOSART model, the simulated number of in-
come recipients also equals the adjusted number. If the model draws that a person
is earning, the income level is simulated by:
Y
it
  expX
it
 
it
 
t
 (A.5)
where:
- Y
it
is labor-market earnings for person i in year t;
- X
it
is a row vector of characteristics for person i in year t;
-  is a column vector with covariates for each characteristic;
- 
it
is a residual for person i in year t;
- 
t
is an adjustment factor/dummy variable for each year t.
The level of labor-market earnings depends on the same characteristics as the
probability of receiving labor-market earnings, and the covariates in  are esti-
mated using GLS on microdata for the period 1985–1988. An exponential function
is chosen to avoid nonpositive income amounts. Total labor-market earnings are
restricted to equal the product of the projected person–years M
t
and an exogenous
wage W
t
per man–year:
X
i
Y
it
  M
t
W
t
(A.6)
The adjustment factor in Equation A.6 is found by first calculating the income
for each income recipient without 
t
:

t
  ln
M

t
W
t
P
i
Y
without 
it
(A.7)
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The labor-market earnings for each income recipient are then adjusted by mul-
tiplying by the exponent of 
t
. The estimation of  in Equation A.5 includes a so-
called disturbance term, which is included in the simulation by the personal residu-
als 
it
. The intention is to capture variations in labor-market earnings not explained
by the model X
it
. In the real initial population, the residuals 
it
are calculated for
each person from the difference between the actual labor-market earnings in 1988
and the expected income by Equation A.7. Residuals 
it
are drawn for new persons
and persons without stable labor-market earnings using the observed distribution
of the disturbance term from the estimation of the equation. Each person keeps the
same residual 
it
throughout his/her entire career in the baseline alternative.
Contribution rates
A major purpose of the MOSART model is to carry out analyses of the economic
consequences of an aging population or, more precisely, how taxes will increase as
a result of increasing public expenditure related to old persons. This version of the
MOSART model excludes important parts of this expenditure, for example, health
care for old persons.
Furthermore, the tax rules are represented in a very simple way as the MOSART
model lacks important income components and excludes behavioral responses to
changes in the tax level. However, we believe that these analyses are of interest as
a large variety of sensitivity analyses are presented. An analysis of the tax system
and public pension benefits requires a clarification of how public pension benefits
are financed and how pensioners are taxed. For simplicity, we assume that current
public pension benefits are financed through current taxes, the so-called pay-as-
you-go system or PAYG. Pensioners also have special tax rules to compensate for
lower income, old age, and health problems [see Arneberg and Gravningsmyhr
(1994) for details]. The question here is how this tax gap will develop in the future.
A reasonable approach may be that income after tax increases at the same rate for
each pensioner as for wage earners. This can be achieved through adjustments to
the special tax rules for pensioners and the special supplement. The basic pension
unit is, however, an inappropriate means of adjusting income after tax for pension-
ers, as it will affect the earning of pension entitlements. In the absence of a more
sophisticated representation of the tax rules, we assume that pensioners pay half as
much tax as wage earners. The average tax rate due to public pension benefits, the
contribution rate, is then calculated by:
Contribution Rate  
P
Pension benefits
P
Labor-market earnings + 0.5  
P
i
Pension benefits (A.8)
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Mean constrained drawing method
The main drawing method in the MOSART model is described in this Appendix,
while Fredrikssen (1996) gives a more detailed discussion of the method and its
effects and suggests how to solve the practical problems. The drawing method
in the MOSART model does not complicate computer programs, and computer
runtimes increase by less than 1% in this version of the MOSART model. Standard
deviations on projection results induced by stochastic drawing are 70%–90% lower
as compared with the random number method (see below).
The Problems of Stochastic Drawing
Dynamic microsimulation models are generally solved by stochastic drawing, often
called the Monte Carlo technique. In the random number method the computer gen-
erates so-called random numbers with uniform distribution (0.1), and if the random
number is smaller than the probability, the event occurs. This stochastic drawing
generates an extra uncertainty in the projections often called Monte Carlo Vari-
ability (MCV). The MCV is measured in this study by relative empirical standard
deviation across replicated simulations, where the only difference is the sequence
of random numbers.
The MCV is unnecessary for most social-planning purposes and is often used
as an important critique of microsimulation. In the MOSART model we have found
the MCV with the random number method to be troublesome when two projections
with different underlying assumptions are being compared. The MCV with the
random number method is also troublesome when year-to-year growth rates are
being estimated and for long-run projections.
The idea of the drawing method in the MOSART model is to constrain the sim-
ulated number of events to its expectation value without changing each person’s
probability of experiencing the event. With exogenous probabilities, the expecta-
tion value of the model is the sum of the transition probabilities. This constraining
is easy when probabilities are (group-wise) homogeneous and, for example, used
when a stratified sample comprises a given number of people from each stratum.
The drawing method in the MOSART model handles heterogeneous binomial prob-
abilities.
Some Related Methods
With a limited knowledge of statistical literature, we cannot exclude the existence
of any similar and better method of reducing MCV than offered in Equation A.15.
However, the related methods discussed below do not offer any method that is
able to both handle heterogeneous binomial probabilities, be unbiased, be easy to
implement in a computer program, and require hardly any computer resources.
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Orcutt et al. (1986) is a major contribution on microsimulation in social planning,
and the introduction by Orcutt (1986) includes a discussion of variance reduction
methods. We have also found useful the discussion in a preliminary version of
Beckering (1995), a dissertation including one paper on variance reduction methods
in microsimulation models. The discussion in Orcutt (1986) and Beckering (1995)
is related to the drawing method in the MOSART model.
The brute method is to increase the sample or use the average across replicated
simulations. This implies that any interesting methods of reducing MCV must be
efficient in the sense that they do not complicate the computer programs too much
or overly increase the computer runtimes. However, a four-times-larger sample
normally reduces the standard deviation to only one-half.
The next idea is to present the sum of the transition probabilities as the sim-
ulation result, which gives the expectation value of the simulation. This method
is used in the MOSART model in the projection of labor-force years and person–
years. However, the method is insufficient in a model with multiple periods because
the number of possible paths for each person will be too large. The process of aging
the population must draw what happens into the next period. If the MCV related to
the number of births and persons who survive is large, this will also affect the sum
of the probabilities in subsequent periods.
Two simulations can be executed with the same sequence of random numbers,
known as the method of common random numbers. This reduces the MCV on
the difference between the two simulations, as only people with changed proba-
bilities can experience different events in the two simulations. Unfortunately, the
method requires the sequence of possible events to be the same, which, in general,
is not true in dynamic microsimulation. What events may occur in one period de-
pend heavily on other events in earlier periods, especially births and deaths. In this
version of the MOSART model, pension benefits do not affect any transition prob-
abilities. An analysis where only rules for calculating pension benefits are changed
can be carried out with the method of common random numbers in the MOSART
model.
Orcutt (1986) focuses on a method called alignment, and implementations of
the method can be found in Caldwell (1996) and Galen (1995). First, all persons
are assigned a personal random number, and the unadjusted number of events are
counted as the number of persons with probabilities larger than the assigned ran-
dom number. The discrepancy between the unadjusted number of events and the
expected number is used to calculate an alignment factor, and this may require
sorting or an iteration process. In the second round, all probabilities are multiplied
by the alignment factor, and if the adjusted probability is larger than the assigned
random number an event occurs:
An event occurs if p
i

f
i
 r
i
, where:
- p
i
is the probability that person i will experience the event;
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- r
i
is the random number with uniform distribution (0.1) assigned to person i;
- f
i
is the alignment factor for person i.
The task between the first and second round is to find the proper value of the
alignment factor f
i
that will result in the expected number of events. The alignment
method is similar to the drawing method in the MOSART model in the sense that
alignment can be used to constrain the number of events to the expectation value of
the simulation when probabilities are binomial and heterogeneous. However, the
alignment method requires the simulation model to run through the population at
least twice and perhaps more if the alignment factor f
i
is difficult to calculate. This
means that the alignment method complicates computer programs and increases
computer runtimes more than the drawing method in the MOSART model.
More seriously, the alignment technique introduces a (small) bias that may be
visualized by a simple example. A person with a probability p
i
should on average
experience p
i
events per drawing. If p
i
is 1, the average number of events should
also be 1. However, on some occasions, a small alignment factor f
i
and a large as-
signed random number r
i
will prevent persons with p
i
equal to 1 from experiencing
the event. Furthermore, the number of events per drawing will never exceed 1, and
the average number of events with the alignment method will therefore be less than
1 for persons with p
i
equal to 1.
The alignment method can also be used to adjust the probabilities so that the
simulation is consistent with any reasonable exogenous constraint on the number of
events. See Beckering (1995) and Galen (1995) for a discussion. In the MOSART
model an adjustment against an exogenous number different from the sum of the
(unadjusted) probabilities requires the probabilities to be adjusted before the simu-
lation, which may reduce the advantages of the drawing method in the MOSART
model.
Beckering (1995) claims that most of the remaining methods require the transi-
tion probabilities to be identical within a limited number of subpopulations, which
we call group-wise homogeneous probabilities. Beckering (1995) also suggests and
tests a new drawing method based on sorting that handles multinomial probabilities
but, according to the author, the method is “not easy to implement in a computer
program.”
The Idea of the Drawing Method in the MOSART Model
Each person i is assumed to have a probability p
i
of experiencing the event. The
population is then divided into drawing groups within each of which the sum of
the transition probabilities is exactly 1. The practical problems of making draw-
ing groups and of rounding is addressed later. The model then draws for each
conditionally on the events of the previous persons in the drawing group:
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
p
i


P
ji
p
j
 if no event has occured in
this drawing group, yet
 if an event has occured in
this drawing group
(A.9)
where:
- i is the person subject to drawing;
- j  i are all persons in the drawing group that have already been exposed.
The drawing is executed by comparing the adjusted probability with a random
number with uniform distribution (0.1) generated by the computer. If the random
number is smaller than the adjusted probability, the event occurs for person i. The
probability r
i
of person i experiencing an event (described in Equation A.9) can be
written as:
r
i
  Ep
adjusted
i
   p
i

X
ji
p
j
  q
i
    q
i
 (A.10)
In Equation A.10 the following assumptions hold:
- q
i
is the probability of no event before person i;
-  q
i
 is the probability of an event before person i.
Two persons within the same drawing group cannot experience an event, and
the probability   q
i
 of any of them experiencing an event is the sum of the
probability of each of them experiencing the event. Using Equation A.11 this gives:
 q
i
 
X
ji
r
j
(A.11)
Equation A.10 can now be simplified by substituting Equation A.11 into Equa-
tion A.10:
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i

X
ji
p
j
  
X
ji
r
j
 (A.12)
It is now easy to show by iteration that the probability r
i
in Equation A.12 is
equal to the probability p
i
:
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The method described in Equation A.13 does not therefore alter each person’s
probability of experiencing an event in this simple example. The last person within
a drawing group must experience the event if no-one else in this group has, as the
probabilities add up to 1:
p
adjusted
last
  p
last


X
jlast
p
last
   p
last

  p
last
   p
last

p
last
   (A.14)
In Equation A.14, each drawing group will therefore end up with one and only
one event, which is also the expected number of events within each drawing group.
With the correct number within each drawing group, the number of events for the
total population is also correct.
Practical Solutions of Making Drawing Groups and Rounding
The drawing groups are formed by one person being simulated at a time and each
new person being added to the current drawing group. At the end of a drawing
group a rounding problem occurs, or more precisely the probabilities do not gener-
ally add up to exactly 1. The transition probability of this last person is “divided”
between the drawing group that is to be closed and the new drawing group, by
adjusting Equation A.9.
p
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




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




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Max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p
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P
j
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j
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(A.15)
where:
- j are all members in the present drawing group
- p
old
i
  
P
ji
p
j
- p
new
i
  p
i
 p
old
i
If 
P
j
pj   open a new drawing group and include in it the probability pnew
i
as the first probability and also any event by p
new
i
 p
old
i

.
If the sum of the probabilities is less than one, the expected number of events
in Equation A.15 is the same as in Equation A.13, or else the expected number of
events in Equation A.15 can be written as:
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where:
- s is the probability of no events before person i in the present drawing group.
The expected number of events in the new drawing group for the person cross-
ing two drawing groups is pnew
i
, and this probability is also included in the new
drawing group. One sequence of drawing groups is used for different groups of the
population for each event to make each drawing group as homogeneous as possible.
This eliminates the uncertainty not only about the total number of simulated
events but also about the number of events within each group of the population.
This also contributes to reducing the uncertainty caused by which probabilities will
“survive” to the next period.
Testing
One test is performed by comparing the percentage of persons becoming disabil-
ity pensioners sorted by the probability of experiencing this event. We find that
the observed percentages fit the underlying probabilities and that the method is not
biased toward small or large probabilities. Moreover, a simple model is presented
with one event, with 100 persons with transition probabilities randomly and uni-
formly distributed (0.1). Replicated simulations across this simple model indicate
that the probability of experiencing the event is the same as the used probability,
independent of the size of the probability or the ordering of persons.
The drawing method in Equation A.15 introduces a strong negative correla-
tion of experiencing an event among members of the same drawing group. Where
independence between the drawings is required, care must be taken to avoid two
persons entering the same drawing group. This may be two persons from the same
household, or if a drawing group crosses two years, the same person being included
twice.
Computer Resources
The MOSART model is programmed in the object-oriented language Simula [see
Kirkerud (1989) for details]. The object orientation simplifies the implementation
of the drawing procedure in Equation A.15. The drawing procedure is defined as a
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class including the necessary counting variables; each type of event is assigned its
own drawing object, and the procedure is invoked by writing:
If name-of-drawing-object.event(probability) then ......
The counting variables are hidden within the object and properly updated. The
drawing “procedure” with the random number method requires approximately the
same amount of source code:
If probability Uniform  u then ......
Classification of education
Below is a description of how education is classified in the MOSART model. The
level of education is measured by the minimum number of years a full-time pupil or
student normally takes to finish his/her education. The primary school level is set
at 9 years, irrespective of the actual length. Secondary school comprises those aged
10–12; higher education 13–19; graduate level 17–18; post-graduate education 19.
The levels at which each educational subject can be studied/finishes are shown in
brackets. See Andreassen et al. (1993) for how the classification of education in the
MOSART model corresponds to the official classification of education in Statistics
Norway (1989). See Vassenden (1993) for a description of the educational registers
used in the MOSART model.
Unknown Education
The education registers lack information on approximately 100,000 adults, mainly
people who failed to report their own educational attainment in the population cen-
sus.
Primary School
All people with only primary school are assigned an educational level of 9 years.
Secondary School
Secondary school comprises the three first years after primary school. Students in
higher education are mainly recruited from academic-track schools, but in reality
most subjects give access to higher education. Approximately 10% of academic-
track-school candidates participate in various basic courses (before they enter
higher education). Academic-track school (10–12, 12), administration and eco-
nomics (10–12, 10–12), vocational training (10–12, 10–12), various basic courses;
domestic science, military subjects (not including compulsory military service),
folkehøyskole (10, 10), other (10–12, 10–12).
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Higher Education
Higher education comprises all education beyond secondary school and requires
a secondary school education providing entitlement to higher education, for exam-
ple, academic-track schooling. Technology (13–19, 13–17+19), administration and
economics (13–16, 13–16), nursing (13–16, 15+16), teaching (13–18, 13–16+18),
preliminary tests (13, 13), humanities (13–19, 13–19), social sciences (13–19, 13–
19), natural sciences (13–19, 13–19), law (15–19, 15+17+19), medicine (13–19,
18+19), dentistry (13–19, 17+19), other (13–19, 13–19).
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